CAVALRY  TACTICS 


Illustrated  by  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 


TOGETHER    WITH 


MANY  INTERESTING  FACTS  IMPORTANT 
FOR  CAVALRY  TO  KNOW. 


BY  CAPTAIN  ALONZO  GRAY, 

Fourteenth  U.  S.   Cavalry. 


FART    I. 


U.  S.  CAVALRY  ASSOCIATION, 
FORT  LEAVBNWORTH,  KANSAS. 

1910. 


COPYRIGHT,  1910, 
BY  ALONZO  GRAY. 


PRKS3  OF  KETCHK80N   PRINTING     CO. 
LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS. 


PREFACE. 


In  pursuing  the  subject  of  cavalry  tactics  I  found  that, 
while  certain  principles  were  accepted  as  correct,  I  was  not 
familiar  with  the  battles  in  which  these  principles  were  ap 
plied.  I  believe  it  to  be  true  that  there  is  no  modern  prin 
ciple  of  cavalry  tactics,  which  is  accepted  today  as  correct  by 
any  first-class  military  power,  which  was  not  fully  illustrated 
during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.  No  war  which  has  occufed 

A 

since  that  time  has,  in  any  respect,  added  to  the  cavalry  tac 
tics  which  were  in  daily  use  during  that  great  struggle. 

I  give  it  as  my  humble  opinion  that  increased  range  of 
firearms  and  the  addition  of  machine  guns,  increase  the 
sphere  of  action  of,  and  necessity  for,  well-organized  cavalry  ; 
that  bicycles,  motorcycles  and  automobiles  will  prove  to  be 
only  valuable  auxiliaries  to  cavalry  in  transporting  informa 
tion  back  to  the  rear,  and  thus  saving  an  unnecessary  expen 
diture  of  horse  flesh ;  and  that  while  flying  machines  may 
bring  information,  by  so  doing  they  will  widen  the  sphere 
of  action  of  good  cavalry  ;  and,  more  than  ever  before,  as  a 
result  of  such  information,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  good 
cavalry  ready  to  move  on  extremely  short  notice. 

In  looking  for  examples  to  illustrate  the  tactical  prin 
ciples  of  cavalry  operations,  I  have  drawn  mostly  from  the 
Records  of  the  Rebellion  (indicated  in  references  by  R.  R.), 
but  have  not  endeavored  to  give  exact  quotations ;  instead  I 
have  quoted  only  so  much  as  is  necessary  to  illustrate  the 
point  involved.  The  illustrations  are  taken  mostly  after  the 
opening  campaign  of  1863,  at  which  time  the  Federal  cavalry 

259819 


reached  anijj  efficient  condition.  At  this  time  the  Confed 
erate  cavalry  was  at  its  best.  (Life  and  campaigns  of  Maj. 
Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  p.  257.) 

The  reason  why  more  Federal  than  Confederate  reports 
are  quoted  is  because  the  former  are  much  more  numerous. 

Whenever  a  report  states  what  happens  to  the  enemy 
or  the  enemy's  losses,  be  the  report  Federal  or  Confederate, 
that  portion  of  it  should  be  accepted  with  great  caution. 

While  the  work  principally  treats  of  tactics,  I  have  in 
corporated  reports  of  such  facts  and  expedients  as  are  use 
ful  for  every  cavalryman  to  know. 

It  is  my  intention  to  follow  this  work,  Part  I,  with  a  work 
on  "Troop  Leading  of  Cavalry,"  wherein  the  decisions  are 
based  on  the  principles  herein  illustrated. 

This  work  is  undertaken  in  the  hope  that  the  lessons 
learned  during  our  great  war  will  not  be  forgotten. 

ALONZO  GRAY. 
Camp  Stotsenburg, 
Pampanga,   P.   I. 
March  31,  1910. 


INTRODUCTION. 


A   OONOI8E    HISTORY    OF    THE    ORGANIZATION    AND   ARMAMENT   OF   THE 
UNITED   STATES   CAVALRY. 


The  first  mounted  force,  consisting  of  one  squad-  March  5, 1792. 
ron,  was  authorized  by  Act  of  Congress  March  5,  1792. 

The  Act  of  March  2,  1799,  authorized  three  regi- March  2, 1799 
ments  of  cavalry,  to  be  composed  of  five  squadrons  of  March  15,1802. 
two   companies   each.     They   were   not   all   raised,   and 
those  which  were  raised  were  mustered  out  March  16, 
1802. 

The  Act  of  April  12,  1808,  authorized  a  regiment  April  12,  isos. 
of  light  dragoons. 

By  Act  of  January  11,  1812,  Congress  ordered  an- January  11,1812 
other  regiment  of  light  dragoons. 

By  Act  of   March   30,    1814,   these   light   dragoon  March  so,  isu. 
regiments    were   consolidated.      The   consolidated    regi 
ment  was  composed  of  eight  troops,  each  consisting  of 
five  officers  and  116  enlisted  men. 

By  Act  of  Congress,  June  15,  1815,  this  regiment  June  15,  isi5. 
was  disbanded. 

Congress,   by   Act   of    March   2,    1833,    authorized 'March 2, im. 
the  raising  of  the  1st  Dragoons.     This  was  the  begin 
ning  of   our  present   cavalry   organization.      The   regi 
ment  w^as  composed  of  ten  companies  to  serve  on  horse 
or  foot  as  might  be  directed. 

On  May  23,  1836,  Congress  authorized  the  raising  May  23,  isse. 
of  another  dragoon  regiment  which  was  to  be  just  like 
the  first.     It  became  the  2d  Dragoons. 

By  an  Act  known  as  the  "Ten  Regiment  Bill"  Con-  Feb.  11, 1347. 
gress,  on  February  11,  1847,  authorized  ten  regiments, 
one  of  which  was  the   3d   Dragoons   and   another   the 
Mounted  Rifles.     Each  of  these  regiments  was  to  have 
two  majors,  the  others  having  only  one. 


1884>  At  the  close  of  the  Mexican  War,  in  the  summer 

of  1848,  the  3d  Dragoons  were  disbanded  and  the 
Mounted  Rifles  mustered  out,  but  immediately  recruited 
and  sent  to  Oregon. 

March 3, 1865.  By  Act   of   March   3,    1855,   Congress   authorized 

two  regular  regiments  of  cavalry.  They  became  the 
First  and  Second  Cavalry. 

May  4,  i86i.  By  presidential  order,  G.  O.   16,  A.   G.  O.,   1861, 

the  3d  Cavalry  was  added  to  the  regular  army.  It 
consisted  of  three  battalions,  each  composed  of  two 
squadrons  of  two  companies  each.  This  order  was  con 
firmed  by  Act  of  Congress  July  29,  1861. 

August  3,  i86i.  All  mounted  troops  were  organized  into  one  arm, 

called  cavalry,  by  Act  of  August  3,  1861.    By  this  act 

The   1st  Dragoons  became  the  1st  Cavalry; 

The  2d  Dragoons  became  the  2d  Cavalry; 

The  Mounted  Rifles  became  the  3d  Cavalry; 

The  1st  Cavalry  became  the  4th  Cavalry; 

The  2d  Cavalry  became  the  5th  Cavalry; 

The  3d  Cavalry  became  the  6th  Cavalry. 

BquaedfirSntioIlof          The  Act  of  J^J  29,   1861,  defines  a  squadron  as 
consisting  of  two  troops  or  companies. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  all  regiments  had  ten 
troops  or  five  squadrons.  The  6th  Cavalry,  formerly 
the  3d,  was,  by  Act  of  Congress,  to  have  twelve  troops 
at  the  time  of  its  organization.  (See  G  .O.  16,  A.  G. 
O.,  May  4,  1861.) 

%  Act  of  Congress  July  17,  1862,  promulgated 
in  G.  O.  91,  A.  G.  O.,  July  29,  1862,  all  United  States 
cavalry  was  organized  as  follows:  Each  regiment  to 
have  1  colonel,  1  lieutenant  colonel,  3  majors,  1  sur 
geon,  1  assistant  surgeon,  1  regimental  adjutant,  1 
regimental  quartermaster,  1  regimental  commissary,  1 
sergeant  major,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  1  commis 
sary  sergeant,  2  hospital  stewards,  1  saddler  sergeant, 
1  chief  trumpeter,  1  chief  farrier  or  blacksmith,  12 
companies  or  troops. 


tnent. 


Each  company  or  troop  to  have  1  captain,  1  first 
lieutenant,  1  second  lieutenant,  1  supernumerary  second 
lieutenant,  1  1st  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  1 
commissary  sergeant,  5  sergeants,  8  corporals,  2  team 
sters,  2  farriers  or  blacksmiths,  1  saddler,  1  wagoner, 
and  78  privates.  Total  100  enlisted. 

G.  O.  No.  7,  A.  G.  O.,  January  7,  1863,  provides 
that  each  troop  or  company  of  United  States  cavalry 
shall  have  from  60  to  78  privates. 

The  volunteer  cavalry  went  out  with  10  troops  per  al™unteer  < 
regiment.  G.  O.  No.  126,  A.  G.  O.,  September  6,  1862, 
directed  that  each  regiment  of  volunteer  cavalry  should 
have  the  same  organization  as  that  prescribed  for  the 
regular  service.  (See  G.  O.  91,  A.  G.  O.,  1862,  above.) 
This  order  directed  that  this  organization  should  be  strict 
ly  adhered  to  by  all  concerned. 

G.  O.  No.  110,  A.  G.  O.,  April  29,  1863,  gave  the 
organization  of  the  volunteer  cavalry  and  but  slightly 
changed  the  above.  It  provided  for  2  trumpeters  per 
troop  and  fixed  the  enlisted  strength  at  the  minimum  of 
82  and  the  maximum  at  100  per  troop. 

By  Act  of  July  28,  1866,  Congress  provided  for  the    July  88,1866. 
organization  of  the  7th,  8th,  9th  and  10th  regiments  of 
cavalry,  and  by  Act  of  February  2,  1901,  it  provided  for    Feb.  2,1901. 
the  llth,  12th,  13th,  14th  and  15th  regiments. 

ARMAMENT. 

During  the  Mexican  War  the  dragoons  were  armed 
with  musketoons,  which  were  carried  on  sling  belts,  ex 
cept  when  marching  the  sling  belt  was  unsnapped.  They 
also  carried  dragoon  sabers  of  Prussian  pattern  and 
horse  pistols. 

The  Mounted  Rifles  were  armed  with  percussion 
rifles  and  Colt's  army  revolvers,  but  no  sabers. 

The  cavalry  regiments  were  armed  with  sabers, 
rifle-carbines  and  Colt"s  navy  revolvers. 

(Brackett's  History  of  U.  S.  Cavalry,  p.  160.) 

During  the  Civil  War  the  U.  S.  Cavalry  was  gen- 
erally  armed  with  rifles  or  carbines,  sabers  and  revolvers.  War 


The  lance. 


1811. 


1814. 


1826. 


Scott  Tactics. 


The  rifles  carried  at  the  commencement  of  the  war  were 
changed  for  carbines,  and  the  single  loading  carbines 
were,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  changed  for  repeat 
ing  ones.  See  Exts.  Nos.  74,  133,  151,  141. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  sabers  were  the 
Prussian  pattern,  with  a  long  straight  blade.  These 
were  replaced  later  by  the  light  cavalry  saber  with  a 
curved  blade,  which  was  regarded  with  much  more  favor 
than  the  Prussian  saber. 

The  Colt's  revolver  was  generally  carried.  It  was 
loaded  with  powder  and  ball  and  fired  with  percussion 
caps. 

Only  one  lancer  regiment  went  out,  the  6th  Penn., 
and  it  changed  the  lance  for  the  saber  in  April,  1863. 

DRILL   REGULATIONS. 

Previous  to  1896  Drill  Regulations  were  called  Tac 
tics. 

In  1811  Anthony  Finley  of  Philadelphia  published 
"Colonel  Harries'  Instructions  for  a  Volunteer  Corps 
of  Cavalry." 

In  1814  Colonel  Wm.  Duane,  Adjutant  General, 
U.  S.  Army,  published  "Hand  Book  for  Cavalry."  It 
was  a  system  of  drill  regulations. 

In  1826  a  Board  of  Officers  was  convened  to  report 
"A  Complete  System  of  Cavalry  Tactics." 

Maj.  Gen.  Winfield  Scott  was  president  and 
Lieut.  Col.  Z.  Taylor  was  a  member  of  the  board 
These  tactics  were  published  in  1834  and  were  known 
as  the  "Scott  Tactics." 

The  system  was  a  double  rank  system  where  two 
troops,  side  by  side,  each  in  double  rank,  constituted  a 
squadron,  and  four  squadrons  a  regiment.  The  squad 
ron  was  commanded  by  the  senior  captain.  While  the 
drill  differs  from  that  of  the  present  time,  the  principles 
are  essentially  the  same.  Much  of  the  phraseology  of 
our  present  drill  regulations  is  a  repetition  of  that  of  the 
"Scott  Tactics." 


In  1841  the  War  Department  published  what  were    Poinsett  or  '4i 
called  the  "  '41  Tactics,"  or  "Poinsett  Tactics."     TheyT' 
differed  from  the  "Scott  Tactics'"  in  providing  for  a  regi 
ment  of  10  companies,  or  5  squadrons. 

The  "History  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry,"  by  Brackett, 
on  page  48  states:  "The  system  of  cavalry  tactics 
adapted  to  the  organization  of  the  dragoon  regiments 
was  authorized  by  the  Hon.  J.  R.  Poinsett,  Secretary  of 
War,  on  the  10th  of  February,  1841.  It  is  mainly  a 
translation  of  the  tactics  of  the  French  service,  and  has 
not  yet  (June  1,  1863)  been  improved  upon,  though  sev 
eral  attempts  have  been  made,  but  they  have  all  proved 
failures.  I  believe  almost  every  cavalry  officer  of  ex 
perience  considers  the  tactics  of  1841  as  far  superior  to 
anything  which  has  yet  been  introduced  into  our  service." 

The  '41  tactics  were  used  by  the  eastern  cavalry 
during  the  entire  war  and  by  the  regular  cavalry  after 
the  war.  The  western  cavalry  used  the  '41  tactics  till 
the  fall  of  1864,  when  they  began  to  use  the  Cooke  tac 
tics,  which  prescribed  a  single  rank  formation. 

Whenever,  in  a  report,  the  term  "squadron"  is  used, 
it  will  mean  a  unit  of  two  troops;  while  the  term  "bat 
talion"  will  mean  four  troops  either  in  single  or  double 
rank. 

Because  of  the  almost  universal  use  of  the  '41  tac 
tics,  it  will  be  necessary  to  describe  some  of  their  im 
portant  features. 

"The  squadrons  of  a  regiment  in  order  of  battle  are  Battle  order, 
distinguished  by  the  denominations  first,  second,  third, 
fourth  and.  fifth;  they  are  formed  on  the  same  line,  in 
order  of  these  numbers,  commencing  on  the  right  with 
an  interval  of  12  paces.  This  is  the  primitive  and  habitual 
order  of  the  squadrons  in  regiments.  Each  squadron  is 
composed  of  four  platoons,  distinguished  by  the  denom 
inations  first,  second,  third  and  fourth,  commencing  on 
the  right.  The  first  and  second  platoons  form  the  first 
division,  the  third  and  fourth  form  the  second  division," 


10 

The  "Column  of  Squadrons"  was  a  column  where 
each  squadron  was  in  line  with  full  distance.  In  a  "Close 
Column  of  Squadrons"  the  squadrons  were  closed  to-  12 
paces  distance. 

poke's  Tactics  November  1,  1861,  the  War  Department  officially 
adopted  the  tactics  written  by  Colonel  Philip  St.  George 
Cooke.  They  were  published  in  1862  and  known  as  the 
"Cooke  Tactics." 

While  it  was  ordered  that  "All  additions  or  de 
partures  from  the  exercises  and  maneuvers  laid  down 
are  positively  forbidden,"  as  previously  stated,  they  were 
not  used  by  the  eastern  cavalry  at  all,  and  not  by  the 
western  cavalry  till  1864.  I  make  this  statement  on  in 
formation  obtained  from  veterans  of  the  war  and  believe 
it  to  be  correct. 

Principles/)!  The  principles  of  the  Cooke  Tactics  differ  materially 
from  any  preceding  them.  The  single  rank  formation 
is  here  introduced.  A  troop  is  called  a  squadron  and  is 
composed  of  four  platoons. 

In  1857  the  War  Department  published  the  report 
on  foreign  armies  made  by  Captain  Geo.  B.  McClellan. 
On  p.  278  he  recommends  that  the  word  company  be 
changed  to  squadron  and  that  the  single  rank  formation 
be  adopted. 

Cooke  acknowledges  getting  his  ideas  from  conver 
sations  with  McClellan. 

The  introduction  of  the  Cooke  tactics  states  that 
the  single  rank  formation  was  tested  by  the  British  in 
Portugal  in  1833  and  1834,  and  it  was  found  that  it 
greatly  simplified  all  cavalry  movements. 

Battle  order.  The  battle  order  for  a  regiment  of  ten  troops  is  four 

troops  in  line ;  four  in  line  of  troops  in  column  of  platoons 
at  full  distance,  300  paces  in  the  rear  of  the  first  line; 
one  troop  50  paces  behind  each  flank  of  the  first  line,  each 
in  column  of  platoons  at  full  distance.  In  case  the  regi 
ment  had  only  eight  troops,  the  two  center  troops  of  the 
second  line  were  the  missing  troops. 

An  "Open  Column"  is  formed  of  subdivisions,  hav- 


11 


ing  between  them  the  necessary  distance  to  form  line  in 
every  way.  The  "Close  Column"  is  formed  of  troops 
with  distance  of  platoon  front  one  from  the  other.  The 
"Double  Column"  is  formed  by  advance  from  the  center 
of  the  line,  by  platoons  at  wheeling  distance. 

Other  than  mentioned,  these  tactics  are  much  the    Double  column 

i          1    •  1  1  i      •  °f  fours. 

same  as  the  drill  regulations  of  the  present  time.  The 
double  column  of  fours  does  not  seem  to  have  been  used 
during  the  Civil  War.  After  his  war  experience  General 
Cooke  rewrote  his  tactics  in  1883.  The  double  column 
of  fours  is  then  introduced.  Of  this  movement  General 
Cooke  says  :  "A  new  system  with  two  lines  and  double 
column  of  fours  as  the  greatest  novelties  was  devised 
and  was,  in  fact,  approved  by  a  board  of  experienced 
officers  as  early  as  1868."  (Upton  Board.) 

General  Wesley  Merritt  reviewed  these  tactics  and    Merritt  reviews 
highly     commended     these     movements     as     "Valuable  °C 
changes  in  the  interest  of    rapidity    of  maneuver  and 
celerity  of  formation,  which  are  so  important  for  the  ef 
fective  action  of  cavalry  under  the  changed  conditions 
for  its  uses  in  modern  warfare." 

When  Cooke,  Merritt  and  Upton  agree  that  the 
double  column  of  fours  is  invaluable  in  the  interests  of 
celerity,  I  conclude  that  :  — 

Any  organization  which  will  not  admit  of  the  ap 
plication  of  double  column  of  fours  is  incorrect. 

Upton's  Assimilated  Tactics  were  adopted  by  G.  O.    isvs   Upton's 
No.  6,  A.  G.  O.,  1873.     The  cavalry  service  never  tookTactics' 
kindly  to  the  effort  to  unite  them  with  infantry. 

The  Drill  Regulations  of  1896  seem  to  be  a  combina-    Drlll  Regula. 
tion  of  Cooke  and  Upton.     They  differ  from  the  Assim-tions'1896 
ilated  Tactics  chiefly  in  that  they  broke  the  tie  that  bound 
the  cavalry  to  the  infantry. 

THE   CONFEDERATE   CAVALRY. 

The  Confederate  cavalry  under  Stuart  in  the  east    stuart'scav- 
early  obtained  a  superiority   over  that  of  the  Federal  alry' 
Government.     After  the  Gettysburg  campaign  the  Con 
federate  cavalry  began  to  deteriorate  because  the  fine 


12 

quality  of  horses  which  they  had  when  the  war  began 
could  no  longer  be  obtained.  Stuart's  cavalry  was  or 
ganized  and  armed  the  same  as  the  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

^wheeler's  cav-  in  the  western  armies  of  the  Confederacy  the  single 
rank  formation  began  to  be  used  early  in  the  war.  Mor 
gan  began  to  use  it  from  the  start.  Forrest  soon  began 
to  use  it,  and  Wheeler  found  that  it  was  necessary  to  the 
conditions  under  which  they  were  laboring. 

^  wheeler's  TEC-  Wheeler  wrote  a  set  of  cavalry  tactics  which  were 
officially  adopted  by  the  following  order : 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
Dalton,  Ga. 

February  17,  1864. 
General  Orders 

No.  22. 

The  system  of  cavalry  tactics  prepared  by  Major 
General  Joseph  W'heeler  is  adopted  for  the  use  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

By  command  of  General  Johnston. 

K.  FALCONER,  A.^V.  G. 

These  tactics  were  used  by  Wheeler  in  1863.  (See 
Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  375.) 

mSeenter'8   Ar~          At  the   battle  of  Murfreesboro   Wheeler's   cavalry 
was  armed  with  the  rifle  or  carbine,  sabers  and  revolvers. 
(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  62.) 
The  following  report  of  an  inspection  of  Wheeler's 
cavalry  is  of  great  importance  since  it  makes  statements 
regarding  the  use  of  the  saber  which  cannot  be  contro 
verted  and  which  are  agreed  to  by  all  men  who  saw  that 
weapon  extensively  used  during  the  war. 

po\t™ewS?eie?B          ^xt<  ^°'  *' — At  ^east  one  re^ment  °f  each  brigade 
cavalry.  should  be  armed  with  pistols  and  sabers.     This  might 

be  held  in  reserve,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  as  the 
charging  regiment;  as  at  present  constituted,  this  com 
mand  is  virtually  little  else  than  mounted  infantry.  A 
change  in  this  respect  is  deemed  very  important,  and  I 


13 

earnestly  and  respectfully  recommend  the  adoption  of 
this  suggestion  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment.  A 
light  carbine  might  be  carried  in  addition.  It  is  a  matter 
of  regret  that  the  saber  has  been  so  much  overlooked;  its 
moral  influence  is  great.  The  "fannade,  the  glitter  of 
the  keen  blades  in  the  air  in  the  event  of  a  charge,  pro 
duce  in  themselves  a  most  terrifying  effect."  In  a  hand 
to  hand  conflict  the  necessity  of  the  saber  is  most  ap 
parent. 

(February,  1865,  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  408.) 
Wheeler  was,  without  doubt,  the  ablest  Confederate 
cavalry  leader  in  the  west.    He  was  always  ready  to  work 
in  the  team  and  play  a  subordinate  part  to  his  command 
ing  general. 

Ext.  No.  2. — The  carbines  and  rifles  were  flashing:    Pen  picture  of 

.  .  the  cavalry  flght 

and  banging  away  at  times,  and  scattering-  shots,  w  hen  ofshelby  vine. 

,,  *  Shelbyville, 

the  game  was  at  long  range,  and  then,  when  a  change Tenn.,  June  27, 
came  on  and  the  work  grew  hot,  the  spiteful  sharp  explo 
sions  swelled  into  a  crackling  roar  like  that  of  a  cane- 
brake  on  fire,  when,  in  a  single  minute,  hundreds  of 
boiler-like  joints  have  burst  asunder.  Add  to  all  the 
whizzing,  angry  whirl  of  countless  leaden  missiles  which 
split  the  air  about  you;  the  hoarse,  unnatural  shouts  of 
command — for  in  battle  all  sounds  of  the  human  voice 
seem  out  of  pitch  and  tone;  the  wild,  defiant  yell  and  the 
answering  huzzas  of  the  opposing  line ;  the  plunging  and 
rearing  of  frightened  horses;  the  charges  here  and  there 
of  companies  or  squadrons  which  seem  to  be  shot  out  of 
the  main  body  as  flames  shot  out  of  a  house  on  fire; 
here  and  there  the  sharp,  quick  cry  from  some  unfor 
tunate  trooper  who  did  not  hear  one  leaden  messenger — • 
for  only  those  are  heard  which  have  passed  by;  the 
heavy,  soggy  striking  of  the  helpless  body  against  the 
ground;  the  scurrying  away  of  the  frightened  horse,  as 
often  into  danger  as  out  of  it,  whose  empty  saddle  tells 
the  foe  that  there  is  one  rifle  less  to  fear.  All  these  sights 
and  sounds  go  to  make  up  the  confusing  medley  of  a 
battle-field. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  101.) 


14 

ForreBt-  Forrest  was  a  very  able  man,  but,  like   Stonewall 

Jackson,  was  at  his  best  when  operating  alone.  He  could 
not  bear  restraint  and  did  not  work  well  to  the  central 
idea. 

?  habifS          Ext  Na  2A.— The  country,  rocky  and  rugged,  was 
fought  on  thickly  clad  with  cedars,  and  difficult,  of  course,  for  cav- 
jJanyHiiijenn,  airy  movements,  so  that,  for  the  most  part,  the  fighting 
was  on  foot,  which,  however,  was  now  Forrest's  habitual 
tactics, 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  p. 
621.  November  29,  1864.) 

COMMENT. 

Forrest  always  had  an  escort,  but  he  and  his  escort 
always  participated  in  the  thickest  of  the  fighting. 

It  would  seem  that  if  a  general  does  not  personally 
enter  the  heavy  fighting,  under  the  changed  conditions 
of  warfare,  a  large  escort  would  be  a  nuisance. 
Armament   of          Forrest's  cavalry  generally  carried  sabers,  but  sel- 

Forrest's  cavalry.  J 

dom  used  them.  His  cavalry  may  be  considered  the  high 
est  type  of  mounted  infantry. 

Morgan  was  essentially  a  raider;  although  a  hard 
fighter  when  the  occasion  demanded,  he  preferred  a  loose 
sort  of  warfare  to  working  in  conjunction  with  other 
troops, 

Morgan's  cav'y.  Ext.  No.  3. — We  were,  in  fact,  not  cavalry,  but 
mounted  riflemen.  A  small  body  of  mounted  men  was 
usually  kept  in  reserve  to  act  on  the  flanks,  but  otherwise 
we  fought  very  little  on  horseback  except  on  scouting 
expeditions.  We  never  used  sabers,  and  long  guns  were 
not  exactly  the  weapons  for  cavalry  evolutions. 

Morgan  rarely  fought  with  the  army;  he  had  to 
make  his  command  a  self-sustaining  one.  Nearly  every 
man  had  a  pistol  and  some  had  two.  The  pistol  pre 
ferred  and  usually  worn  was  the  Army  Colt. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Mosby.  Mosby  was  a  partisan  and  fought  whenever  every 

thing  seemed  to  be  in  his  favor.     His  force  seldom  ex- 


15 

ceeded  300  men,  mounted  on  the  best  horses  the  state  of 
Virginia  could  produce.  His  men  were  all  picked  men 
who  knew  the  country  where  they  were  operating.  With 
this  class  of  horses  he  could  always  fight  on  his  own 
terms.  When  not  raiding  or  harassing  trains,  they  scat 
tered  in  the  surrounding  country  and  came  together  again 
on  call.  They  were  armed  with  the  revolver  only,  ex 
cept  that  most  men  had  two,  besides  carrying  extra  cylin 
ders  to  slip  loaded  into  the  weapon  when  all  loads  were 
exhausted. 


16 


CHAPTER  I. 


ARMS  AND  THEIR  USES  — REVOLVER  vs.  SABER. 


EMBRACING  A   DISCUSSION    OF    THE    RELATIVE    MERITS    OF    THE    REVOLVER 

AND    SABER    AND   SHOWING    WHEN    EACH    SHOULD    BE    USED. 

THE   TERM    PISTOL,   IN   ANY   REPORT,    MEANS   REVOLVER. 

Bowie  knives.  Ext.  No.  4. — But  while  a  few  of  the  Confederate 

soldiers  were  efficiently  armed,  almost  every  man  of  them 
had  a  bowie  knife  and  revolver.  The  Arkansas  and 
Texas  troops,  especially,  carried  enormous  knives,  that 
might  have  made  a  Malay's  blood  run  cold,  but  in  the 
end  these  huge  knives  did  duty  far  oftener  as  cleavers 
than  as  bayonets. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

u«»  of  pistol.  Ext.  No.  5. — Colonel  Wickham  and  a  few  of  his 

June fll^i'scaf1  *'  men  threw  themselves  into  a  field  on  the  roadside,  and  by 
the  fire  of  their  pistols  checked  further  pursuit. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  289.) 

Forrest's  men          Ext.    Nfo.   6. — Forrest  placed  his  men  dismounted 
verAlimomited  immediately  behind  a  gully.     The  first  Federal  charge 
Fe°bk2V64.MiS8"  was  checked  at  60  yards.     The  second  Federal  charge 
was  checked  at  40  yards.    The  third  Federal  charge  was 
not  checked  till  it  reached  20  yards.     The  fourth  Fed 
eral  charge  went  through.     The  Confederate  rifle  am 
munition  was  exhausted  and  they  fought  with  revolvers. 
(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  399.) 

ute  of  revolver,  Ext.  No.  7. — Two  strong  lines  of  Federal  infantry 
Ti^h. min go  pressed  upon  Rucker,  Bell  and  Duff,  through  an  open 
10,  istST"  field.  Their  front  line  came  within  30  paces  of  the  Con 
federates,  who  then  drew  their  revolvers  and  drove  the 
enemy  back  with  great  slaughter. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  473.) 


17 


Ext.  No.  8.— The  9th  Penn.  Cavalry  had  been  with-  Federal,  use 
drawn  from  the  battery  and  placed  in  position  by  the  sidem^nleT8  dls" 
of  the  road,  and  by  close  pistol  fighting,  held  the  largeTe^Ko.z^'Gs! 
columns  of  the  enemy  in  check. 

(Col.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  654.) 

Ext.  No.  9.— The  enemy  charged  in  gallant  style,  Texan.  use  re- 
and  were  repulsed  twice,  the  second  time  the  Texans  v^Pooi,MiSS., 
using  their  six-shooters  at  20  paces.  F«b.a,  i86£ 

(Maj.  Genl.  S.  D.  Lee,  C  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part 
I,  p.  365.) 


Ext.  No.  10. — In  one  instance  the  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry    2d  u. s. cavalry 

j  ,1  ,      .  use  revolver,  dis- 

drove  the  enemy  before  them  with  their  pistols    ( dis- mounted- 
mounted)  after  the  carbine  ammunition  had  given  out. 


Co 

(Brig.  Genl.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part    Ml 
I,  p.  805.) 

Ext.  No.  11. — Anderson  advanced  in  good  style,  the    charge  with 
Confederates  with  sabers,  supported  by  the  5th  Georgia  versraga°n.tecai- 

...  ,  ™,  J  &       bines   does  not 

with  pistols.      Ihree  times  these  two  regiments  charged 8UCCeed- 

the  4th  Michigan,  but  each  time  they  were  driven  back  Ga-»Jlln«aO' 1864! 

in  confusion. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II    p 
821.) 

Ext.   No.   12. — The  enemy  relied  wholly  upon  the    saber    against 
carbine  and  the  pistol;  my  men  preferred  the  saber.     A^e!ve 
short  but  closely  contested   struggle   ensued,   which  re-  vaTsept^iSf^l' 
suited  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy.     Many  prisoners  were 
taken  and  quite  a  number  of  both  sides  were  left  on  the 
field. 

(Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I 
p.  456.) 

Ext.  No.  13.— The  charge  was  met  by  one  from  the    m  the  meiee 
enemy  and  the-  command  was  broken.     The  men  had  no«tf.VibiStoS 
weapons  but  their  carbines,   and  these  were  extremely  ^sTb^T'Gap 
difficult  to  load  and  inefficient  in  the  melee  that  ensued.  Feb>  19)  1865' 
The   rebels    (Mosby's   men)    had   very    few   sabers   but 
were  well  supplied  with  revolvers  and  rode  up  to  our  men 
and   shot  them  down  without  meeting  more  resistance 
than  men  could  make  with  carbines.     I  ascribe  the  dis- 


18 

aster  to  *  *  *  fourth,  to  the  men  having-  neither 
sabers  nor  revolvers,  and  consequently  being  unable  to 
engage  in  a  melee  successfully  with  an  enemy  armed  with 
at  least  two  revolvers  to  the  man. 

(Maj.  Thos.  Gibson,  14th  Pa.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46, 
Parti,  p.  465.) 

sabers  necea-          Ext.  No.   14.  —  Lomax's  cavalry  are  armed  entirely 

country.11        n  with  rifles  and  have  no  sabers,   and  the  consequence  is 

•etSj*i864.HI11'that  they  cannot  fight  on  horseback,  and  in  this  open 

country  they  cannot  successfully  fight  on   foot  against 

large  bodies  of  cavalry. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  Jubal  A.  Early,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43, 
Part  I,  p.  559.) 

Ext.  No.  15.  —  I  could  not  stand  that;  but,  drawing 


combat  with  an  .  1   .     ,,. 

Indian,  revolver  my  saber,  rushed  upon  the  monster  and  inflicted  a  severe 

wins  against  sa 

ber  cut.  wound  on  his  head.     At  the  same  moment  he  fired  his 

Solomon's  Fork,  «  ....  -  .. 

July  29,  1857.  last  barrel  within  a  foot  of  me,  the  ball  taking  effect  in 
the  center  of  the  breast,  glancing  to  the  left  and  lodging 
near  my  left  nipple. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  21.) 

saber  used  as  a          Ext.  No.  16.  —  Colonel  Munford  was  dismounted  by 
^Manassas^Jirty  a  saber  stroke  and  his  horse  was  killed. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  107.) 

individual          Ext.  No.  17.  —  Perceiving  his  danger,  Colonel  Davis 
turned  upon  Allen  with  a  cut  of  his  saber,  which  Allen 


mFieetwood,*  va.,  avoided  by  throwing  himself  on  the  side  of  his  horse;  at 
June  9,  1K63.     '  the  game  moment  he  fired  and  Colonel  Davis  fell. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  265.) 

Revolver  wins          Ext.   No.    18.  —  Colonel   HamptOD,   while   engaging1 

against  the  «aber  f     ,  .  ,     ,  . 

one  of  the  enemy  with  his  saber,  was  shot  through  the 
*"^!  body  by  another,  and  mortally  wounded. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.   Stuart, 
p.  289.) 


*In  the  reports  of  Southern  Officers  the  engagement  at  Brandy  Station  is  given 
as  "Fleetwood"  or  "Fleetwood  Hill." 


19 
Ext.  No.   19. — Captain  Latane  and  Captain  Royall    individual 

.  ,    combat,  revolver 

met  hand  to  hand,  one  with  the  sab'er  and  the  other  with  wins  against  sa 
ber. 

the  pistol,  and  Latane  received  instant  death.    Royall  was    chicka hominy 
severely  wounded  by  Latane's  saber  and  by  the  men  who  IBS-/. 
charged  close  at  Latane's  side. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  56.) 

Ext.  No.  20.— Corporal  Caroll  and  Private  Jett  °f 
Co.  UC,"  after  the  hand  to  hand  fight  in  the  field,  showed 
me  their  sabers  cut  off  close  to  the  hilt,  and   Caroll' s  3 
forehead  was  gashed  with  a  saber. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  344,  Gettysburg  campaign.) 

Ext.  No.  21. — And  the  road  was  soon,  and  for  sev-    Forrest's    cav- 

.  it-  airy  uses  saber  as 

eral  miles,  thickly  dotted  with  the  wounded  and  slam — a  a  cutting  weapon 
number  of  whom  had  been  cut  down  by  the  sabers  of  Ky"rifei!*28i' 

i  &  V '  i 

the  untrained  but  heavy-handed  Confederates  who  fol 
lowed  Forrest  that  winter  afternoon. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  52.) 

Ext.  No.  22. — Forrest  was  assaulted  simultaneous-    Pistol  wins 

against  saber 

ly  by  two  officers  with  their  sabers;  but,  eluding  the  f ull  ^^ th?*gew 
force  of  their  thrusts  by  bending  his  body  suddenly  for-j^jjjfjg"^11,1 
ward,  their  sword  points  only  touched  his  shoulder.    Car 
ried  a  few  paces  ahead  by  the  impetus  of  his  horse,  check 
ing  and  drawing  which  aside  in  time  to  shoot  one  of  his 
opponents  as  he  came  up,  he  thrust  his  saber  point  into 
the  other.      *     *     *     obliging    him    to    run   his  saber 
through  one,  and  disable  the  other  by  a  blow  on  the  sword 
arm. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  p. 
53.) 

Ext.  No.  23.— Private  W.  H.  Terry,  while  engaged  ^officer    uses 
single-handed  with  a  Federal  trooper  whom  he  was  ham-    sacremanto, 

Ky.,  Dec.  Jo,  oi. 

mering  with  his  exhausted  rifle,  was  run  through  the 
heart  by  Captain  Davis. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  p. 
54.) 


20 
charge  in  coi-          Ext.  No.  24.  —  He  drew  his  men  up  for  the  work  in 

umn    of    squad- 

r°Forrest's  cav-an  °Pen  space,  in  a  column  of  squadrons.  The  order  to 
charge  up  the  ravine  was  given,  with  instructions  for  the 
first  and  second  companies  of  the  squadrons  severally  to 


U8Fort  Donison,  deploy  to  the  right  and  left  as  they  advanced.     About 


Feb.  15,  i86a.  the  batterv  a  ^and  to  fa^  struggle  ensued.  Sabers, 
pistols  and  carbines  were  lavishly  used,  with  much  cost 
of  lives  on  both  sides. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  82.) 
Forrest  uses          Ext.   No.   25.  —  Forrest    resolved    to    charge.      At 

shot-guns  during 

tje  Dearly  part  of  twenty  paces  the  Confederates  gave  a  volley  with  their 
shiioh,  April  7  shot-guns,   a   formidable  weapon   at  that  distance,   and 

1862. 

rushed  in  with  pistols  and  sabers. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  146.    Battle  of  Shiioh.) 
saber  used  as          Ext.  No.  26.  —  Very  many  charges  were  made  and 

shock  weapon. 

Cpp  rviiie,  Va.,  the  saber  used  freely. 

(Genl.  A.  Pleasonton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  912.) 
saber  used  aa          Ext.  No.  27.  —  There  were  several  charges  and  the 

shock  weapon. 
Brandy  Station,  Saber  was  USed   With  SUCCCSS. 

(Genl.  Buford,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  932.) 
sturdy  men  of          Ext.  No.  28.  —  They  outnumbered  us  three  to  one, 
asacuttinge  weap'  but  could  not  withstand  the  heavy  saber  blows  of  the 
']y  Ford  sturdy  men  of  Maine  who  rode  through  them  and  over 


(Genl.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  986.) 
stuart's  cav-          Ext.  No.  29.  —  The  charge  was  spiritedly  made  and 

^ooTbfrVug'h  sabers  freely  used>  as  the  heads  of  my  men  wil1  attest 

Md.,  jV^isSs!          (Lieut<  Col    Preston,  1st  Vt.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27, 

Parti,  p.  1015-) 

Kiipa  trick's          Ext.   No.  30.  —  Upwards  of  200  left  in  our  hands 
duXl8Uaveannbaeh  were  wounded  by  the  saber  alone. 
CftwayaneSnborough  (General   Kilpatrick,    Savannah   Campaign,   R.   R., 

'  Vol.  44,  p.  365.) 

stuart's  cav-          Ext.   No.   31.  —  Jones  brigade,  with  drawn  sabers, 
till  wfth^lbe^."  charged  down  the  turnpike  under  a  fearful  artillery  fire. 


21 
(General  Stuart,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  p. 

\  ^"  Jily  6,  1868. 


Ext.  No.  32.  —  With  an  abiding  faith  in  the  god  of 
battles,  and  a  firm  reliance  on  the  saber,  your  success 
will  continue. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27, 
Part  II,  p.  720.) 

Ext.  No.  33.  —  After  driving-  the  whole  cavalry  force    saber  used  to 

r   ,,  1-1         it     1         i  finiah  the  fight. 

of  the  enemy  steadily  all  day  long,  our  troops  went  in    seriersviiie, 


about  4  o'clock  with  the  saber  and  a  yell  and  routed  them.  iseJ'.' 

(Brig.  Genl.  S,  D.  Sturgis,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
p.  134.) 

Ext.  No.  34.  —  This  great  disaster  would  have  at 
once  been  retrieved  but  for  the  insufficient  armament  of 
the  command.  Besides  the  1st  and  2d  Md.  and  a  squad 
ron  of  the  8th  Va.,  there  was  not  a  saber  in  the  com 
mand. 

In  that  open  country,  perfectly  level,  the  only  mode  Cia8asldlrybecause 
of  fighting  charging  cavalry  was  by  charging,  and  this  ^s.  have  n°  6a~ 


the  men  were  unable  to  do.  vaNeIiiCr4Cki'864 

(Brig.  Genl.  Bradley  T.  Johnson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
43,  Part  I,  p.  6.) 

Ext.   No.  35.  —  The  cavalry  made  some  handsome    Prisoners  cap- 

i  ,  .  ,  .    ,  tured    with    the 

saber  charges,  in  which  most  of  the  prisoners  were  cap-saber- 

fl11_j  Cedarville,  Va., 

tUred.  Aug.  16,  1864. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  19.) 

Ext.  No.  36.  —  Forrest  was  charged  by  a  Federal  baptersr°enalolco^r- 
officer  who  lunged  at  him  with  his  saber  ;  Forrest  parried  twhrnust°ver  saber 
the  thrust  with  his  pistol,  and,  firing,  killed  his  resolute  vi^  aArla  ^aprlef 
adversary.  18(i5' 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  668.) 

The  following  is  another  account  of  the  same  af 
fair: 

Ext.  No.  37.  —  While  charging,  Captain  Taylor  ran    Sameasabove 
up  to  Forrest  and  hit  him  over  the  head  with  his  saber, 


22 

and  ordered  him  to  surrender.    Forrest  then  drew  his  re- 
cu8toldieru8e*the  v°lver  and  shot  him  dead.     Another  of  our  boys  ran 
after  him,  striking  at  him  with  his  saber  as  he  ran. 

(The  Last  Campaign,  by  E.  N.  Gilpin,  published 
in  the  Cavalry  Journal.) 

in   the  thick          Ext.  No.  38. — The  enemy  had  used  the  saber  al- 

woods  the  revol-  .  . 

ver  is  superior  to  most  exclusively,    torrest  and  his  staff  were  armed,  each 

the  saber. 

Near  Maples-  with  two  navy  revolvers,  and  the  men  with  Spencer  rifles 
ville,  ll»..Apr.  1,  . 

1865.  as  well  as  pistols.     It  was  a  contest  of  sabers  with  fire 

arms,  with  the  odds  of  four  to  one  against  the  Confed 
erates.  Forrest,  Lieut.  Boon  and  five  of  his  men  only 
were  wounded,  while  some  thirty  of  the  enemy  were 
killed  and  as  many  as  sixty  were  left  in  the  hospital,  near 
by,  badly  wounded. 

(Campaigns  of  Forest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  p. 
669.) 

saber  dis-          Ext.   No.   39. — The   10th  Ohio  made  a  most  gal- 
Bear  Creek  sta.  lant  saber  charge  against  the  enemy  posted  behind  rail 
VsJi.Ga'' NoT<  16)  barricades ;  dismounted,  they  drove  the  enemy  in  con 
fusion,  killing  and  wounding  many  with  the  saber. 
(Col.  Atkins,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  389.) 

saber  used  an  a          Ext.  No.  40. — The  captain  had  command  of  the  ad- 
^wiTson's^Bjiidi vance  company  and  did  not  hear  the  order  to  turn  off  the 
road,  so  he  charged  on  past  the  artillery,  cutting  right 
and  left  among  the  enemy  until  shot  down  by  them,. 
(Col.  J.  G.  Vail,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  455.) 

The  following  discussion  is  taken  from  "Volunteer 
Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,"  written  by  Captain 
Frederick  Whittaker,  6th  N.  Y.  Cavalry : 

Ext.  No.  41. — So  far  as  the  author's  observation 
goes,  he  never  remembers  an  instance  in  which  the  saber 
charge,  resolutely  pushed,  failed  to  drive  the  pistols.  But 
the  individual  fancy  of  the  colonel  seemed  to  regulate 
the  matter  for  his  regiment.  If  he  were  an  enthusiastic 
swordsman  he  always  managed  to  infuse  the  same  spirit 
into  his  men,  and  such  men  depended  on  their  sabers  with 
just  confidence.  The  saber  is  a  weapon  that  requires 


23 

constant  practice  to  keep  one's  hand  in,  and  our  cavalry 
officers  as  a  class  are  entirely  deficient  in  the  practice. 

In  all  the  instances  during  the  war  in  which  the 
saber  proved  ineffective  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  it 
was  owing  to  two  things — want  of  fencing  practice  and 
blunt  sabers.  (Pp.  6  and  7.) 

Now,  the  moral  effect  of  the  charge  is  tremendous. 
The  fierce  charging  yell,  rising  and  swelling  higher  and 
higher  till  it  overtops  the  sound  of  musketry,  frightens 
more  men  than  bullets.  Very,  very  few  troops  will  stand 
up  against  a  charge  unsupported  by  works;  we  might 
say  none.  One  side  or  the  other  is  sure  to  give  way,  not 
from  the  force  of  the  weapons,  but  simply  because  they 
are  afraid.  Anything  which  encourages  men  to  charge 
home  doubles  their  morale,  and  morale  is  everything. 
(P.  11.  See  also  Exts.  Nos.  1,  2,  480.) 

The  true  use  of  the  revolver  lies  in  irregular  war 
fare,  where  single  combats  and  sudden  encounters  of 
small  parties  take  place,  on  horseback,  in  narrow  lanes, 
among  woods  and  fences,  where  the  saber  cannot  be  used. 
In  such  places,  and  wherever  regular  order  is  broken  up, 
the  revolver  is  invaluable.  In  pursuits,  patrols  and  sur 
prises  it  is  superior  to  the  saber.  In  line  charges  in  the 
field,  the  latter  is  always  conqueror  if  it  is  sharp.  But 
one  thing  should  be  impressed  upon  every  man — never 
to  try  long  shots  when  on  horseback.  The  revolver  on 
the  right  hip  should  have  a  cord  fastened  to  it  a  yard 
long.  The  men  should  be  practiced  in  firing  at  a  target 
while  passing  at  speed,  and  then  dropping  the  pistol  on 
the  opposite  side,  to  use  the  cord  while  they  handle  the 
saber.  (P.  14.) 

The  men  should  be  taught  never  to  fire  before  the 
word.  The  moral  effect  of  a  reserved  volley  is  tremen 
dous.  Irregular  firing  during  an  advance  is  both  useless 
and  demoralizing.  Thirty  or  forty  feet  from  the  enemy's 
line  is  the  time  to  fire,  all  together  aiming  low.  (P.  15.) 

Ext.  No.  42. — We  overtook  about  300  Cheyenne  The  saber  is 
warriors  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle,  and  marching  boldly  fo0oseaorTaertisan 
and  steadily  towards  us.  It  was  my  intention  and  that 


24 

Solomon's  Fork,  of  most  company  commanders  to  give  a  carbine  volley 
1857.  '  and  then  charge  with  drawn  pistols,  and  use  our  sabers 

as  a  dernier  ressort;  but,  much  to  my  surprise,  the  colonel 
ordered  "Draw  sabers,  Charge/'  We  set  up  a  terrific 
yell,  which  scattered  the  Cheyennes  in  disorderly  flight, 
and  we  kept  up  the  charge  in  pursuit.  Very  few  of  the 
company  horses  were  fleet  enough  after  the  march  to 
keep  up  with  Indians  on  fresh  ponies. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B   Stuart, 
p.  20.) 
in  the  Gettys-          Ext.  No.  43. — Just  then  Hampton  arrived  with  the 

burgcavalry  fight  .,         ,  T      _, 

both  saber  and  1st  N.  C.  and  the  Jeff  Davis  Legion,  and  the  battle  was 

revolver  were  J 

used  in  themeiee.  renewed  back  and  forth  across  the  plain  until  all  of 
July  3, 1863.'  '  Hampton's  brigade  except  the  Cobb  Legion,  and  all  of 
Fitz  Lee's  brigade  except  the  4th  Va.  Cav.  were  engaged 
in  the  fierce  hand  to  hand  melee  which  followed.  For 
many  minutes  the  fight  with  saber  and  pistol  raged  most 
furiously. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  340.     Battle  of  Gettysburg.) 

wooded  coun-          Ext.  No.  44. — There  was  little  chance  for  mounted 

try  not  suitable  r    1  .  .    . 

for  the  use  of  the  fighting  in  eastern  Virginia,  the  dense  woods,  the  arma- 

saber  by   large     '  ° 

bodies  of  cavalry,  ment  of  both  parties,  and  the  practice  of  barricading 
making  it  impracticable  to  use  the  saber  with  anything 
like  a  large  force;  and  so,  with  the  exception  of  Yellow 
Tavern,  the  dismounted  method  prevailed  in  almost  every 
engagement. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  424.) 

COMMENTS   ON   THE    SABER   AND   REVOLVER. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  next  chapter  that  during  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  the  same  as  for  centuries  past,  the 
saber  was  essentially  a  weapon  for  shock  action.  During 
the  thick  of  the  melee  it  was  still  to  be  preferred ;  but 
.  when  the  melee  began  to  dissolve  into  individual  combats 
the  saber  was  or  should  have  been  exchanged  for  the  re 
volver.  This  exchange  can  be  effected  by  throwing  away 
the  saber,  returning  it  to  the  scabbard  or  by  dropping 
it  and  letting  it  hang  attached  to  the  wrist  by  a  sword 


25 

knot.  The  second  method  of  getting  rid  of  it  is  quite 
impossible  when  in  motion,  while  the  third  will  be  ac 
companied  by  some  danger  to  the  trooper  if  the  weapon 
is  as  sharp  as  it  should  be.  Up  to  the  present  time, 
therefore,  there  is  no  satisfactory  way  to  exchange  the 
saber  for  the  revolver  while  in  action. 

In  the  individual  combat  the  revolver  will  be  the 
winner  in  almost  every  case.  If  the  trooper  is  expert  in 
its  use,  he  has  nothing  to  fear  from  an  individual  enemy 
armed  with  a  saber.  (Exts.  15,  17,  18,  19,  22,  36,  37, 
38,  41.) 

The  revolver  was,  at  times,  used  for  collective  fire 
dismounted,  but  only  under  exceptional  circumstances, 
such  as  from  behind  a  stone  wall,  or  for  defensive  pur 
poses  after  the  carbine  ammunition  had  become  ex 
hausted.  (Exts.  5  to  10  and  90.) 

The  revolver  should,  then,  be  used  whenever  regu 
lar  order  is  broken  up.  (Ext.  41.)  That  is,  in  individ 
ual  combat,  charging  as  foragers  on  wagon  trains  or  ar 
tillery  (Ext.  24),  in  the  woods  (Exts.  38,  44),  on  patrol 
duty,  when  on  mounted  skirmish  line  in  close  country,  in 
irregular  or  partisan  warfare  where  sudden  encounters 
of  small  parties  are  to  be  expected.  (Ext.  41.) 

In  the  melee  the  carbine  is  useless  against  the  re 
volver.  (Ext.  13.) 

As  to  the  type  of  revolver  or  pistol  needed  the  con 
clusions  that  can  be  reached  are  that  there  is  needed  for 
the  cavalry  a  weapon  of  large  caliber  or  great  stopping 
power,  quick  firing,  and  accurate  not  to  exceed  fifty 
yards.  Since  the  change  from  the  saber  to  the  revolver 
will  be  made  during  the  fight,  it  is  evident  that  the 
trooper  should  be  able  to  get  his  weapon  into  action  with 
the  greatest  degree  of  rapidity.  Such  a  contrivance  as 
a  holster  with  a  button  flap  and  carrying  the  butt  to  the 
front  should  be  discontinued  at  the  earliest  moment. 

All  references  to  the  saber  as  a  thrusting  weapon, 
which  were  observed,  have  been  extracted.  (Exts.  22, 
23,  36,  37.)  It  will  be  noticed  that  it  was  so  used  by  of 
ficers,  who  are  presumably  better  instructed  in  its  use 


26 

than  are  enlisted  men.  Only  a  small  portion  of  the  ref 
erences  to  the  saber  as  a  cutting  weapon  have  been  ex 
tracted.  (Exts.  15,  16,  17,  20,  21,  28,  29,  37,  40,  55,  83.) 
Not  only  these  references,  but  conversations  with  vet 
erans  of  the  Civil  war  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  en 
listed  man  is  going  to  use  his  saber  almost  entirely  as  a 
cutting  weapon.  At  the  close  of  the  war  it  was  no  dif 
ferent  than  at  the  beginning.  It  is  believed  that  the  cav 
alry  at  the  close  of  the  war  was  as  well  trained  in 
swordsmanship  as  any  troops  that  the  United  States  will 
ever  put  in  the  field.  If,  then,  our  best  trained  cavalry 
is  going  to  use  the  saber  chiefly  as  a  cutting  weapon,  it 
is  better  to  give  it  a  weapon  adapted  to  the  manner  in 
which  it  will  be  used  rather  than  one  adapted  to  the  use 
of  a  trained  fencer.  The  above  statements  deal  with 
historical  facts  and  not  with  abstract  theories.  It  is  not 
to  be  inferred  that  the  cut  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  thrust, 
since  the  contrary  is  the  case,  but  it  is  reiterated  that  the 
cut  has  been  and  will  be  used  to  the  almost  entire  exclu 
sion  of  the  thrust. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discussion  in  the  U. 
S.  cavalry  service  in  years  past  regarding  the  relative 
merits  of  the  revolver  and  saber.  Such  discussion  is  time 
wasted.  Each  weapon  has  its  distinct  and  proper  uses, 
and  neither  can  replace  the  other;  neither  can  either  of 
them  be  discontinued  as  a  necessary  part  of  modern  cav 
alry  armament. 

It  is  often  asserted  that  the  horse  is  the  real  weapon 
in  the  shock  (Ext.  67),  and  that  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  a  trooper  has  a  revolver  or  saber  in  his  hand. 
(See  Exts.  29,  30,  35,  43,  and  Chapter  II.)  The  moral 
effect  of  the  flash  and  glitter  of  a  "three-foot  razor'"  is 
not  to  be  ignored. 

The  '41  tactics  prescribed  that  the  charge  should  be 
at  a  "raise  saber"  and  it  was  so  used  all  through  the  war. 

Upton,  after  his  war  experience  as  a  successful  cav 
alry  commander,  retained  the  "raise  saber"  for  the  charge 
in  his  tactics  of  73,  probably  because  he  found  that  his 


27 

men  used  it  no  matter  what  was  prescribed.  Untrained 
men  instinctively  use  the  saber  as  they  would  use  a  club. 

The  Cooke  tactics  of  '61  prescribes  the  "tierce 
point"  as  the  charging  position,  and  Cooke,  after  his 
Civil  war  experience,  still  prescribed  the  "tierce  point" 
in  his  tactics  of  '83. 

The  "tierce  point"  was  officially  adopted  as  the 
charging  position  of  the  saber  in  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regu 
lations  of  1896. 

In  the  effect  of  the  saber  previous  to  and  at  the  in 
stant  of  contact  is  largely  a  moral  one  (see  Exts.  1,  2, 
41 ) ,  then  it  would  seem  that  this  effect  may  be  materially 
increased  by  carrying  the  saber  during  the  charge  at  a 
"raise  saber"  rather  than  at  the  position  of  "charge 
saber"  as  now  used,  since  in  the  former  position  its  flash 
and  glitter,  and  therefore  its  moral  effect,  will  be  much 
greater  than  if  carried  at  the  latter. 

THE   LANCE. 

At  Vionville,  Aug.  16,  1870.  Bredow's  brigade  was    AB  &  defensive 

weapon  the  lance 

composed  of  two  regiments.     One  was  armed  with  the  i^noj>etter  than 
saber  and  the  other  with  the  lance.     With  equal  numbers 
they  charged  in  the  same  line  under  identical  conditions 
and  suffered  equal  losses.     This  would  indicate  that  as  a 
defensive  weapon  the  lance  is  not  superior  to  the  saber. 

In  our  service  we  know  very  little  about  the  lance. 
In  the  Mexican  war  we  had  lancers  for  opponents,  as 
will  be  seen  from  the  following : 

Ext.  No.  45. — The  cavalry  made  one  most  gallant    sabers  against 

J  Mexican  lancers. 

charge  against  the  enemy  on  the  23d  of  February,  and    Benna  vista, 

cut  their  way  through  them;  but  the  Mexican  lancers 

were  far  from,  being  a  contemptible  enemy,  and  many 

of  them  were  admirable  horsemen.     Our  people  had  the 

advantage  of  larger  horses  and  heavier  men  as  a  general 

thing,  but  the  Mexicans  were  much  more  agile,  and  could 

handle  their  horses  as  well  as  any  people  on  earth,  while 

with  the  lance  they  were  greatly  our  superiors,  and  used 

that  weapon  with  great  effect  both  at  Buena  Vista  and 

at  San  Pascual. 


28 

We  have  yet  to  make  good  lancers  in  the  United 
States,  as  experiments,  even  on  a  small  scale,  have  proved 
failures  among  the  Americans. 

(History  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry,  by  Brackett,  p.  83.) 
Rush's  lancers.  The  6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  known  as  Rush"s 
Lancers,  went  out  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  with 
lances  which  they  carried  through  all  the  campaigns  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  till  April,  1863.  They  never 
used  that  weapon  in  any  shock  action,  and  after  Stone- 
man's  raid  in  April,  1863,  they  abandoned  it  as  unsuited 
to  the  service,  and  were  thereafter  armed  with  sabers  and 
carbines.  At  the  battle  of  Beverly  Ford  we  find  them 
charging  with  sabers,  June  9,  1863. 

(See  Annals  of  the  6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  p. 
167.) 

COMMENTS   ON   THE   LANCE. 

The  lance  cannot  be  used  to  advantage  in  a  close 
wooded  country  such  as  is  found  everywhere  along  the 
Atlantic  coast.  The  greatest  use  of  the  lance  is  in  the 
shock.  In  the  melee  the  saber  possesses  a  decided  ad 
vantage.  In  meeting  an  enemy  armed  with  the  lance  it 
would  be  necessary  to  first  break  the  continuity  of  his 
lines  before  the  saber  could  gain  a  superiority.  In  these 
extracts  there  can  be  found  many  examples  where  cav 
alry  charges  have  been  broken  by  magazine  fire  by  hold 
ing  it  till  the  charging  line  is  within  very  close  range. 
The  traditions  of  our  cavalry  and  its  training  are  such 
that  we  can  dismount  and  fight  on  foot  in  a  very  short 
time.  This  dismounted  fire  should  be  supported  by 
mounted  troops,  which  should  deliver  the  charge  as  soon 
as  the  lancer  line  is  broken.  If  it  were  necessary  to  meet 
lancers,  whose  lines  were  unbroken  by  fire  action,  with 
shock  action  of  troops  armed  with  the  saber,  I  would 
endeavor  to  strike  the  weakest  point  of  their  line  with  a 
mass  formation  of  some  kind,  either  by  squadrons  in 
column  of  troops  or  in  line  of  troops  in  columns  of  fours. 
Thin  lines  fleeing  in  front  of  lancers  would  soon  cause 
their  lines  to  become  so  broken  that  other  troops  held  in 
reserve  could  meet  them  with  a  fair  chance  of  success. 


29 


CHAPTER  II. 


SHOCK  ACTION  AND  THE  USE  OF  SABER. 


Ext.  No.  46.—  About  4:00  p.  m.  the  enemy  came  up 
and  resolutely  assailed  the  right  of  Roddy's  position  wi 
a  mounted  battalion,  with  drawn  sabers.     It  was  hand-    saber  used  as 

the  shock  weap- 

somely  done,  and  the  Confederates  were  thrown  into  a  on. 

.      .  .    .  -1-j  Wilson's    Raid, 

great  deal  of  confusion,  giving  way  m  disorder.  Apr.  i,  1865. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  666.) 

Ext.   No.  47.  —  On  came  the  Federal  cavalry  with  th^Jfaer^um  of 
their  sabers  drawn.     *     *     *     Such  was  the  momentum    Wilson's  Raid, 

Apr.  1,  1865. 

of  the  Federal  charge  that  one  of  their  horses,  striking 
squarely  against  the  wheel  of  a  piece,  broke  every  spoke, 
and  split  his  own  breast  open. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  667.) 

Ext.  No.  48.  —  The  enemy  left  some  two  or  three    sudden   onset 

succeeds     "where 


regiments  at  Sugar  Creek,  a  strong  position,  to  oppose 

my  advance;  but  instead  of  fighting  them  at  long  range,  faiL 

as  they  expected,  I  ordered  a  saber  charge.     The  5th 

Iowa  made  a  most  gallant  charge,  breaking  through  their    sugar  creek, 

Tcnn.,  Oct.  9,1868. 

lines,  etc. 

(Brig.  Genl.  George  Crook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, 
p.  687.) 

Ext.  No.  49.  —  Our  rapid  pursuit  and  vigorous  use    pursuit  should 
of  the  saber  completely  demoralized  this   force,   which    caihoun.  Te 

,  ,  ,.      .  ,    .  Dec.  28,  1863. 

was  thrown  into  great  confusion,  and  scattered  in  every 
direction,  their  men  throwing  away  large  numbers  of 
arms,  accoutrements,  etc. 

(Col.  Eli  Long,  Comg.  2d  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.  643.) 


30 

m?natspireS1St°?n          Ext  N°"  5°'—  Z  can  only  account  for  our  small  loss 
^  raPidity  of  Ollr  movements  and  the  consternation 


ing  weapon.        produced  by  the  saber  charges 

Pair  Garden, 

.  •>»"•  27,          (Col.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I,  p.  141.) 


we?id  conducted          "^xt<  ^'°'  ^'  —  ^  w*^  ke  observed  that  we  lost  but 

!trboeyr8cther!ccS?-little^   which  shows  that  the  enemy,  by  the  courageous 

m7es°nfrethe  ene"  and   coolly   executed   saber   charge,   was  so   struck  and 

okoiona,  Miss.,  taken  by  surprise  that  he  lost  the  balance  of  power  to 

Feb.  22,  1864.  .  n      • 

give  a  well-aimed  fire,  and  this  explains  the  many  horses 
shot  in  the  legs  and  head. 

(Maj.  Gust.  Heinricks,  4th  Mo.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
32,  Parti,  p.  280.) 

8hockeweaSponaSby  Ext    N°'    S2'~  TllC    7th    Pa'    and   the   4th    Mich-    each 

western  armies    mac{e  one  saber  charge,  and  two  battalions  of  the  4th 

JiOonuHy  Crp^k, 

G».,  June  20,  1864.  Mich,  repulsed  three  saber  charges  made  by  Anderson's 
brigade  of  regular  cavalry. 

(Col.  R.  G.  H.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p. 
812.) 

Driving  cav-          Ext.   No.   53.  —  At  the  same  time  General  Wilson, 
faSry  ^nfs  re-  with  Mclntosh's  brigade,  dashed  up  the  Winchester  pike 

suits  in  capture    , 

re  fmenVantry  ^rove  ^e  reb^l  cavalry  at  a  run,  came  in  contact  with 
Near  Berryviiie,  Kershaw's  division,  charged  it,  and  captured  the  8th  So. 
'Carolina  regiment    (16  officers  and   145   men)    and  its 
battle  flag,  with  a  loss  of  only  two  men  killed  and  two 
wounded. 

(Maj.  Gen.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  24.) 

^xt'  ^°'  ^'  —  ^resn  columns  of  the  enemy  arriv- 
Juned9yi863atlon>  *n£>  unc^er  ^le  heavy  blows  of  our  sabers  were  driven 
back.  For  an  hour  and  a  half  the  contest  continued  in 
determined  charges. 

(Genl.  D.  McM.  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p. 
951.) 

infantry  may          Ext.  No.  55.  —  A  six-gun  battery  of  the  enemy  was 

be  safely  charged     ,  *. 

if  struck  when  playing  away  rapidly  toward  our  left  front.     This  was 

changing  front. 

ordered  to  be  charged,  but  before  the  order  could  be  exe 
cuted  it  withdrew,  and  the  charge  was  directed  against 
the  enemy's  infantry,  which  was  attempting  to  change 


31 

front  and  meet  us;  they  were  in  confusion;  no  time  was 

lost;  the  intrepid  Devin,  with  his  gallant  brigade,  burst  ^an  n*  attacking 

like  a  storm  of  case  shot  in  their  midst,  showering  saber  ^Q*^^  Creck 

blows    on    their   heads    and    shoulders,    trampling   themV*-'8^-19'1864' 

under  his  horses'   feet,  and   routing  them  in  droves  in 

every  direction.      The  brigade   emerged   from  the   fray 

with  three  stand  of  colors  and  over  300  prisoners. 

(Brig.  Genl.  W.  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I,  p. 
444.) 

Ext.  No.  56.  —  On  July  3,  engagement  two  or  three  al£  u®hearr's  ° 
miles  to  the  right  of  Two  Taverns,  in  which  this 
ment  (1st  Mich.  Cav.)  charged  in  close  column 
Hampton's  brigade,  using  the  saber  only,  and  driving 
the  enemy  from  the  field,  with  a  loss  to  this  regiment  of 
6  officers  and  80  men. 

(Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  899.) 

Ext.   No.   57.  —  A  second,  third  and   fourth  charge    charge  should 

t      i        ,,  1         r        1  •   1  11          be  met  by  counter 

was  made  by  the  enemy,  each  of  which  was  repulsed  or  charge. 

met  and  driven  back  by  counter  charges.     During  all 

enemy's  charges  the  loss  of  men  and  horses  must  have 

been  severe. 

(Genl.  Jos.  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  410.) 

Ext.  No.  58.  —  He  occasionally  attacked  us  by  charg-    charge 

.,,    ,.  <  ,  •   ,  .  •    i  ,  ,   ,  ably  met  by  conn 

ing  with  his  cavalry,  which  was  invariably  met  by  coun-  ter  charge. 

i  Waynesboro. 

ter  charges.  Ga.,  Dec.  4,  1864. 

(Genl.  Jos.  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  410.) 
Ext.  No.  59.  —  I  immediately  ordered  the  charge  in    Cobb's  Legion 

close  columns  of  squadrons  and  swept  the  hill  clear  of 


.  «  column  of  squad- 

the  enemy.  rons. 


(Col.  P.  M.  B.  Young,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part 
II,  p.  732.) 

Ext.  No.  60.  —  Colonel  Owen,  with  his  gallant  little    gaber  iB  used 
regiment,  took  the  center  of  the  road  supported  by  the^  terrible  ef' 
2d  Va.  on  his  right  and  the  5th  on  his  left,  dashed  in  with  j^ftfSft  Va> 
the  most  spirited  charge  of  the  day,  driving  the  regiment 
before  him:,  using  the  saber  with  terrible  effect,  captur 
ing  and  killing  nearly  the  whole  regiment. 


32 

(Genl.  Munford,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  p. 
741.) 

saber86 rvesuse          ^xt'  No.  61- — At  the  proper  moment  our  reserve 
Tenndeoot°ni  is*?'  c^ar§"e^-      Thirty-seven    of    the    enemy   were    killed   or 
wounded  and  42  made  prisoners.    Nearly  all  the  wounds 
were  inflicted  with  the  saber. 

(Col.  O.  H.  LaGrange,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p. 
683.) 
Revolver  is          Ext.  No.  62. — General  Smith  ordered  a  charge.    Six 

substituted    for 

the  nature  oVthe  tro°Ps  roc^e  forward  upon  the  enemy's  lines  with  drawn 
^ sabers-  The  nature  of  the  ground  prevented  the  ef- 
''  fectiye  use  °f  tne  saber,  but  the  pistol  was  substituted  for 
it  and  did  most  excellent  service.  The  enemy  was  driven 
from  his  position  and  lost  fearfully  in  killed  and 
wounded. 

(Lieut.  Col.  Thos.  M.  Browne  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part 
I,  p.  276.) 
Regiment          Ext.    No.   63. — In  one  day  six  distinct  regimental 

makessix  J  & 

charges  in  one  charges  Were  made  besides  a  number  of  smaller  ones. 
jnBrandy^ation,          (Col.   Wyndham,   1st  N.  J.   Cav.,   R.   R.,  Vol.   27, 

Part  I,  p.  966:) 

Brigade  makes          Ext.  No.  64. — Soon  commenced  a  series  of  charges 
Brandy  station,  and  counter  charges  by  the  5th,  6th  and  15th  Va.  Cav 
alry.    There  were  five  distinct  charges  made  at  this  point, 
which  resulted  in  leaving  us  in  possession  of  the  railroad 
and  station. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Lomax,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I, 
p.  465.) 
charges  made          Ext.  No.  65. — Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  six  distinct 

by  a  division  in  .    .    . 

battle.  charges  were  made  by  parts  of  the  division  after  the  gen- 

va,.qsept.r  lateral  advance  toward  Winchester — two  by  the  2d  Brigade 
and  one  by  the  1st  Brigade  against  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
one  by  the  2d  Brigade  and  one  by  the  reserve  against  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  artillery,  and  one,  the  final  charge, 
in  which  all  three  of  the  brigades  were  concerned. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  445.) 


S3 

Ext.  No.  66.  —  Baker  was  charged  by  a  fresh  regi-    charges  and 
ment.     Then  I  put  in  the  Cobb  Legion  and  broke  the  at-  C°vwmm**v™', 
tacking  party.     The  Cobb  Legion  was  again  attacked/" 
and  again  with  the  Jeff  Davis  Legion-  I  turned  the  flank; 
and  this  series  of  charges  went  on  until  all  my  regiments 
named  had  charged  three  times  and  I  had  gained  ground 
to  the  right  and  front  of  more  than  half  a  mile. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  311,  Upperville.) 

Ext.  No.  67,  -The  order  was  given  to  charge.  The  The  horse  as  & 
most  terrific,  yet  magnificent,  charge  ever  witnessed  wasWj7™sborou^ 
made.  The  saber  and  the  horses'  hoofs  were  about  our?^;  Augl  19' 
only  weapons. 

(Col.  E.  H.  Murray,  Comg.  Cav.  Div.,  R.  R.  Vol. 
38,  Part  II,  p.  864.) 

Ext.   No.   68.—  The  order  "By  fours,   right  about    charge  i,  very 
wheel"  was  heard.     The  result  was  most  unfortunate,  cffbelaugh^ 
The   enemy   saw   the   wheel    and    instantly   ordered    the  neuvertng0*  : 
charge.      Colonel    Hampton   again   ordered    the    "Right    cavalry  8eizes 
about  wheel"  and  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  his  men; 


but  it  was  of  no  avail.     In  a  moment  they  were  swept  to    pieetwood  mil, 


the  side  of  the  road,  and  the  full  force  of  the  charge  f  ell  tVn) 
upon  the  4th  Virginia. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 
p.  289.) 

Ext.  No.  69.—  This  charge  was  gallantly  made  and    TWO  brigades 
gallantly  met  as  any  the  writer  ever  witnessed  during  Ji™e"hSJe!n  a 
four  years  of  active  service  on  the  outposts.    Taking  into  (ifilSg'aitlSj; 
estimation  the  number  of  men  that  crossed  sabers  in  this  Va"  JuneM8< 
single  charge   (being  nearly  a  brigade  on  each  side),  it 
was  by  far  the  most  important  hand-to-hand  contest  be 
tween  the  two  armies. 

As  the  blue  and  gray  riders  mixed  in  the  smoke  and 
dust  of  that  eventful  charge,  minutes  seemed  to  elapse 
before  the  effect  was  determined.  At  last  the  inter 
mingled  and  disorganized  mass  began  to  recede  ;  we  saw 
that  the  field  was  won  to  the  Confederates. 


34 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  277.  Battle  of  Brandy  Station.) 

Ext.  No.  70.  —  Observing  a  small  portion  of  Fed 
eral  cavalry,  Lieut.  Col.  Watts  was  sent  forward  with 
one  squadron.  His  charge  developed  the  fact  that  he  had 
attacked  the  advance  guard  of  a  brigade,  which  was  ad 
vancing  to  battle  in  column  of  regiments.  Munford 
formed  the  second  regiment  in  line  and  was  retiring  to 
gain  the  advantage  of  a  better  position,  when  he  heard 
the  order  given  to  the  enemy's  column,  "Forward,  trot, 
Quick  decision  march."  He  instantly  wheeled  by  fours  and  charged  at 

essential  to  a  cav 


alry  leader.         fuu  o-allop.     The  impetuosity  of  the  charge  carried  his 

Groveton,Va.,  b. 

Aag.  29,  186-i  regiment  entirely  through  the  first  line  of  the  enemy, 
with  whom  his  men  were  thoroughly  intermingled  in 
hand  to  hand  fight. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  106.) 
smaii  losses          Ext.  No.  71.  —  Nothing  but  the  impetuosity  of  the 

due  to  impetuos-  . 

ity  of  the  charges,  charges,  whereby  the  enemy  was  not  given  time  to  de- 

Mar.  i9,-Apr.  21,'  f  end  himself,  can  account  for  the  small  list  of  casualties. 

(Maj.   Genl.  E.  Upton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 

475.) 

Mounted  coi-          Ext.  No.  72.  —  The  fruits  of  our  victories  have  been 

umns  should  be 

ready  to  strike  matenally  increased  by  having-  mounted  columns  always 

when  the  enemy  J  J  £>  J 

breaks.  ready  to  take  advantage  of  opportunities  offering. 

Wilson's    Raid,  J 

Mar.  i9-Apr.  2i,  (  Bvt.  Brig.  Genl.  E.  F.  Winslow,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  482.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  saber  was  the  only  weapon 
used  for  shock  action  except  when  the  ground  was  un 
favorable,  such  as  a  close  or  wooded  country.  Under 
such  conditions  the  revolver  was  substituted  for  the 
saber.  (Ext.  62.)  To  secure  favorable  and  decisive  re 
sults  a  cavalry  commander  must  make  a  quick  decision 
and  quickly  take  the  initiative.  (Exts.  48,  50,  51,  68, 
70,  71,  72.)  A  timid  cavalry  leader  will  usually  fail 
where  a  bold  one  will  succeed.  In  many  cases  a  bold 
and  sudden  attack  will  result  in  small  losses  (Exts.  50, 


35 

51),  and  boldness  will  take  the  place  of  numbers.  (Ext. 
79.) 

The  pursuit  should  be  vigorous  as  long  as  it  is  kept 
up.  The  time  when  it  should  be  stopped  is  discussed  un 
der  the  head  of  ''Pursuit." 

Cavalry  in  falling  back  should  be  careful  to  move  to 
the  flanks  of  supporting  infantry,  otherwise  their  con 
fusion  is  communicated  to  the  infantry  with  serious  con 
sequences  to  the  latter.  (Ext.  53  and  471.) 

A  charge  should  always  be  met  by  a  charge.  (Exts. 
57,  58,  66,  92,  230.) 

A  regiment  can  make  as  many  as  six  charges  in  one 
day.  (Exts.  63,  64.) 

Tactical  organizations  launched  in  a  charge  are 
usually  not  greater  than  a  regiment  at  any  one  time 
(Exts.  63,  64,  66),  but  an  entire  brigade  may  be  charged 
as  such.  (Exts.  65,  69.)  In  one  case  the  charge  of  an 
entire  division  is  recorded.  (Ext.  65.) 

The  charge  will  be  most  destructive  if  the  enemy 
can  be  caught  in  the  act  of  maneuvering.  (Ext.  68.) 

A  mounted  column  should  always  be  held  in  readi 
ness  to  take  the  initiative  when  opportunity  is  offered. 
There  will  at  rare  intervals  be  a  golden  moment,  and  the 
commander  who  would  seize  it  must  be  found  ready. 
(Exts.  68,  72.) 

Ground  scouts  should  always  be  sent  in  advance  of 
attacking  troops.  (Ext.  68.) 

Reserves  should  have  sabers  drawn.     (Ext.  61.) 

Care  must  be  exercised  that  cavalry  does  not  arrive 
at  the  charging  point  in  a  distressed  or  blown  condition. 
(Ext.  95,  411,  418.)  The  distance  over  which  cavalry 
can  travel  at  an  increased  gait  and  still  be  fit  to  deliver 
a  shock  will  depend  upon  their  training.  Frederick  the 
Great  required  that  his  cavalry  should  be  able  to  pass 
over  4,000  yards  at  a  trot,  1,800  yards  at  a  gallop,  and 
still  be  able  to  finish  300  to  400  yards  at  full  speed. 
Modern  conditions  with  long  range  fire  arms,  more  than 
ever,  make  it  necessary  that  cavalry  be  able  to  pass  over 
great  distances  at  high  speed. 


36 

Extract  418  speaks  of  charging  five  miles,  but  it  is 
likely  that  the  language  exaggerates  to  some  extent.  See 
also  Extracts  411,  418. 

CHARGING   ARTILLERY. 

charge  battery          Ext.  No.  73.  —  They  made  a  charge  across  a  deep 

using  only  the 

*»beT.  ravine  and  a  creek,  up  a  steep  hill,  the  road  rough  and 

sept.  ^fms.  *''  stony,  and  through  a  heavy  shell  fire,  right  up  to  the 
muzzle  of  the  guns,  two  of  which  they  brought  off  with 
out  firing  a  shot,  using  nothing  but  the  saber. 

(Col.  Davies,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  120.) 

Attack  with          Ext.  No.  74.  —  The  enemy  moved  a  brigade  to  en- 
fh^centS6  and  gage   the   2d   Iowa    Cavalry,    one   regiment   dismounted 

dismounted  men  ,  .        .   ,  i.inir  •  j 

on  the  flanks.      as  skirmishers  on  both  flanks  of  a  regiment  mounted. 

trauon^badlac-  Mounted  and  dismounted  men  of  the  enemy  came  for 

ward  in  fine  style,  the  howitzers  of  the  2d  Iowa  firing 

Defense  holds  .  ,    .  .. 

their  fire.  rapidly.     The  regiment  lying  on  the  ground  waited  until 


y.  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  within  50  yards   (Confederate 
Federal  cav-  report  savs  60  yards)  ,  sprang  to  their  feet,  and,  with 

airy  use  rapid  fire  '  J 

thewa?  during  cheers,  poured  in  a  severe  fire  from  revolving  rifles.     A 
TenilieMov  1s'  ^ew  men  reacnec^  tne  g"11118'  tne  repulse  was  thorough. 
l*™'  (Col.  Edward  Hatch,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  245.) 

Attackartiiiery          Ext.  No.  75.  —  Colonel  LeGrange,  by  a  magnificent 

with  sabers.  . 

Fair  Garden,  and  gallant  saber  charge  upon  the  Fair  Garden  road, 

Tenn.,    Jan.    27,  .  f          M1  1      . 

1084.  captured  two  pieces  of  artillery,  sabered  the  cannoneers 

and  supports  and  captured  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 

(Col.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R,  Vol.  32,  Part  I,  p.  140.) 

cavalry  farm          Ext.  No.  76.  —  From  a  personal  examination  of  the 

in  column  of  •    1  >    1 

squadrons  to  ground,  I  discovered  that  a  successful  charge  might  be 

charge  a  battery.  fe  ° 

Yellow  Tavern,  made  upon  the  battery  of  the  enemy,  keeping  well  to 
the  right.  With  this  intention,  I  formed  the  1st  Mich. 
Cav.  in  column  of  squadrons  under  cover  of  the  woods. 
As  soon  as  the  1st  Mich,  moved  from  the  cover  of  the 
woods  the  enemy  divined  our  intention  and  opened  a 
brisk  fire  with  shell  and  canister.  Before  the  battery 
could  be  reached  there  were  five  fences  to  be  opened  and 
a  bridge  to  cross,  over  which  it  was  impossible  to  pass 
more  than  three  at  one  time.  Yet  notwithstanding  these 
obstacles,  the  1st  Mich,  advanced  boldly,  and  when  with- 


37 

in  200  yards  of  the  battery,  charged  it  with  a  yell 
which  spread  terror  before  them.  Two  pieces  of  can 
non,  two  limbers  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  were 
among  the  results  of  this  charge. 

(Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  818.) 

Note. — During  this  charge  two  regiments  engaged 
the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  front  while  the  1st  Mich, 
executed  its  charge. 

Ext.  No.  77. — A  part  of  the  1st  N.  T.  cavalry  came    Artmery 
.       j  out  support  re- 

thundering  down  the  narrow  ridge,  striking-  McGregor's  p«l8M  cavalry 

charge,  using  re- 

and  Harts  unsupported  batteries  in  the  flank,  and  riding  volveri- 

..  *     Brandy  Station, 

through  and  between  guns  and  caissons  from  right  to  va.,junee,  ises. 

left,  but  met  by  a  determined  hand-to-hand  contest  from 

the  cannoneers  with  pistols,  sponge  staffs  and  whatever 

else  came  handy  to  fight  with.     The  charge  was  repulsed 

by  artillerists  alone,  not  a  solitary  friendly  trooper  being 

within  reach  of  us. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  278.) 

Ext.   No.   78. — "Now,   don't   express   any   opinion,    There  ain't  no 
but  answer  my  question,  'what's  the  best  way  to  charge  charge  aWbaJtery! 
a  battery?'     He  looked  me  squarely   in  the  eye   for  a 
few  seconds  and  then  said  very  earnestly,   'Lieutenant, 
to  tell  you  the  God's  truth,  thar  ain't  no  good  way  to 
charge  a  battery.'  " 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

COMMENTS. 

Against  artillery  the  saber  was  frequently  used  as 
the  charging  weapon  (Exts.  73,  75.)  The  best  results 
will,  however,  be  obtained  by  using  the  revolver,  since 
the  gunners  will  take  refuge  behind  their  pieces  and  can 
do  good  execution  with  the  revolvers  with  which  they 
are  armed,  (Ext.  77.) 

A  frontal  charge  against  artillery  is  not  apt  to  suc 
ceed  unless  the  distance  is  very  short  (Ext.  68)  ;  the 
greater  the  distance  charged  the  less  the  chance  of  suc 
cess.  The  flank  attack  offers  a  fair  chance  of  success 


38 

unless  the  artillery  is  well  supported  by  foot  troops. 
(Ext.  76.)  The  frontal  attack  on  artillery  with 
mounted  troops  in  the  center  and.  dismounted  troops  on 
the  flanks  is  an  example  of  the  poorest  kind  of  tactics. 
(Ext  74.) 

The  best  time  to  strike  artillery  is  when  it   is  in 
the  act  of  limbering  or  unlimbering. 

CHARGING   FOOT   TROOPS. 

charging  in-  Ext.  No.  79.  —  At  4:00  p.  m.  the  enemy  pressed 
nk<  warmly  along  our  entire  line.  The  troops  on  my  left 
gave  way  and  an  entire  corps  of  the  enemy  rushed  in 
pushing  in  on  our  rear  till  they  gained  our  hospitals,  and 
were  resting  directly  upon  the  only  line  of  retreat  of  our 
army.  I  immediately  charged  his  left  flank,  feeling  cer 
tain  that  the  boldness  and  rapidity  of  a  charge  was  all 


raB?dftnesstake(s^iat  cou^  ^n  any  manner  check  a  force  so  vastly  our 

toe  place  of  num-  SUperjors  jn  numbers.     The  rangers  broke  through  the 

c  Var^ises8'^116  °^  skirmishers  without  breaking  their  impetus  and 

pushed  on,  striking  the  main  line  almost  at  the  same  time 

with  Allen's  gallant  Alabamians,  which  threw  the  entire 

force  of  the  enemy  in  a  most  rapid  and  disorderly  retreat. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  Jos.  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  47, 

Part  I,  p.  1131.) 

carairy  catches          Ext.    No.    80.  —  Wilson,    with    Mclntosh's    brigade 

infantry      in     a  1111 

cafion  where  it  leading,  made  a  gallant  charge  through  the  long  canon, 
8uccwsfuirigeB  U  anc^   meeting  the   advance   of    Ramsen's    rebel   infantry 
opeqmm  creek,  division,  drove  it  back  and  captured  the  earthworks  at 
the  mouth  of  the  cafion. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  P.  47.) 

Against  shaken          Ext.  No.  81.  —  The  charge  of  the  left  column  was 

charge  boot  to  ordered  ;  the  gallant  Custer  led  it  ;  boot  to  boot  these 

op'eqnon  Cre<k,  brave  horsemen  rode  in.     The  enemy's  line  broke  into 

v».,  *«pt.  19,  isbi  a  thousanc[   fragments   under  the   shock.     The   reserve 

brigade    followed    the   blow,    and    all    was    lost    to   the 
enemy. 

(Brig.  Genl.   W.   Merritt,  R.   R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  445.) 


39 

Ext.  No.  82.  —  The  enemy  now  threw  a  heavy  force 
of  infantry  across  the  river  on  the  left  of  the  position,  while  forming. 

Front  Boyal  Vs 

The  4th  and  part  of  the  6th  N.  Y.  were  ordered  to  Aug.  ie,  1864.' 
charge  them  before  they  could  succeed  in  forming.  This 
was  successfully  accomplished.  While  the  4th  and  the 
6th  were  charging  the  rebel  infantry,  the  cavalry  again 
advanced  to  turn  our  right.  As  soon  as  their  column 
was  fully  exposed,  two  squadrons  of  the  6th  N.  Y. 
were  ordered  to  charge,  and  again  broke  and  routed 
them. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Thos.  C.  Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  474.) 

Ext.    No.    83.—  At    this    time    a    line    of    infantry  edlnwwiey?nathge 

.  r~*  .     act   of  emerging. 

emerged  from  the  woods  in  our  front.      I  hey  were  in  from  the  woods. 

some  disorder.     General  Merritt  at  once  ordered  me  to 

charge,  which  I  did  by  changing  front  obliquely  to  the 

left,   the   evolution   being   splendidly   executed   by  both 

regiments  at  the  gallop,  when,   like  a  whirlwind,   they    ^  cut  geems 

dashed  on  the  unfortunate  infantry,   who  were  vainly  tofa  be  tgrefened 

endeavoring  to  form.     It  was  a  terrible  scene.     Right  on,  g*  on  foot 

over  and  through  the  rebel  lines,  dashed  the  wild  troopers, 

slashing  right  and  left,  pistoling  those  who  had  again 

seized  their  guns  after  surrender  and  taking  prisoners 

by  the  score. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Thos.  C.  Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  482.) 

Ext.    No.   84.  —  The   enemy,   mounted,   three   times    charge  deiiver- 

•"  ed  by  successive 

charged  our  dismounted  men  in  an  open  field,  and  wereblows-  ^^ 
as  often  repulsed,  but  not  until,  mingling  in  our  ranks,  Term.,  Dec.  24,  '&s\ 
some   of   his   men   were    brought    to    the    ground    with 
clubbed  guns. 

(Maj.  Genl.  W.  T.  Martin,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.  547.) 

Ext.  No.  85.  —  As  we  moved  up,  the  whole  force  (of 
the  enemy)  charged  down  at  a  gallop,  and  I  am  proud 
to  say  my  men  did  not  disappoint  me.  Standing  firm,  take 


they   repulsed  the  grandest  cavalry  charge  I   ever  wit- 
nessed.     The  2d  and  7th  Tenn.  drove  back  the  advance 


40 

line,  and  as  it  wheeled  in  retreat,  poured  upon  them  a 
destructive  fire.  Each  successive  line  of  the  enemy  shared 
the  same  fate,  etc. 

(Maj.  Genl.  N.  B.  Forrest,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12, 
Part  I,  p.  354.) 

Ext.  No.  86. — The  column  being  attacked  in  rear, 
General  Kilpatrick  ordered  me  to  withdraw  my  command 
and  form  for  a  charge  on  the  attacking  force.  I  formed 
my  brigade  (now  reduced  to  a  little  over  700  of  all 

menhtaeform gin ranks)    in   line   of   reg™ental   column  of    fours    (three 

umnoffouS601"  regiments).    I  sent  a  few  men  from  each  of  my  columns 

are  senToutcouts  t0  c^ar§'e  as  f°ragers,  and  remove  portions  of  the  first 

fence,  and  moved  forward  at  a  trot  until  I  arrived  on  top 

of  the  rising  ground  behind  which  we  had  formed,  when 

charging  cav-  we  rushed  forward  at  a  gallop.     One  fence  still  inter- 
airy  knock  down 

a  fence,  and  pass  vened  between  us  and  the  rail  barricades,  from  behind 

on  to  the  attack. 

LoTejoy  station,  which  the  rebels  were  firing.  The  leading  horses,  in 
'trying  to  leap  the  fence,  knocked  off  some  of  the  top 
rails,  and  gaps  were  soon  made  through  which  the  col 
umns  poured.  The  rebels  held  their  position  until  we 
were  within  about  ten  rods,  when  they  broke  from  their 
cover  and  scattered  in  the  wildest  confusion. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p. 
814.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  is  now  generally  accepted  that  unshaken  infantry 
cannot  be  successfully  charged  in  front  by  cavalry.  This 
is  not  necessarily  true.  The  infantry  of  Frederick  the 
Great  in  solid  lines,  three  deep,  delivered  a  fire  of  50- 
caliber  balls  as  rapidly  as  our  thin  lines,  with  two  yards 
intervals,  can  now  deliver  a  fire  of  30-caliber  bullets. 
Then  every  ball  that  hit  a  horse  stopped  him.  Unless 
hit  in  a  vital  spot  by  a  30-caliber  bullet,  a  horse  with 
many  wounds  will  now  finish  the  charge  and  still  be  able 
to  leave  the  field.  There  will  be  many  opportunities 
offered  for  a  successful  charge  against  infantry  other 
than  directly  against  its  front.  It  can  be  charged  in 
flank  (Ext.  79)  ;  when  changing  front  (Ext.  55) ;  while 


41 

forming  (Ext.  82)  ;  while  in  column  emerging  from  a 
defile  or  from  the  woods  (Ext.  83)  ;  when  shaken  by 
fire  (Ext.  81) ;  in  a  canon  where  it  cannot  deploy  (Ext. 
80). 

If  infantry  can  be  surprised  by  a  well  executed 
charge,  it  is  likely  that  its  fire  will  be  very  inaccurate. 
(Ext.  51.) 

It  will  often  be  possible  to  support  a  mounted  charge 
by  dismounted  fire  or  the  fire  of  artillery  delivered  from 
a  flank  position;  this  will  keep  down  the  enemy's  fire 
or  divert  it  from  the  charging  troops. 

When  dismounted  toops  break  through  a  firing  line 
their  advance  may  be  checked  by  a  mounted  charge. 
(Exts.  79,  219.) 

CHARGING   FIELD   WORKS. 

Ext.  No.  87. — A  portion  of  the  6th  Mich.  Cav.,  see-    cavalry  charge 

earthwork. 

ing  that  only  a  portion  of  the  enemy  were  behind  earth 
works,  charged.     At  a  trot  they  passed  up  the  hill,  re 
ceiving  the  fire  of  the  whole  line,  and  the  next  moment 
rode  through   and   over  the  earthworks,   passed   to  the  h 
right  and  left,  sabering  the  rebels  along  the  entire  line,  ef 
and  returned  with  a  loss  of  30  men. 

(Reference  omitted.) 

Ext.  No.  88. — They  had  constructed  barricades  and  charging  rifle 
rifle  pits,  which  we  charged  and  captured.  Todd's  javen», 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p.  V> 
776.) 

Ext.  No.  89. — Four  mounted  companies  from  the    Field   works 

charged  in  flank 

same  regiment  followed  in  rear  of  Captain  Abraham,  and,  |dter  bein«  turn- 
after  crossing  the  bridge,  turned  to  the  right  and  charged    coiumbns,  Ga., 
in  flank  the  works  at  the  lower  bridge,  capturing  (500) 
prisoners  and  three  guns  at  that  point. 

(Maj.  Genl.  E.  Upton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
475.) 

Ext.  No.  90. — The  enemy's  cavalry  emerged  f rom  Bt^neef y^  °* 
the  woods  and  a  hand-to-hand  conflict  ensued.  The  gf^JJJ and  pis" 
enemy  outnumbering  us  three  to  one,  we  retired  behind  j^YVeS1  Va" 
a  stone  wall  and  maintained  our  position,  repulsing  the 


42 

repeated  charges  of  the  enemy  by  well-directed  carbine 
and  pistol  firing. 

(Gal.  Wm.  Gamble,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  933.) 
Mounted  attack          Ext.  No.  91. — Brigadier  General  Farnsworth  moved 

of    stone    fences 

?aen??yded  by  **" with  the  lst  W-  Va-  and  18th  Pa->  followed  by  the  1st 
8 Gettysburg, July  Vt.  and  5th  N.  Y.,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  one  position 
to  another  until  a  heavy  stone  wall  was  reached,  behind 
which  the  rebel  infantry  was  gathered  in  great  numbers. 
The    1st   Vt.   and   the    1st   W.   Va.,   led  by   the   gallant 
Farnsworth,  cleared  the  fence  and  sabered  the  rebels  in 
rear, 
sameasabo™.          (Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  993.) 

Anyone  not  cognizant  of  the  minutiae  of  this  charge 
upon  infantry  under  cover  of  heavy  timber  and  stone 
fences  will  fail  to  form  a  just  conception  of  its  mag 
nitude. 

(Major  Capehart,  ist  W.  Va.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
27,  Part  I,  p.  1019.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  mounted  attack  of  field  works 
was  not  unusual.  The  most  persistent  was  the  attack 
on  the  right  of  the  Confederate  lines  at  Gettysburg,  on 
July  3d,  where  the  Confederates  were  behind  a  succes 
sion  of  breast-high  stone  fences.  In  these  attacks,  the 
gallant  Farnsworth  lost  his  life.  It  is  believed  that  these 
attacks  were  the  cause  of  the  suspension  of  the  general 
attack  against  the  Federal  left. 

More  attention  should  be  given  in  our  service  to 
the  matter  of  jumping  obstacles.  Unless  cavalry  can 
pass  ordinary  obstacles,  it  will  meet  with  defeat  when 
otherwise  there  should  be  every  reason  to  expect  success. 

FORMATION   USED   IN   CHARGING. 

charge  in  coi-          Ext.  No.  92. — The  charge  was  made  in  column  of 

umn  of  fours.  .  -111 

cavalry  receiv-  *ours  an^  wltn  tne  saber.  It  was  received  by  the  enemy 
staSmnlma/ex^  standing  in  line,  drawn  up  in  the  road  and  on  either 
P<Tot»pott0mj  ^de  °f  it>  and  with  an  almost  harmless  discharge  of  their 

»2.Va"June  pistols.  -jiiad 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  56.) 


43 

Ext.  No.  93.  —  Not  50  yards  below,  Colonel  Percy    At  the  battle 
Windham  was  advancing  the  1st  N.  T.  Cav.  in  magnificent  Brandy   station 

/  both  sides  charge 

order,  in  column  of  squadrons,  with  flags  and  guidons  nn    °f 


flying,     (p.  271  below.)     Hampton  had  formed  his  four    June  9,1868. 
regiments  in  column  of  squadrons,  and,  with  everything 
in   hand    for   action,    was   moving   forward   briskly   to 
attack. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  274.) 

Ext.  No.  94.  —  I  immediately  ordered  the  charge  in   same  at  Brandy 

J  Station. 

close  columns  of  squadrons,  and  swept  the  hill  clear  of    June  9,  ises. 
the  enemy,  he  being  scattered  and  entirely  routed. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  277.) 

Ext.  No.  95.  —  At  the  fight  at  Cass  Station,  May  24,,  charge  over  a 

J         '  long  distance  de- 


1864,   Stoneman's  cavalry  is  reported  to  have  charged  grog^  C^e8it°hne' 
in  line  over  an  open  field  for  about  1,000  yards.     Wjheel-  JJ^YnSdiS?^ 
er's  cavalry,  in  two  lines,  one  directly  behind  the  other,  MayS|58t^64n'  G*" 
supported   by   other   troops    in    column,    waited   till   the 
Federals  had  approached  to  within  200  yards.     The  Fed-    Troops  which 

strike   with    the 


eral  line  was  by  this  time  disorganized  by  its  long  charge. 

At  this  time   Wheeler's  cavalry  started    forward   at   aceed- 

walk,   then   trot   and   finally   sounded   the  charge   when 

about  30  yards  from  the  enemy.  edCata3oeydseliver" 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.   186, 
reports  Wheeler  successful.) 

Ext.   No.  96.  —  They  had  rested  to  feed  their  ani-  U^ffi0™sco1' 
mals,  and  were  about  to  take  the  road  thence  to  Newport.    Cosby  creek, 

Tcnn.,     Jan.     14, 

I  immediately  charged  them  in  column  of  fours,  routing1864- 

their  entire  command. 

(Col.  Wm.  J.  Palmer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I,  p.  75.) 

Ext.  No.  97.  —  'Six  companies  were  now  ordered  up    same. 

at  a  gallop,  and  charged  in  column  of  fours.  Ten!n., 

1864 

(Col.  LaGrange,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I,  p.  144.) 

Ext.  No.  98.  —  The  1st  Brigade  moved  to  a  position    Brigade  forms 

.  .  for  charge  in  col- 

near  the  front,   and,   forming  in  column  of  squadrons,  umn  of  •quad- 
made  ready  to  give  the  final  stroke  to  the  work  of  the    opequoa  creek, 

J  Va.,  Sept.  19,1864. 

day. 


44 

(Brig.  Genl.  W.  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I,  p. 
445.) 
Brigade  attacks          Ext.  No.  99.  —  The  1st  Brigade,  in  column  of  regi- 

in  column  of  re-  .  ,1-1 

giments  in  line,  ments  m  line,  moved   forward  like  an  immense  wave, 

Hiddle1own,Va.,     ,         ,  r  ,  ,. 

Oct.  19,  1864.        slowly  at  first,  but  gathering  strength  and  speed  as  it 

progressed,  overwhelmed  a  battery  and  its  supports,  etc. 

(Brig.   Genl.   W.   Merritt,   R.   R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 

p.  450.) 

Division  form-          Ext.  No.  100.  —  This  division  was  formed  in  line  of 

ed  in  three  lines  ,      AA,  .  ,  .  .  1  r   ,  ,. 

of  equal  strength,  battle,  with  regiments  in  column  ot  battalions. 
o5!w!w^'V*''          (Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 

p.  523.) 
Five   brigades          Ext.  No.  101.  —  At  this  time  five  brigades  of  cavalry 

advance   in  line  .  ,,    ,    ..  .  f  n         r      1 

of  battle,   regi-were  moving  on  parallel  lines;  most,  if  not  all,  of  the 

merits     in     col-  ... 

umns  of  squad-  brigades  moved   by  brigade   front,   regiments  being   in 
The  whole  re-  Para^el    columns    of    squadrons.      One    continuous    and 
!  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  covered  the  advance,  using  only 


mounted.car    ie  the  carbine,  while  the  line  of  brigades,  as  they  advanced 

va^  septni9CT8e6^'.  across  the  open  country,  the  bands  playing  the  national 

airs,  presented  in  the  sunlight  one  moving  mass  of  glit 

tering   sabers.      This,   combined   with   the   various   and 

bright  colored  banners  and  battle  flags,  intermingled  here 

and  there  with  the  plain  blue  uniforms  of  the  troops, 

i  m  p  o  sin  g  furnished  one  of  the  most  inspiring  as  well  as  imposing 

scenes   on  the  -  .    , 

battle  field  in-  scenes  of  martial  grandeur  ever  witnessed  upon  a  battle 

spire  soldiers  to 
perform    brave  field. 

(Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  456.) 

COMMENTS. 

In  forming  for  the  charge,  almost  every  formation 
was  used  : 

Column  of  fours  (Exts.  92,  96,  97)  ;  column  of 
squadrons  (Exts.  76,  93,  98,  101);  close  column  of 
squadrons  (Exts.  56,  59,  94)  ;  line  of  regiments  each  in 
column  of  fours  (Ext.  86)  ;  brigade  in  column  of  regi 
ments  each  in  line,  making  three  lines  of  equal  strength 
(Ext.  99)  ;  division  formed  in  line  of  regiments  each  in 
column  of  battalions,  also  making  three  lines  of  equal 


45 

strength  (Ext.  100).  The  formation  depended  alto 
gether  on  the  conditions.  In  a  lane  a  column  of  fours 
was  all  that  could  be  used.  When  there  was  room  the 
column  of  squadrons  or  close  column  of  squadrons 
seemed  to  be  preferred.  This  gave  a  front  of  two  troops 
and  a  depth  of  six  lines.  If  at  full  distance  the  squad 
rons  in  rear  could  be  diverted  to  other  objectives,  used 
for  a  flank  attack  or  held  in  reserve  to  fulfill  the  principle 
that  victory  will  lie  with  that  side  which  can  put  in  the 
last  formed  reserve.  (Exts.  66,  95.) 

As  soon  as  the  leading  unit  has  delivered  its  shock, 
it  should  rally  in  rear  of  the  column  (Exts.  52,  54,  57, 
64,  65,  66,  84,  233).  This  exercise  should  be  practiced 
frequently. 

The  more  solid  the  mass  at  the  instant  of  impact, 
the  greater  will  be  the  effect  of  the  shock.  The  charge 
should,  therefore,  be  made  boot-to-boot.  (Ext.  81.)  Not 
withstanding  this  well-known  maxim,  the  tendency  is  to 
open  out  the  rank  at  a  time  when  the  troopers'  greatest 
safety  lies  in  riding  well  closed  toward  the  guide. 

If  the  three  line  formation  is  used,  the  first  line 
should  usually  be  heavier  than  either  the  support  or  the 
reserve.  If  time  is  precious  and  success  depends  upon 
one  cast  of  the  die,  the  first  line  should  be  as  strong 
as  possible :  if  the  enemy  has  reserves  constantly  arriving, 
then  numerous  lines  should  be  used. 

The  lines  should  be  far  enough  apart  so  that,  if  the 
advanced  line  is  overthrown,  it  will  not  communicate  its 
confusion  to  the  lines  in  rear.  For  this  reason  it  is 
better  to  hold  the  troops  in  rear  of  the  second  line  in 
line  of  columns.  The  first  line  should  be  preceded  by 
mounted  skirmishers  using  mounted  rifle  fire.  (Ext. 
101,  239.)  These  same  tactics  were  used  by  Frederick 
the  Great.  The  mounted  skirmishers  amount  to  the  same 
thing  as  ground  scouts  which  would  be  sent  out  from 
troops  in  the  front  line. 


46 


After  a  line  has  been  launched  in  a  charge,  the 
commander  can  only  influence  the  fight  by  the  use  of 
troops  held  in  reserve.  The  commander  should  not  per 
sonally  engage  in  the  fight  until  after  his  last  reserve  is 
thrown  in.  The  place  for  regimental  bands  should  be 
not  caring  for  the  wounded,  but  in  the  battle,  inspiring 
with  stirring  martial  music  those  engaged  in  the  combat. 
(Exts.  101,  223,  469.) 


47 


CHAPTER  III. 


FIRE  ACTION. 


MOUNTED   FIRE   ACTION  —  CARBINE. 

Ext.  No.   102.  —  I  ordered  my  first  two  squadrons    TWO  squadrons 

use    mounted 

to  advance  carbine  and  be  ready  to  receive  them.     The  carbine  flre. 
enemy  came  dashing  down  the  road.      The  fire  of  my  JuiKj-ses! 
regiment  being  too  hot  for  him,  the  enemy  wheeled  and 
I  ordered  the  charge. 

(Lieut.  Col.  Doster,  4th  Pa.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27, 
Part  I,  p.  984.) 

Ext.  Nb.    103.  —  Being  dismounted,  our  men  were    Mounted  fire 

has  not  the  pre- 


.  .     . 

able  to  fire  with  much  greater  rapidity  and  precision 

the  enemy,  who  were  exposed  by  remaining  on  horse-  f^'men  exposes 

back,  and  fired  high  above  our  heads.  Roju^Tenn  €octs 

(Col.   O.    H.  LaGrange,   R.   R.,  Vol.   30,   Part  II,  ^  * 
p.   683.) 

Ext.  No.   104.  —  At  this  place  the  saber  companies    Great  havoc 

.  .  .  done    with    car- 

did  great  havoc  with  their  carbines  (mounted).  bine  mounted. 

(Maj.  D.  E.  Coon,  2d  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  re^lrW"88'1 
I,  p.  300.) 

Ext.  No.  105.  —  I  soon  met  the  enemy  in  consider-    Mounted  »kir- 

7  mishers  use  car- 

able    force    and    skirmished     (both    mounted    and    dis-bine- 

Near  Knoxville, 

mounted)   with  him.  i«3B<)  Feb>  20' 

(Lieut.  Col.  Robert  Klein,  3d  Ind.  Cav.,  R.  R,  Vol. 
32,  Part  I,  p.  410.) 

Ext.    No.    106.  —  By   immediate    order   of    General    charge  with. 
Upton,  I  sent   Co.  I  to  the  left  in  line  over  the  open    Wilson's  Raid, 

r    1  i  1-11  •   1    APr-  *>  1866- 

fields,  over  which  they  at  once  charged,  mounted,  with 
carbines,  upon  the  plainly  visible  lines  of  the  enemy. 

(Col.  John  W.  Noble,  3d  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  491.) 

See  also  Ext.  101. 


48 
caught          Ext.  No.  107.  —  When  two  panels  of  the  fence  were 


iSstantfy  ta       down,  the  men   (enemy)   trotted  through  for  75  yards, 

the  aggressive  J  J  J 

and  wins  a  most  and  gradually  came  down  to  a  walk  and  almost  halted. 

complete  victory.  J 

Major  Forbes1  first  platoon  (mounted  and  225  yards  from 
bine  fire  at  225  the  fence)  was  ordered  to  fire  with  carbines.     Here  was 

yards  is  not  eft'ec-  . 

tire.  the  first  mistake.    It  created  confusion  among  the  horses, 

Pistol   lire  at  and  the  squadron  in  the  rear  added  to  it  by  firing  a  few 

ish.yar  *"  pistol  shots.  Had  the  order  been  given  to  draw  saber 
and  charge,  the  rebels  would  never  have  got  their  gun 
off. 

Major  Forbes  attempted  to  move  the  first  squadron 
by  the  right  flank.  The  rebels  saw  their  chance,  gave 
a  yell,  and  our  men,  in  the  confusion  of  the  moment, 
broke.  The  two  rear  squadrons  went  off  in  confusion. 

runrofo?  csaevvern  ^  have  onty  to  reP°rt  a  perfect  rout  and  a  chase  for  five 


zfonto  seven  miles.  More  than  100  horses  were  taken.  Men 
'  Va"  Jaly  killed,  12;  wounded,  37;  taken  prisoners  by  Mo<sby,  44. 
Mosby  had  about  200  men  with  him  and  used  the  re 
volver. 

(Col.  C.  R.  Lowell,  2d  Mass.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  37, 
Part  I,  p.  359.) 
Mounted  »hir-          Ext.  No.  108.  —  I  was  now  ordered  to  advance  and 

mishers  advance  .  .  .  .  . 

at   a  trot  with  press  the   enemy,   which   I   did   with   success,   my  skir- 

carbines. 

Near  Tom's  Run,  mishers  advancing  at  the  trot. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Thos.  C.  Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  483.) 
Forrest's  men          Ext.  No.   109.  —  The  Confederates,  advancing  with 

use  rifle  mounted 

aVwn  streets  of  spirit  through  the  town,  mounted,  began  to  fire  with  their 
okoiona,  Miss.,  long  rifles  as  they  came  within  100  vards  of  the  enemy. 

Apr.  22,  1863. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of   Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  393.) 

moused  "skVr-         Ext   N°"    HO.—  This  change  having  been  made,  a 

Soeo?ao)netem-strong  nne  °f  skirmishers  displayed  by  the  enemy  was 

^uet^burg^uiy  evidence  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  gained  our  right, 

and  were  about  to  attack  with  a  view  of  gaining  the  rear 

of  our  line  of  battle.     *     *     *     The  First  New  Jersey 

Cavalry  was  posted  as  mounted  skirmishers  to  the  right 

and  front  in  a  wood. 


49 

(Brig.  D.  McM.  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  956.) 

Ext.  No.   111. — In  a  few  minutes  the  enemy  came ingn0enmayra0davda°rce 
dashing  down  the  road,   when  I  ordered  my  first  two 
squadrons   to  advance  carbines  to  be   ready  to  receive 
them.     The  fire  of  my  regiment  being  too  hot  for  him,  June  21)  1863' 
the  enemy  wheeled,  and  I  ordered  the  charge. 

(Lieut.  Col.  W.  E.  Doster,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  984.) 

COMMENTS. 

Mounted  carbine  fire  was  often  used.  Its  use  was 
confined  mostly  to  mounted  skirmishers  which  preceded 
the  first  line  while  forming  for  attack.  (Exts.  108,  110, 
239.)  It  can  be  used  to  advantage  to  accelerate  the 
retreat  of  defeated  infantry,  but  should  not  replace  the 
saber,  which  is  more  effective.  (157.)  The  fire  of 
mounted  men  is  very  inaccurate,  since  one  hand  is  always 
necessary  to  control  the  horse.  (Ext.  103.) 

Mounted  carbine  fire  is  not  so  accurate  as  revolver 
fire  provided  the  force  armed  with  the  revolvers  comes  to 
close  quarters.  (Ext.  107.) 

MOUNTED    FIRE    ACTION — REVOLVER. 

Ext.   No.    112. — From  this   point   General  Lee  or-    charge  in  coi- 
clered  the  Third  to   charge.      The  order   was  executed  using  revolvers™ 
in  column  of  fours.     The  regiment  swept  down  the  line  vaK, Mar.  n. 
of  stone   fence  which  separated  them   from  the  enemy 
in  the  woods  beyond,  delivering  the  fire  of  their  pistols. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  210.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  seems  strange  that  so  little  mention  is  made  of 
mounted  revolver  fire  when  used  collectively.  The  in 
ference  is  that  collective  revolver  fire  was  but  little  used. 
Captain  Whittaker  refers  to  it  in  Ext.  41.  There  is 
numerous  mention  of  the  revolver  being  used  individ 
ually,  and  it  is  in  this  use  that  its  chief  value  lies. 


50 

Badly  defeated  cavalry,  if  vigorously  pursued  with 
the  revolver,  will  be  assembled  in  the  next  county.  ( Ext. 
107.) 

DISMOUNTED  FIRE   ACTION  —  AGAINST   CAVALRY. 

va?ueof°hoiS«iS  Ext-  No-  113' — It  may  not,  however,  be  amiss  to 
peratat8ionfonrfltbesay  that  one  of  the  lessons  of  his  operations  will  be  in 
the  demonstration  of  the  great  utility  in  war  of  horses 
in  the  rapid  transportation  of  a  body  of  men  to  the 
field  of  battle  or  operations,  there  to  be  employed  as 
riflemen  fighting  on  foot. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  683.  The  above  expression  of  opinion  was  written 
in  1867.) 

snooting  at          Ext.  No.   114. — We  moved  at  a  brisk  trot  and  so 
Sore?*  doaesgnot  sudden  was  the  movement  that  nearly  one-half  of  the 

occasion     heavy  .    .  , 

10Newman  Ga  8th  Ind>  §"ot  tnrou§"n  tne  lmes  without  receiving  a  shot, 
July  so,  1864.'  ''an(i  although  the  remainder  of  the  column  ran  the 
gauntlet  of  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry,  yet,  strange  to 
say,  but  one  man  was  wounded,  although  the  enemy 
was  in  some  places  near  enough  to  almost  touch  the 
horses. 

(Lieut.  Col.  F.  A.  Jones,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II, 
p.  877.) 

Ext.   No.   115. — Throwing  down  the   fence  of  the 

meadow,  some  300  poured  into  it,   formed  a  long  line 

and  dashed  across  with  sabers  drawn.     Four  companies 

had  by  this  time  dismounted  and  dropped  on  their  knees 

Fire  from  be-  behind  a  low  f ence.    They  held  their  fire  until  the  enemy 

hind  a  fence  gtea- 

dies  the  men.      was  witnin  30  yards,  when  they  opened.     Then  was  seen 
charge  fails  the  effect  of  the  volley  from  that  long,  thin  line,  which 
seemed  so  easy  to  break.     Every  man  had  elbow  room 
and  took  dead  aim  at  an  individual  foe.     Two-thirds  of 
^  rjc|ers  an<j  horses  seemed  to  go  down.     The  cavalry 
was  at  once  broken  and  recoiled. 
(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 


51 
Ext.  No.   116.  —  The  enemy  charged  upon  my  line    Dismounted 

i  111-  men   repulse   a 

twice,   but  were   repulsed   each  time  by  my  carbineers  mounted  charge. 

with  heavy  loss. 

(Col.  Wyndham,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  966.) 

Ext.  No.   117.  —  Three  successive  charges  were  re-    Same- 


pulsed  by  dismounted  men.  niml  V£ 

(Col.  Thompson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  1056.) 
Ext.  No.  118.  —  A  part  of  the  92d  dismounted  and    same. 

attacked  the  enemy  on  foot,  when  the  enemy  charged  Nov^iSeSl11'6*' 

on  horseback.     The  charge  was  received  and  repulsed, 

and  the  enemy  charged  in  turn. 

(Col.  Atkins,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  390.) 

Ext.  No.    119.  —  I  attribute  the  loss  of  the  gam  to    Horse  artillery 

needs  a  support. 

the  fact  that  the  enemy  could  advance  under  excellent 
cover  to  within  short  rifle  range  of  the  position  we  occu- 

Artillery    disa- 

pied,   to  the  killing  of  the   two  wheel  horses,   and  the 


want  of  a  regularly  designated  support.  James  River, 

Va    Julv  29   1864 

(Capt.  A.  M.  Randol,  1st  U.  S.  Art.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
40,  Part  I,  p.  616.) 

Ext.  No.  120.  —  The  enemy  was  compelled  to  retire    carbine  fire. 
before  the  terrific  carbine  fire.  jnne^r/sel'  Va>' 

(Genl.  Buford,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  921.) 

Ext.  No.   121.  —  Early  this  morning:  the  enemv  ad-    Dismounted 

J  cavalry    success- 

vanced  upon  me  in  a  pretty  strong  force.     (Cav.,  Inf.  J^}^h  ^f  t£J* 
&  Art.)     During  the  first  part  of  the  day  they  pressed  combined' 

Boonsborough, 

me   severely.  Towards   night   I   turned   the  Md-  Jul.v  s,  ises. 

tables  upon  them  and  drove  them  across  the  Antietam. 

*     *     *     All  my  fighting  had  to  be  on  foot. 

(Genl.  Buford,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  925.) 

Ext.   No.   122.  —  An  animated  fight  ensued,  princi-    Dismounted 

pally  on  foot,  the  ground  being  entirely  too  soft  f  rom  baevhirndg  stone 

recent  rains  to  operate  successfully  with  cavalry.     The  ^nkstown.  Md. 

enemy's   advance   was   handsomely    repulsed,    in   which  Jaly  10>  186bV 

Witcher's  cavalry,   on   foot  behind  a  stone   fence,   per 

formed  a  very  gallant  part,  standing  their  ground  with 

unflinching  tenacity. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27, 

Part  II,  p.  704.) 


52 

Demounted          Ext.   No.   123.  —  They  had  every  advantage  in  se- 

cavalry  fight  on  ,  .   .  ,    .  ,  .   ,  _ 

foot  for  ninelectmg  position,  and  to  drive  and  dislodge  them  I  was 
okoiona,  Miss.,  compelled  to  dismount  the  most  of  my  command  and 

Feb.  22,1864.  rill  •  -i  r 

fought  the  last  nine  miles  on  foot. 

(Maj.  Genl.  N.  B.  Forrest,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32, 
Part  I,  p.  353.) 

NO  rest  for  cav-  Ext.  No.  124.  —  It  was  nearly  daylight,  June  3d, 
before  my  command,  worn  and  jaded  from  its  exhaust 
ing  labors,  bivouacked  at  Linney's  house.  At  10:00 
A.  M.  I  received  orders  to  cross  to  the  west  side  of  the 

Tactical  use,  to  Totopotomy,  drive  the  rebel  cavalry  from  Haw's  Shop 
and  then  swing  to  the  left  again,  recross  the  creek  near 
^ts  source,  and  attack  the  left  of  the  rebel  infantry  line 

er.Jnne3.1864.      ^    ^ 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  882.) 

Formation  is  Ext.  No.  125.  —  The  Third  Brigade,  dismounted, 
gthenedCby8piao-  with  one  battalion  4th  regulars  on  each  flank,  charged 
o^gthTnanks°opfl  the  rebels  on  the  Lithona  road  and  drove  them  in  con- 

Lithonia,  Ga.,  r 
July  28,  1864.  lUSlOn. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II, 
p.  813.) 

Ext.  No.  126.  —  We  moved  forward  under  a  heavy 
fire  of  shot  and  shell  until  within  600  yards  of  the  top 
of  the  hill,  where  the  enemy  were  posted  behind  a  breast 
work  of  rails,  and  at  this  period  a  general  charge  was 
ordered,  and  the  skirmish  line,  being  reinforced  by 
Reinforcement  the  reserve,  dashed  forward  with  a  shout  and  a  yell, 

by     the    reserve  , 

carries  the  line  carrying  everything  before  them.    As  we  gamed  the  crest 
of  the  hill  our  ammunition  failed  and  in  some  parts  of 

It  is  convenient  . 

to  find  stones  and  the  line  the  enemy  were  actually  driven  from  their  posi- 

clubs    handy 

Clubs. 


Hanover  c   H.          (Lieut.  Col.  G.  A.  Purington,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part 

Va.,  May  oil  ioo4. 

I,  p.  894.) 

Regiment  fires  Ext.  No.  127.  —  The  horses  held  by  the  reins,  the 
m£?°honideinS<h£  men  maintained  the  position,  but  finding  it  impracticable 
?e?ns8e  ieto  charge  the  second  works,  they  mounted,  and  being 
:  relieved  by  the  infantry  line,  the  92d  was  withdrawn. 


53 

(Col.  Eli  H.  Murray,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II, 
p.  890.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  mobility  of  cavalry  renders  it  extremely  val 
uable  as  a  reinforcement  to  weak  points  in  the  line  of 
battle.  (Ext.  113.) 

A  rapidly  moving  target  does  not  suffer  heavy 
losses.  (Ext.  114.) 

From  behind  a  fence  troops  shoot  with  greater 
accuracy  than  when  in  the  open.  (Ext.  115.) 

Dismounted  men  can  often  stop  with  their  fire  a 
mounted  charge,  even  though  it  gets  as  close  as  50  yards. 
(Exts.  115,  116,  117,  118,  120,  121,  122.) 

All  references  show  that  a  very  large  part  of  the 
cavalry  fighting  was  done  on  foot. 

A  formation  for  attack  is  strengthened  by  placing 
regular  troops  on  the  flanks.  (Ext.  125.) 

The  time  for  a  skirmish  line  to  go  forward  is  when 
it  receives  fresh  troops  from  the  reserves.  (Ext.  126.) 

Dismounted  fire,  when  each  man  holds  his  horse  by 
the  reins,  is  very  rare.  (Ext.  127.) 

The  time  to  inflict  severe  losses  on  an  enemy  is  when 
his  attacking  line  breaks  to  the  rear.  (Exts.  85,  170.) 

Dismounted  fire  action  will  be  resorted  to  when  the 
ground  is  unsuited  to  mounted  action.  (Ext.  123.) 

DISMOUNTED  FIRE  ACTION — AGAINST  INFANTRY. 

Ext.   No.    128. — As  the  enemy  moved   up,   he  ex-    cavalry  attacks 

,    i   •       n       ,  infantry  in  flank. 

posed  his  flank  to  me.  I  at  once  ordered  General  Lee 
to  attack,  which  he  did  with  the  9th  and  10th  Va.  regi 
ments  in  the  handsomest  style,  leading  his  men  in  person. 
These  regiments  went  in  in  line  of  battle,  dismounted 
and  reserved  their  fire  until  very  near  the  enemy.  De-  .Firenotopened 
livering  it  regularly,  they  charged,  routing  the  enemy  the  Inem?.ear 
completely,  capturing  900  prisoners  and  10  standards. 

(Maj.  Genl.  Wade  Hampton,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  42, 
Part  I,  p.  948.) 

Ext.  No.  129. — Although  the  main  force  remained 
without  change  of  position  from  September  3  to  19, 


NO  re*t  for  cav-  still  the  cavalry  was  employed  every  day  in  harassing 

airy,  and  they    ,  .  ...  ..,...- 

should  permit  no  the  enemy,  its  opponents  being  principally  infantry.     In 
shenandoah  these  skirmishes  the  cavalry  was  becoming  educated  to 

Valley  Campaign.  . 

attack  infantry  lines. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  46.) 
Five  brigades  of          Ext.  No.  130..  —  About  a  mile  from,  Leetown  a  small 

cavalry  attack  m- 

f«m  try,  demount-  cavalry  f  orce  was  met  in  a  heavy  woods,  and  from  all 
Leetown^w.va.,  the  information  that  could  be  obtained,  all  went  to  show 
that  nothing  but  cavalry  was  in  our  front,  and  disposi 
tion  was  immediately  made  to  attack.  A  brigade  was 
sent  on  each  flank,  two  to  attack  in  front  and  one  held 
in  reserve.  Soon  after  the  attack  was  commenced,  it 
was  found  that  we  were  fighting  infantry. 

(Maj.  Genl.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  425.) 
opinion  that          Ext.  No.  131.  —  This  short  but  brilliant  engagement 

dismounted  cav-       n  ..  Al  , 

airy  is  as  good  as  reflected    great    credit   on    the    regiments    engaged,    and 
New   Market  established  the  fact  that  our  cavalry  can  dismount  and 
1864.'  '  '  with  their  carbines  successfully  repulse  their  own  front 

of  veteran  infantry. 

(Brig.  Genl.  T.  C.   Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol  43,  Part  I, 
p.  471.) 

in  rough  comr          ^xt-  ^°-   132.  —  It  was  now  almost  dark;  the  cav- 
alrymen  having  been  fighting  all  day  on  foot,  owing  to 


cavalry  fight  the  roughness  of  the  country,  were  very  much  fatigued. 

on  foot  all  day.  t  J  . 

miuborough  General  Hatch  was  ordered  to  bring  up  nis  horses,  collect 

Tenn,,Dec.  15,  '64..,  .  . 

his  men  and  bivouac  on  the  Hillsborough  pike. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I, 
p.  563.) 

Ext.  No.  133.  —  A  dispatch  was  received  directing 
that  Cold  Harbor  be  held  at  all  hazards,  and  I  therefore 
immediately  ordered  its  reoccupation,  changed  the  tem- 

Cavalry    con-  M    1  1        r 

struct  breast-  i)orary  breastworks   so  as  to  make  them   available   for 

works  for  infan-  .  . 

try  to  occupy,      our  troops,  dismounted  the  cavalry,  placing  them  behind 
Ammunition  these  works,  and  distributing  ammunition  in  boxes  along 
the  line.     While  this  was  being  done  the  enemy  could 


be  heard  giving  commands  and  making  preparations  to 


55 


attack  in  the  morning.    Just  after  daylight,  June  1st,  he    Magazine   fire 
marched  to  the  attack,  and  was  permitted  to  come  close 


to  our  little  works,   when  he  received  the  fire  of  our  °s  no  different1*! 

,  .  j  ,  .  ,  short  range. 

batteries  and  our  repeating  carbines,  which  were  used    Cold  Harbor,  Va., 
with  terrible  effect,  and  he  was  driven  back  in  confusion.  M' 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  794.) 

Ext.    No.    134.—  July  9th,   dismounted  and   waded    cavalry  con- 
the  Chattahoochee  in  rear  of  the  Third  Brigade;  threw 
up   breastworks   and   held   the   ground   till   dark,    when 
General  Newton's  division  of  the  4th  Corps  relieved  us. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p.' 
813.) 

Ext.  No.  135.  —  During  these  combats,  which  were 
mostly  on  foot   (the  enemy's  infantry  being  engaged), 
there  were  some  telling  charges  made  mounted.     *     *    * 
The  men  of  the  brigade,  from  long  and  constant  prac-    Brigade  be- 
tice,  are  becoming  perfect  in  the  art  of  foot  fighting  and  foot  flgSSS*  *' 
skirmishing.      They   drove   infantry    from   strong  posi-  ju'J'iofwS'  Md< 
tions. 

(Brig.  Genl.  W.   Merritt,   R.   R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  944.) 

Ext.   No.   136.—  To  check  this  advance,  four  regi-    Cavalry  attack 
ments  were  dismounted  and  moved  to  the   front.   This  int™tTl 

flew   nope   tn., 

strong    line    of    dismounted    cavalry    rushed    upon    the  v»»Kov-27>1868- 
enemy,  firing  volleys  from  their  carbines,  and  drove  the 
infantry  line  to  the  cover  of  advance  woods,  and  there 
held  it  at  bay. 

(Genl.   D.  McM.   Gregg,   R.   R.,  Vol.   29,   Part  I, 
p.  807.) 

Ext.  No.  137.  —  (My  dismounted  men  were  ordered 
to  charge  the  Yankee  skirmishers,  which  was  done  in  v»P*S5?!!», 
handsome  style,  driving  them  out  of  their  camps  and 
through  the  woods. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  B.  Gordon,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29, 
Part  I,  p.  903.) 


56 

cav»iry  fight          ^xt-     No.     138.  —  General    Armstrong's     division 
ii  a  almost  entirely  on  foot,  always  up  and  frequently 

' 


.  ,  sept.  20,  1863.  -n  acivance  Of  the  infantry. 

(Genl.  Forrest,  Battle  of  Chickamauga,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
30,  Part  II,  p.  525.) 

cavalry  charge          Ext.   No.   139.  —  The  2d  Indiana  were  dismounted 
s  cross  and  charged  upon  the  right  at  double  quick.    This  move- 

.,  Oct. 


(Col.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p. 
676.) 

Ext.  No.   140.  —  At  4:00  P.  M.  Colonel  Campbell's 

8eviersviWe,  _ 

Tenn.,Jai.26,  '64.  brigade  charged  dismounted. 

(Brig.  Genl.  S.  D.  Sturgis,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
p.  136.) 

cavalry  use  re-          Ext.  No.  141.  —  When  the  enemy's  line  reached  the 
wSSSffl™a?S!  crest,   a   fire   from   our   repeating   carbines   was   opened 

rapid  as  our  mo-  «  .          .,  •&       ^e       & 

dernarms.          UpOn  it,  whereupon  it  gave  way  in  disorder. 

This  counter  attack  against  the  infantry  was  made  by 
the  tide1?!  battle,  the  1st  and  2d  cavalry  divisions  simultaneously,  and  our 

Darby  town.  Va..  ,.  ,11-11 

July  27,  1864.       own  line  re-established. 

(Genl.    P.   H.    Sheridan,    R.   R.,   Vol.    36,    Part   I, 
p.  800.) 

Barricades.  Ext.  No.  142.  —  During  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea, 

it  was  the  regular  custom  for  cavalry  to  protect  them 
selves  every  night  by  throwing  up  log  barricades. 

(See  all  cavalry  reports,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  and  par 
ticularly  Report  148.) 

cavalry  attacks          Ext.  No.   143.—  Custer  found  Early  as  he  (Early) 

bfeast  worbkshiDd  had  promised,  at  Waynesborough,  in  a  well-chosen  posi- 

A  careful  re-  tion,   with  two  brigades  of  infantry  and   some  cavalry 

connaissance  -11  i 

JIiii11whii?ieatisISdSun^er  R°sser>  tne  infantry  occupying  the  breastworks. 
den  eauack  will  Custer,  without  waiting  for  the  enemy  to  get  up  his 
Attack  by  courage  over  the  delay  of  a  careful  reconnaissance,  made 
?i°gUmiudntSdhis  dispositions  for  the  attack  at  once.  Sending  three 
whue  mounted  regiments  around  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  he,  with 

troops   turn    the  ,  .  <        •,  • 

flank.  the  other  two  brigades,  partly  mounted  and  partly  dis- 


mounted'  at  a  given  signal,  boldly  attacked  and  carried 
break?.  enemythe  works,  while  the  8th  N.   Y.  and   1st  Conn.,  which 


57 

were  formed  in  column  of  fours,  charged  over  the  breast-    cavalry  should 

gather     all    the 

works  and  continued  the  charge  through  the  town.          fruits  of  victory. 

f        ,  -11  <~>r\r\  1        1     1  Wayniborough. 

He  captured  1 1  pieces  of  artillery,  200  loaded  wag-  va.,  Mar.  -2,  ml. 
ons  with  teams,   17  battle  flags  and   1,600  officers  and 
men. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I, 
p.  476.) 

Ext.    No.    144. — The   most   determined   effort   was    cavalry, dis- 

.  .  ,  .  ,  11-  -i  mounted, in  close 

made  on  both  sides  and  neither  would  give  way  until  column    attacks 

.  .      infantry. 

late   in   the   evening,    when    Custer  s   brigade   was    dis-    Haw's  shop.va., 
mounted,  forming  in  close  column  of  attack,  and  charged 
with  Gregg's  division,  when  the  enemy  was  driven  back, 
leaving  all  his  dead  and  his  line  of  temporary  works  in 
our  possession. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  793.) 

Ext.  No.  145. — On  reaching  that  place  on  July  1st,  ,c?,vairy  selects 

J      J  battle  field   and 

General  Reynolds  found  Buford's  cavalry  warmly  en-f^^^^J 
gaged  with  the  enemy,  who  had  debouched  his  infantry JgJJi.iUpport 
through  the  mountains  on  the  Cashtown  road,  but  was  G^J^WP*., 

July  1,  lb63. 

being  held  in  check  in  the  most  gallant  manner  by  Bu 
ford's  cavalry. 

(Maj.  Genl.  Meade,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  114.) 
Ext.  No.  146. — On  arriving  within  one  mile  of  West    Troops  should 
Point.  I  was  ordered  to  dismount  to  fight  on  foot.     I  Si  compelled1?) 

0  do  so. 

dismounted  and    formed   the   regiment   in  line   with   as    west  Point, Ga., 

,  .,  .  ,.  Apr.  in,  1865. 

much  alacrity  as  possible,  and  was  directed  to  move  on 
rapidly  across  the  fields  towards  the  fort  and  engage  the 
enemy  on  the  right.  While  crossing  the  fields  toward 
the  fort  the  enemy  threw  shells  at  my  lines  in  rapid  suc 
cession,  the  most  of  which  passed  over  without  effect. 
When  we  got  within  fifty  yards  of  the  fort  I  ordered 
the  men  to  commence  firing,  which  was  done  with  effect. 
(Maj.  A.  S.  Bloom,  7th  Ky.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  435.) 


58 

COMMENTS. 

Successful  turning  movements  may  be  made  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  the  flank  or  rear  of  an  infantry 
line.  (Exts.  124,  128,  153,  171,  180.) 

The  fire  of  an  attacking  line  should  not  be  opened 
till  the  enemy's  fire  compels  it.  (Exts.  128,  146.) 

Cavalry  can  attack  infantry,  and  during  the  war 
often  did,  but,  if  it  comes  to  a  hand-to-hand  fight,  cav 
alry  should  at  least  be  supplied  with  the  rod  bayonet. 
(Exts.  130,  131,  135,  136,  137,  141,  144.) 

At  times  cavalry  will  be  called  upon  to  fight  for 
long  periods  on  foot.  (Exts.  123,  129,  132.) 

Breastworks  will  often  be  constructed  by  cavalry 
with  a  view  of  their  being  occupied  later  by  infantry. 
(Exts.  133,  134.) 

Ammunition  in  boxes  can  be  conveniently  distrib 
uted  along  the  line  from  pack  mules  before  the  action 
begins.  (Ext.  133.) 

It  will  rarely  be  possible  for  cavalry  to  select  a 
battlefield  and  hold  it  till  occupied  by  infantry.  (Ext. 
145.) 

It  will  often  be  possible  for  cavalry  to  hold  im 
portant  tactical  positions  until  relieved  by  infantry.  Exts. 
133,  127,  175,  184.)  Under  such  conditions  the  com 
mander  should  see  that  the  cavalry  be  not  kept  to  do 
infantry  work,  but  returned  to  its  own  legitimate  sphere 
of  usefulness.  (Ext.  187.) 

DISMOUNTED  FIRE  ACTION — AGAINST  FIELD  WORKS. 

Ext.  No.   147. — Drove  Martin's  division  of  cavalry 

Attack  of  field  J 

works.  an(j  one  brigade  of  infantry  from  their  line  of  breast- 

Big  Shanty,  Ga., 

June  9, 1864.        works  at  and  near  Big  Shanty. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p. 
812.) 

cavalry  assault          Ext.   No.   148. — I  regard  the  capture  of  Selma  as 
S  sefma%7a0rks  the  most  remarkable  achievement  in  the  history  of  mod 
ern  cavalry,  the  one  illustrative  of  its  new  powers  and 
tendencies. 


59 

The  fortifications  assaulted  and  carried  consisted  of    Dimensions  of 

.          .         ,.  »•  £  1      ^1  -1  1    the  bastion  line. 

a  bastion  line  on  a  radius  of  nearly  three  miles,  extend-  seima  Ala., 
ing  from  the  Alabama  river  below  to  the  same  above  Apr> 
the  city.  The  part  west  of  the  city  is  covered  by  a 
miry,  deep  and  almost  impassable  swamp,  extending  from 
the  river  almost  to  the  Summerfield  road,  and  entirely 
impracticable  for  mounted  men  at  all  times.  The  profile 
of  that  part  of  the  line  assaulted  is  as  follows:  Height 
of  parapet,  6  to  8  ft. ;  depth  of  ditch,  5  ft. ;  width  from 
10  to  15  ft.;  height  of  stockade  on  glacis,  5  ft.;  sunk 
into  the  earth,  4  ft.  The  ground  over  which  the  troops 
advanced  is  an  open  field,  sloping  slightly  towards  the 
works,  but  intersected  by  one  ravine  with  marshy  soil, 
which  both  the  right  and  left  of  Long's  line  experienced 
some  difficulty  in  crossing.  The  distance  over  which 
the  troops  charged,  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire  of  mus 
ketry  and  artillery,  was  600  yards.  Number  of  men 
engaged  in  assault,  1,550  officers  and  men.  The  works 
were  manned  by  Armstrong's  brigade,  regarded  as  the 
best  in  Forrest's  corps,  and  reported  by  him  at  more 
than  1,500  men. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  360.     For  map  see  Plate  70,  Map  4,  Atlas.) 

Loss,   46   killed   and   200   wounded.      Fifteen   per 
cent  of  all  troops  engaged. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  47,  Part  I,  p.  351.) 

Ext.  No.  149. — Detachments  dismounted  and  pre-  cavalry  assault 
pared  to  assault  Fort  Tyler,  covering  the  bridge.  Colonel  shooting  down' 
LaGrange  describes  it  as  a  remarkably  strong:  bastioned  while  bridges  are 

made  with  which 

earth-work,  35  yards  square,  surrounded  by  a  ditch  1 2 to cross the ditcn- 
feet  wide  and  10  feet  deep,  situated  on  a  commanding 
eminence,  protected  by  an  imperfect  abatis  mounting  two 
32-pounder  guns  and  two  field  guns. 

At  1  :30  P.  M.  the  charge  was  sounded  and  the  brave 
detachments   rushed   forward  to  the  assault,  drove  the 
rebel   skirmishers   into   the    fort  and    followed   under   a 
withering  fire  of  grape  and  musketry,  to  the  edge  of  the  ApY*e,  ufe*' G*M 
ditch.     This  was  found  impassable,  and  Col.  LaGrange 


60 

posted  sharpshooters  to  keep  down  the  enemy's  fire  and 
organized  parties  to  gather  material  for  bridges ;  as  soon 
as  this  had  been  done,  he  sounded  the  charge  again.  The 
detachments  sprang  forward  again,  laid  the  bridges  and 
rushed  forward  over  the  parapet  into  the  work,  captur 
ing  the  entire  garrison  of  265  men. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  364.) 

cavairycapture          Ext.  No.  150. — Colonel  Starr,  with  the  6th  111.  Cav., 

earthworks.  .  ,  ,  ,  .        .   ,  . 

Hnrricane111   three   or   four   hours    severe   skirmishing  drove  the 
i3,ei864Mls>>' Ang>  force  in  front  of  him  across  the  creek,  and  pressing  it 
back   on  the   main   force,   captured   the  enemy's   earth 
works. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Edward  Hatch,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part 
I,  p.  389.) 
Attack  doesnqt          Ext.  No.   151. — As  soon  as  we  uncovered  the  hill, 

open    fire    until 

compelled  to  do  about  600  yards  from  the  earthworks,  the  enemy  opened 
a  destructive  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery  on  the  line, 
d°ur- ^ut  we  moved  steadily  forward  until  wnthin  short  range, 
^^   when  a  rapid  fire  was  opened  by  our  Spencers,  and  with  a 
Apr. 2, 1865.       'cheer  the  men  started  for  the  works  on  the  run. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Eli  Long,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
438.  Attack  on  Selma.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  Civil  War  furnishes  many  cases  of  cavalry  at 
tacking  field  works.  The  most  noted  works  were  those 
of  Selma,  Ala.  (Ext.  148),  where  an  assault  was  made 
on  a  bastioned  line.  Other  cases  are  cited  (Exts.  149, 
150)  from  which  it  will  appear  that  it  easily  can  be  done 
if  the  attackers  are  able  to  shoot  down  the  enemy's  fire. 


61 


CHAPTER  IV. 


COMBINED  ACTION  —  MOUNTED  AND  DISMOUNTED. 


Ext.  No.  152.  —  My  command  was  posted  one  bat-    in  combined 

action     the     r«- 

tahon  mounted  in  reserve  arid  two  battalions  dismounted  serve  is  kept 

mounted. 

in  the  center.     The  enemy  charged  in  column. 
(Reference  omitted.) 
Ext.    No.    153.  —  The  enemy  had   deployed   a  con-    Mounted  force 

.   .  .  .  turns  the  enemys 

siderable  force  in  a  strong  position.     I  immediately  de- 


waver- 


ployed  two  regiments  and  commenced  skirmishing.  Find- 
ing  their  position  strong,  I  detached  a  squadron  to  turn 
their  right  flank.  This  caused  the  enemy  to  waver,  when  when  enemy 

J  wavers,    the    at- 

we  charged  in  line  and  also  in  column  on  the  road,  driv- 
ing  him  in  confusion.  The  enemy  attempted  to  form  a 


new  line  with  his  reserves,  but  we  met  him  with  such    Enemy   not 

given  time  to 

force  as  to  disperse  him  each  time.  form  line  with 


(Maj.  Genl.  Jos.  Wheeler,   C.   S.,   R.   R.,  Vol.   30, 

Campaign.  1863. 

Part  II,  p.  521.) 

Ext.    No.    154.  —  We    found   the   enemy   in   line   of    (;avalry  attack 
battle  behind  a  stone  wall  and  a  rail   fence  which  had  [SJSS  twaifehlnd 
been  so  fixed  as  to  afford  good  protection  to  the  men. 
The  second  brigade  was  immediately  formed  in  line  of 
battle  in  a  corn  field  as   follows:     The  39th  Ky.,   dis-  when  dismoun- 
mounted,    on    the    right,    with    the    llth    Mich.    Cav.,  IH  'enemy  1SS 


mounted,  on  the  left.     The  39th  Kv.  succeeded  in  reach-  cavalry    charge 

...  .  repeatedly. 

ing  the  enemy  s  position.     As  the  regiment  gamed  the    cynthiana,  Ky.. 
wall  and  fence  the  enemy  fled.     The   llth  Mich.   Cav. 
repeatedly  charged  the  rebel  lines,  driving  them  in  great 
confusion. 

(Col.  David  A.  Minis,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part  I,  p. 
37.) 

Ext.    No.    155.  —  The   dismounted   line    formed   on 

.-I  ,         •  *          c    .1  *  •<  1  Dismounted 

the  enemys  side  of  the  stream,  while  a  mounted  regi-  men  in  the  center 

t  .  ,  -      -  .  •  1          n  AT-V       mounted  men  on 

ment  filed  past  their  rear,  half  of  it  to  either  flank.    The  the  flanks. 
line   thus   formed,   dismounted   men   in  the   center  and  va.*oct627S,  ISG""' 


62 

mounted  men  on  the  flanks,  charged  up  the  hill,  routed 
the  enemy  and  captured  his  works. 

(Col.   C.  H.   Smith,  Comg.  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  42, 
Part  I,  p.  648.) 

Mounted  men          Ext.  No.  156.  —  The  remainder  of  the  72d  Ind.  was 

to  charge  as  soon 

as  the  enemy's  brought  forward,  dismounted  and  formed  on  the  left  of 

line  is  broken. 

8eima,Aia.,Apr.the  road,  and  at  the  sarnie  time  I  directed  Colonel  Vail, 
commanding  the  17th  Ind.,  to  send  forward  four  com 
panies  armed  with  sabers  to  charge  the  enemy  as  soon 
as  his  line  was  broken. 

(Col.  A.  O.  Miller,  Comg.  1st  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  446.) 

Mounted  men          Ext.   No.    157.  —  I  received  orders  directing:  me  to 

ready  to   charge 

with  saber  as  move   the  command   to   the  led  horses  and   hold   it   in 

soon  RS    tnG  GD~ 


.  readiness  to  mount  at  a  moment's  notice  and  charge  with 

Selma,Ala..Apr. 

2,1865.  the  saber  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  line  should  be  broken. 

(Lieut.  Col.  B.  D.  Pritchard,  Comg.  4th  Mich.  Cav., 
R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  464.) 
Dismounted  at-          Ext.    No.    158.  —  The   attack   of   Selma   by   Long's 

tack  followed  by    .......  ,  .  . 

mounted  charge,  division,  dismounted,  which  carried  the  works,  was  im- 

Selma.Ala.,Ai)r.  ..,..,,  .  , 

2,1865.  mediately  followed  with  a  mounted  charge  into  the  city 

by  a  part   of   Upton's   division,    which   captured   many 
prisoners. 

(Maj.  Genl.  E.  Upton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
473.) 
combined          Ext.    No.    159.  —  Captain  Abram,   having  failed  to 

mounted  and  dis-  . 

mounted  action,  receive  my  order,  formed  his  battalion,  dismounted,  on 

Mountedaction  the  right  of  the  Third  Battalion,  and  materially  assisted 

emy  breaks.  ^u'  in  routing  the  enemy,  though  his  efforts  were  not  so 

Mar.^rfse?.'11*''  effective  as  they  would  have  been  had  he  received  my 

order  and  been  on  hand  to  charge  mounted. 

(Lieut.  Col.  J.  H.  Peters,  4th  la.  Cav,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
49,  Part  I,  p.  496.) 

Ext.   No.    160.  —  The  enemy,  behind   a  stone  wall, 

Aldie,  Va.,  Jane 

is,  1863.  were   attacked   by   dismounted   cavalry,   while   mounted 

cavalry  charged  along  the  main  road.     The  position  was 
carried. 


63 

(General  J.  Irving  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  975.) 

Ext.  No.  161. — Dismounted  men  moved  forward  to 

...  r  ,          .    ,,  ,    Ga.,  Dec.  4, 1864. 

the  attack,  while  a  column  of  cavalry  followed,  mounted, 
on  each  flank.  When  the  enemy  broke,  the  mounted 
troops  charged. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  392.) 

Ext.  No.   162. — In  this  charge  we  were  met  by  the   Mountedattack 

...          ,  .  supported  by 

enemy  and  succeeded  in  driving  him  back  under  cover  dismountedmen. 
of  his  dismounted  sharpshooters,  who  were  posted  in  then, IMS.' 
woods  on  each  side  of  the  road. 

(Major    Breckenridge,    R.    R.,   Vol.   27,    Part   II, 
p.  742.) 

Ext.  No.  163. — Four  companies  were  dismounted  Dismountedat- 
and  thrown  forward  rapidly  as  skirmishers,  a  mounted  SomuK?n.by 
company  being  sent  to  either  flank  and  the  remainder  of  Cr^.R0\Jss  T?niiS 
the  regiment  kept  sheltered  within  supporting  distance.  Oct2'18< 

(Col.  O.  H.  LaGrange,  1st  Wis.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
30,  Part  II,  p.  683.) 

Ext.  No.   164. — The  enemy  advanced  in  three  col-   Dismounted  at- 

,  ,       , .  .   ,         tack     supported 

umns,  one  on  the  road,  dismounted,  and  one  on  either  by  mounted  men 

on      the      flanks 

flank,  mounted,   rendering  it  almost  impossible  for  my  makes  it  difficult 

J  for  the  enemy  to 

dismounted  men  to  regain  their  horses  regain  their  led 

horses. 

(Col.  J.  K  .Mizner,  1st  Brig.  Cav.  Div.,  16th  Corps,  ^Y^-  MiS8-> 
R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  580.) 

Ext.  No.  165.— The  1st  and  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry  were 

'  Dismountedat- 

accordingly  ordered  to  make  a  detour  through  the  woods 
to  our  right  and  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank.  Nearly  1 00 
infantry  prisoners  were  taken  by  these  regiments  in  this  Va"  May31-1864- 
movement.  In  the  meantime  the  1st  N.  Y.  Dragoons 
and  the  6th  Pa.  Cavalry  were  occupying  the  enemy's 
attention  in  front.  Here  was  accomplished  a  work  of 
which  every  one  connected  with  the  brigade  is  justly 
proud — a  success  by  cavalry  which  has  no  parallel  in  this 
war — a  single  brigade  contending  with  and  taking  from 
an  enemy,  at  least  three  times  its  numbers,  one-third  in 
fantry,  a  naturally  strong  position,  made  doubly  strong 
by  artificial  means. 


64 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  849.) 

Mounted  troop.  Ext.  No.  166.  —  About  200  yards  beyond  this  bar- 
ope?ewM?e  d?*  ricade  the  advance  was  charged  by  a  large  column  of 
Sold1  the  woods  cavalry,  moving1  up  the  plank  road,  this  column  having 

on  the  flanks.  .  . 

Near  Ream's  on  either  flank  a  line  of  dismounted  men  in  the  woods. 
static,!,,  va.,  Jui  ^.^   Genl   ^    M^  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  40,  Part 

I,  p.  614.) 

Ext.  No.  167.  —  When  dismounted  men  retreat  while 

Mounted   men 

should  always  unc[er  fire,  the  retreat  is  always  covered  by  a  mounted 

cover  the  retreat 

£/en  dismounted  jine  stationed  behind,  whose  imposing  attitude  awes  the 
enemy  for  a  brief  space,  long  enough  for  the  footmen 
to  get  away  in  safety. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  18.) 
Ext.  No.  168.  —  Deploying  Knipe's  division  as  skir- 

4th  U.  S.  Cav.  .  , 

charges  in  col-  mighers,     dismounted,     with    Hatch  s   in   close    support, 

umn     of     fours 

breaking  theplene-  General  Wilson  ordered  the  4th  U.    S.   Cavalry,  Lieu- 

emies  center.       tenant  Hedges  commanding,  to  charge  the  enemy.   Form 

ing  on  the  pike  in  column  of   fours,  the  gallant  little 


command  of  200  men  charged  with  sabers  drawn,  break- 

.  1    *i       ~T7~     *        ?  1     TT     j     i   ? 

ing  the  enemy  s  center,  wrmle  Knipe  s  and  Hatch  s  men 
pressed  back  the  flanks,  scattering  the  whole  command 
and  causing  them  to  abandon  their  artillery. 

(Maj.   Genl.   Geo.   H.   Thomas,   R.   R.,   Vol.   45> 
Part  I,  p.  41.) 

conduct  of  an          Ext.  No.   169.—  The  heads  of  columns  met  in  the 
by  ^f  narrow  road  in  a  hand-to-hand  saber  fight.     While  this 


°T        *  was  in  progress  Captain  Irving  threw  down  the  fence 


\    Jane 

on  the  right  of  the  road  and,  bringing  his  squadron  to 

the  front,  opened  fire  on  the  enemy's  left  flank.  Cap 
tain  Tebbs  executed  a  similar  movement  on  the  left 
of  the  road,  while  the  sharpshooters  were  all  the  time 
firing  into  the  enemy's  rear.  Their  attack  was  com 
pletely  broken,  and  their  leading  squadron  almost  de 
stroyed. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 

p.  299.) 


65 


Ext.    No.    170.— We  met  in   a  lane,  both  sides  of    Fences  too 
which  were  post  and  rail  fences  too  strong  to  be  broken Stl 
with    an    ax.      The   country    is    open,    the    fields    small, 
and  all  the  fences  the  same  character  as  along  the  lane. 
No  estimate  could  be  made  of  the  opposing  force,  but 
knowing  that  a  vigorous  assault  must  put  even  a  small    Vig9rous  «- 
force   on   a  perfect   equality   with   a   large   one   until   a  should  puH 

i  r    1  i  111  small  force  on  an 

larger  neld  could  be  prepared,  I  at  once  ordered  the  7th  equality  with  a 

1  .    ,  large  one. 

regiment,   which  was  in   front,   to  charge.      Before   the    Fairfleid,pa., 
enemy  could  be  reached  he  succeeded  in  throwing  car- Jnly  3>  1863' 
bines  through  the  gates  right  and  left,  who  poured  into 
our  flanks  a  galling  fire.    The  leading  men  hesitated,  the 
regiment  halted  and  retreated,  losing  more  men  than  a 
glorious   victory   would   have   cost   had   the   onset   been 
made  with  boldness  and  vigor. 

(Brig.  Gen.  W.   E.  Jones,  C.  S.,   R.  R.  Vol.   27 
Part  II,  p.  752.) 

COMMENTS. 

In  the  combined  mounted  and  dismounted  actions, 
with  few  exceptions,  the  dismounted  men  were  in  the 
center  and  the  mounted  men  on  the  flanks.  (Exts.  152, 
155,  161,  163,  164,  165.)  The  exception  is  where  the 
the  most  suitable  ground  for  a  charge  is  along  a  narrow 
lane,  running  at  right  angles  and  leading  to  the  center 
of  the  enemy's  line,  along  which  the  charge  will  neces 
sarily  be  made  in  column  of  fours.  (Exts.  153,  160, 
166,  168.)  The  reason  for  the  mounted  men  being  on 
the  flanks  is  that  by  rapid  movements  they  can  attack 
or  threaten  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear.  If  the  enemy 
breaks,  it  will  be  difficult  for  them  to  regain  their  led 
horses,  provided  that  the  mounted  men  are  quick  to 
take  the  aggressive.  (Exts.  156,  164.)  The  reason  for 
the  formation  with  the  mounted  men  in  the  center  is 
explained  in  Ext.  168.  Dismounted  men  were  pressing 
back  the  enemy's  flanks,  thus  presumably  weakening  their 
center  by  drawing  troops  away  from  that  part  of  their 
line. 


66 

Mounted  troops  should  always  be  ready  to  charge 
when  the  enemy's  line  breaks.  (Exts.  153,  156,  157, 
158,  159,  161.) 

When  the  enemy  is  broken,  he  should  not  be  given 
time  to  form  new  lines  with  his  reserve.  (Ext.  153.) 

Dismounted  sharpshooters  under  cover  are  a  good 
support  for  a  weak  or  timid  mounted  force.  (Exts. 
162,  166.) 

If  the  terrain  is  not  suited  to  retiring  by  successive 
formations,  then  the  retreat  of  the  dismounted  men 
should  be  covered  by  mounted  troops  whose  threatening 
attitude  will  give  the  dismounted  men  time  to  regain 
their  horses.  (Exts.  167,  191.) 

When  mounted  troops  meet  in  a  lane,  the  head  of  the 
column  should  engage  in  mounted  combat,  while  those 
in  rear  break  through  the  fences  to  the  right  and  left 
and  endeavor  to  gain  a  flank  fire  on  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  column.  (Exts.  169,  170.) 

In  a  lane  from  which  no  deployment  can  be  made, 
a  small  force  is  on  an  equality  with  a  large  one  so  long 
as  this  condition  can  be  maintained.  (Ext.  170.) 

COMBINED    ACTION  —  CAVALRY  AND   INFANTRY. 

cavainy,  with          Ext.  No.  171.—  October  17,  just  before  daylight,  the 

SbehSd^makes  rebel    General  Rosser,  with  one  brigade  of  infantry,  rid- 

micies.cu         **  ing  behind  the  cavalry,  attacked  Brigadier  General  Cus- 

ter's  extreme  right  picket  from  the  rear.     He  had  made 

a  circuit  of  32  miles  to  get  in  rear  of  our  picket  line. 

(Maj.  Genl.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  R.  R.  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  432.) 

(For  mounting  cavalry  behind  infantry,  see  also 
report  of  Maj.  Genl.  Jubal  A.  Early,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
43,  Part  I,  p.  561.) 

No'  172'  —  On  SePtember  22  my  division,  with 


?™CrSnem0ii?tne  exception  of  McCausland's  Brigade,  was  dismounted 

long>  and  placed  on  the  left  of  the  line  at  Fishers  Hill  and 

directed  to  throw  up  works  continuous  with  those  of  the 

Line  to  hold  infantry.     This  line  was  over  one  mile  long  and  to  be 

one  man  to  1.7  -11  1        .1   r\r\r\ 

yards.  occupied  by  about  1,000  men. 


67 

(Maj.  Genl.  L.  L.  Lomax,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43, 
Part  I,  p.  611.) 

Ext.    No.    173.  —  Every   available   cavalryman   was    cavalry    reiu- 

,.  ,  ,       ,          ,     .       ,.  force  infantry  in 

dismounted  and  placed  in  line  of  battle  to   strengthen  holding  a  moun 

tain  pass. 

the  two  regiments  of  infantry  under  his   (Munford's)    crampton's  Gap, 

J  Md.,  Sept.  14,  '62! 

command. 

(Munford's  Defense  of  Crampton's  Gap,  Life  and 
Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  p.  120.) 

Ext.  No.   174.  —  The  command  took  an  active  part    confederate 
in  the  skirmishes  and  battle  at  and  near  Chickamausra.  SSntry  'during 

/-    i  A.          ,.  i         •  ,  the  battle  of  Chic- 

hghtmg  dismounted,  with  or  on  the  flanks  of  the  infantry  kamauga. 

i        •  ,1        i.     .,1  Sept.  19-20.  '63. 

during  the  battles. 

(Maj.  Genl.  W.  T.  Martin,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.  545.) 

(See  also  138.) 

Ext.  No.   175.  —  At  this  time,  meeting  Major  Gen-    cavalry  holds 

1   TTT  ,.  o,    ^  enemy  till  iu  fan- 

era!  Warren,  commanding  the  2d  Corps,  I  was  asked  by  try  cau  get  into 
him  to  hold  my  position  until  he  should  be  able  to  sret    cedar  Run.  va.. 

A    j          -o  Oct.  14,1863. 

his  corps  across  Cedar  Run. 

(Genl.    D.    McM.    Gregg,    Comg.    2d   Cav.    Corps., 
R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  357.) 

Ext.  No.  176.  —  The  enemy  in  front  of  Custer  now    infantry  attack 

returned  to  the  attack.     He  advanced  in  two  lines  of  in-a?r^PonthenankI 

fantry  skirmishers,  supported  on  the  flanks  by  cavalry.  morTvaTo^o, 

(Genl.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  383.)  " 

Ext.   No.    177.  —  Their  cavalry   force  is  about  two    weak   cavalry 

.     ,  .     .  is  followed  close 

regiments,  and  they  keep  close  to  infantry  supports.          by  infantry  sup- 

(Maj.  Genl.  S.  D.  Lee,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  PartP( 
I,  p.  26.) 

Ext.    No.    178.—  After   the   fight   General   Hill   di-    cavalry 
rected  me  to  put  my  command  in  the  trenches  to 


j_i  ',,1    1  1        <•      1         •     f  of  infantry. 

the  withdrawal  of  the  infantry.  Ream's  station 

(Maj.  Genl.  Wade  Hampton,  C.  S.,  R.  R,  Vol.  42,  Va"  Au^25'1864'- 
Part  I,  p.  944.) 

Ext.  No.  179.  —  Whilst  slightly  swinging1  to  the  left,    cavalry  assaui- 

,  .    .  P  ,  .  ts    redoubts   de- 

came  upon  a  redoubt  containing  four  guns,  which  was  fended  by  good 
splendidly  carried  by  assault  at  1  :00  P.  M.  by  a  portion    Nashville,  Tenn. 

*   TT   j.   ti       1-    •   •  i.  Dec.  15,  1864. 

or  Match  s  division,  dismounted,  and  the  captured  guns 


68 

turned  upon  the  enemy.  A  second  redoubt,  stronger  than 
the  first,  was  next  assailed  and  carried  by  the  same  troops 
that  captured  the  first  position,  taking  four  more  guns 
and  about  300  prisoners. 

The  infantry  of  McArthur's  division,  on  the  left  of 
the  cavalry,  participated  in  both  of  the  assaults;  and, 
indeed,  the  dismounted  cavalry  seemed  to  vie  with  the 
infantry  to  see  who  should  first  gain  the  works;  as  they 
reached  the  position  nearly  simultaneously,  both  lay  claim 
to  the  artillery  and  prisoners  captured. 

(Battle  of  Nashville,  Maj.  Genl.  G.  H.  Thomas, 
R.  R.,  Vol.  45.  Part  I,  p.  38.) 

wwie  infantry          Ext.   No.   180. — Wilson's  Cavalry,  dismounted,  at- 
cavairy,  by  turn- tacked    the    enemy    simultaneously    with    Schofield    and 

ing     movement, 

cuts  off  the  ene-  Smith,   striking  him  in  reverse  and  gaining  possession 
Nashville,  of  the  Granny  White  Pike,  cut  off  his  retreat  by  that 

Teiin..    Dec.    15, 

1864.  route. 

(Battle  of  Nashville,  Maj.  Genl.  G.  H.  Thomas, 
R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I,  p.  40.) 

cavalry  assault          Ext.  No.  181. — The  firing  of  the  5th  Corps  was  the 

field  works.  1   T\  ^         •  1-1 

Five  Porks,  va.,  signal  to  General  Merntt  to  assault,  which  was  promptly 

responded  to,  and  the  works  of  the  enemy  were  soon 

carried  at  several  points  by  our  brave  cavalrymen.     The 

enemy  were  driven  from  their  strong  line  of  works  and 

completely  routed,  the  5th  Corps  doubling  up  their  left 

menteforecaavSi°y  flank  in  confusion,  and  the  cavalry  under  General  Mer- 

breaksf  *        ry  ritt   dashing  on   the   White   Oak   road,    capturing  their 

artillery  and  turning  it  upon  them  and  riding  into  their 

broken  ranks  so  demoralized  them  that  they  made  no 

serious  stand  after  their  line  was  carried,  but  took  flight 

When  infantry 

in  disorder.  Between  5,000  and  6,000  prisoners  fell  into 
our  hands,  and  the  fugitives  were  driven  westward  and 
were  Pursued  till  long  after  dark  by  Merritt's  and  Mac- 

up0aU8?onbgeas  JOB*  Kenzie's  cavalry  for  a  distance  of  six  miles. 

8ible-  (Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I, 

p.  1105.) 


69 

Ext.  No.  182.— Hq.  Dept.  of  the  Cumberland,  weak   cavalry 

Oct.  1,  1863,  2:15  A.  M.         grMS5?2S 
Colonel  McCook,  commanding  Division  of  Cavalry. 

The  General  commanding-  directs  that  you 

move  with   all  dispatch  with  the  balance  of 

your  force  to  Anderson's  Cross  Roads     *     *     *     Three 

regiments  of  infantry  and  a  section  of  artillery  have  been 

ordered  there  to  support  you. 

(S*ig.)     J.  A.  GARFIELD, 
Brigadier  General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 
(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  his  Cavalry,  p.   120.) 
Ext.  No.  183.— Hq.   1st  Cavalry  Division, 

May  28,  1864. 
Lieut.  D.  H.  How, 

A.  A.  A.  G.  Cavalry  Command, 

Department  of  the  Cumberland. 
*  *  Privately  this  thing  of  covering  the  flank 
of  infantry  seems  a  one-sided  affair;  if  they  are  attacked 
I  am  to  pitch  in,  while  if  I  am  attacked  by  a  superior 
force  I  can  expect  no  assistance.  These  last  paragraphs 
of  my  letter  are  unofficial,  of  course. 

(Sig.)      E.  M.  McCooK, 

Colonel  Commanding. 
Hq.  Chief  of  Cavalry,  Dept.  of  the  Cumberland. 

May  28,  1864. 
Brigadier  General  E.  M.  McCook, 

Commanding  1st  Division  of  Cavalry. 
Don't  write  unofficial  remarks  with  official ;  the  lat 
ter  are  necessary  to  have,  the  former  is  a  pleasure  to 
receive. 

(Sig.)      W.  L.  ELLIOTT, 

Brigadier  General, 

Chief  of  Cavalry. 
(R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  IV,  p.  336.) 

Ext.  No.  184. — Rosecrans  was  determined  to  make  cavalry  backed 
his  superior  numbers  tell,  at  least  in  the  immediate pSrtwhfchycoSuiPd 
vicinity  of  his  army.  He  inaugurated  a  system  about  b?gun by ?heflcgay- 
this  time  which  resulted  in  the  decided  improvement  of  &i 


70 

his  cavalry.  He  would  send  out  a  body  of  cavalry 
stronger  than  anything  it  was  likely  to  encounter,  and 
that  it  might  never  be  demoralized  by  a  complete  whip 
ping,  he  would  back  it  by  an  infantry  force  never  far 
in  the  rear,  and  always  ready  to  finish  the  fight  the  cav 
alry  had  begun.  This  method  benefited  the  latter  greatly. 
(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

confederate          Ext.  No.   185. — General  Wirt  Davis  states  that  at 
BkPrnSn e°r e^by  Chickamauga  the  Confederates  supported  their  cavalry 
skirmish  lines  by  infantry. 

TWO  cavalry          Ext.   No.    186. — August   1   to    14  the   1st  and  3d 
a  corap  of  infancy  Brigades,    dismounted,    relieved    the   23d   Corps   in   the 

in    the   trenches  r 

fortwoweeku.     trenches  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  army.     During  this 

Atlanta  Cam-    .  . 

Aug.  i-i4,  time  it  did  duty  as  infantry. 

(Col.  R.  G.  H.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p. 
813.) 

cavalry  is  kept          Ext.  No.  187. — At  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  For- 
"four  rest's  Cavalry  was  not  relieved  from  the  lines  where  it 


had  been  fighting  as  infantry  till  it  had  been  in  action 
four  days. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  353.) 

cavalry  go  to  Ext  No-  188- — Seeing  our  troops  retiring,  and  their 
j!  need  of  assistance,  I  immediately  rushed  Gamble's  Bri- 
gade  to  Doubleday's  left,  and  dismounted  it  in  time  to 
render  great  assistance  to  our  infantry,  and  to  check 
and  break  the  enemy's  line.  My  troops  at  this  place  had 
partial  shelter  behind  a  low  stone  fence,  and  were  in 
short  carbine  range.  Their  fire  wras  perfectly  terrific, 
causing  the  enemy  to  break  and  rally  on  their  second 
line,  which  made  no  further  advance  toward  my  position. 
(Brig.  Genl.  Jno.  Buford,  July  1st,  Gettysburg, 
R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  927.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  tactical  action  of  combined  cavalry  and  in 
fantry  is  much  the  same  as  that  of  mounted  and  dis 
mounted  cavalry. 


71 

The  case  of  Early's  infantry  riding  double  behind 
Rosser's  Cavalry  (Ext.  171)  is  very  rare  and  of  doubt 
ful  utility. 

At  Fisher's  Hill  the  cavalry  threw  up  earth  works, 
the  same  as  infantry,  to  be  occupied  at  the  rate  of  one 
man  to  1.7  yards.  (Ext.  172.)  This  line  would  seem 
to  be  weak.  It  was  not  so  since  the  cavalry  was  armed 
with  repeating  carbines  at  this  time. 

Cavalry  was  often  thrown  into  the  battle  to 
strengthen  infantry.  (Exts.  138,  173,  174,  183,  188.) 

Extract  175  illustrates  the  case  of  cavalry  holding  a 
position  long  enough  to  enable  infantry  to  complete  its 
maneuver. 

It  is  sometimes  thought  that  the  Manchurian  war 
furnished  a  new  method  of  handling  weak  cavalry — > 
namely,  following  it  up  by  light  infantry  behind  which  it 
took  refuge  when  driven  back.  This  use  of  cavalry  was 
frequently  resorted  to  during  the  war  of  the  Rebellion. 
(Exts.  177,  182,  184,  185.) 

In  principle  the  system  attributed  to  Rosecrans  (Ext. 
184)  is  altogether  wrong.  Cavalry  should  not  be  imbued 
with  the  idea  that  a  lot  of  infantry  must  follow  it  around 
like  the  tail  of  a  comet.  The  correct  idea  is  expressed 
by  Sheridan  (Ext.  238),  namely,  that  cavalry  ought  to 
fight  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  infantry  the  enemy's  in 
fantry.  It  is  true  that  cavalry,  the  same  as  artillery  is 
a  subordinate  arm,  and,  under  the  commanding  general, 
should  work  to  the  central  idea,  and  while  doing  so,  can 
and  will  fight  anything.  Good  cavalry  is,  however,  too 
difficult  to  replace  to  expend  it  on  foot  troops  massed 
behind  entrenchments,  and  its  possibilities  are  likewise 
too  great  to  kill  its  mobility  by  tying  it  to  infantry  sup 
ports. 

Cavalry  can  often  cover  the  withdrawal  of  infan 
try  by  being  placed  in  trenches,  thus  enabling  the  in 
fantry  to  get  away  without  molestation  or  their  absence 
being  discovered.  Wilson's  cavalry  screened  the  move 
ment  of  Grant's  army  across  the  James  River.  (See 
also  Exts.  178,  249.) 


72 

Extract  180  furnishes  a  good  illustration  of  the 
ability  of  cavalry  to  make  a  turning  movement  and  cut 
off  the  retreat  of  defeated  troops  and  thus  secure  a  rich 
reward  in  prisoners  and  trophies. 

It  will  happen  more  frequently  that  cavalry  acts  as 
support  for  infantry  than  that  infantry  acts  as  support 
for  cavalry.  However,  Colonel  E.  M.  McCook  has  some 
ideas  of  his  own  on  the  subject,  as  expressed  in  Ext. 
183. 

The  putting  of  cavalry  in  trenches  for  longer  than 
twenty-four  hours  is  very  demoralizing  to  the  cavalry 
(Ext.  186.)  The  fighting  of  men  in  the  trenches  will 
not,  as  a  rule,  compensate  for  the  damage  to  their  horses 
resulting  from  neglect. 

COMBINED    ACTION  — WITH   ARTILLERY. 

combined  cav-          Ext.  Nb.  189. — Dismounting  his  men,  except  about 

!cticm!da     lery  200  who  were  distributed  equally  on  his  right  and  left 

mSS&m^SS.  flanks,  the  Confederate  commander  disposed  them  in  one 

line  of  battle  with  his  artillery,  occupying  three  positions, 

Morton's  battery  in  the  center  and  a  section  of  Freeman's 

on  each  flank,  a  few  paces  in  advance  of  the  dismounted 

men. 

(Campaigns  of   Forrest  and  of  Forrest's   Cavalry, 

p.  211.) 

Stuart's  hand-  Ext.  No.  190.— The  successful  resistance  which 
arntfn°eryhi8  h°rse  Stuart  was  enabled  to  oppose  to  the  Federal  advance 
a"was  in  great  measure  due  to  the  skillful  handling  of  his 
artillery.  Stuart's  fondness  for  the  use  of  artillery  was 
almost  excessive;  Pelham's  skill  in  its  management 
amounted  to  genius.  Stuart  and  Pelham  imparted  to 
the  horse  artillery  an  independency  of  action  and  celerity 
of  movement  which  characterized  it  to  the  end  of  the  war, 
and  which  was  nowhere  equalled  or  imitated,  except  in 
the  same  arm  of  the  Federal  service.  Achievements  of 
the  batteries  attached  to  both  Federal  and  Confederate 
cavalry  are  worthy  of  a  separate  record  and  the  careful 
attention  of  military  men. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  173.) 


73 


CHAPTER  V. 


DELAYING  ACTIONS  AND  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE 
OF  RIVER  CROSSINGS. 


Ext.  No.   191. — Morgan  ordered  the  command   to    A  charge  win 

often    disconcert 

retreat  on  the  Augusta  road  and  charged  with  the  mount- 
ed  reserve  to  cover  the  withdrawal. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry  by  Duke.) 

Ext.   No.    192. — The  army,  the  siege  of  Knoxville    Rear  of  retreat- 

i     .  .  .  M1      ing  army  covered 

being  raised,  commenced  its  retreat  toward  Rogersville.  by  cavalry. 
General  Morgan's  division   followed,  covering  the  rear  pa?gnXVDece  VGS! 
of  General  McLaw's  division  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Holston.     General  Armstrong's  division  performed  the 
same  service  on  the  Knoxville  and  river  roads. 

(Maj.  Gen.  W.  T.  Martin,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.  548.) 

Ext.   No.   193. — With  973   men  the  First  Brigade  7ooo3foreio  houS 
had  disputed  the  advance  of  7,000  rebels  from  7  o'clock  vance  only  five 

miles. 

in  the  morning  until  5  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  at  the    chickam-anga 
end  of  that  time  had  fallen  back  only  five  miles.  iff*1 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  I,  p. 
923.) 

Ext.    No.    194. — For  five    and   a   half   hours,   over    onebrigadede- 

lays  a  large  force 

seven  miles  of  country,   the  unequal  contest  continued,  so  that  they  »d 

J  vance  seven  miles 

My  gallant  brigade  was  cut  to  pieces  and  slaughtered.       in  five  hours. 

(Col.  G.  B.  Hodge,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, tat? cS VMM! 
p.  728.) 

COMMENTS. 

When  Bragg  retreated  from  Perry ville  followed  by 
Rosecrans,  Wheeler's  cavalry  covered  his  retreat. — Ext. 
261. 

The  retreat  of  Hood's  army  after  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville  was  covered  by  Forrest's  cavalry. 


74 

Cavalry  is  particularly  fitted  for  the  work  of  delay 
ing  the  advance  of  a  victorious  army.  Its  mobility  en 
ables  it  to  take  advantage  of  the  terrain  in  places  where 
its  horses  can  be  kept  close  up.  Under  this  condition  it 
can  delay  its  retirement  with  impunity.  If  horses  cannot 
be  kept  close  up,  and  owing  to  unfavorable  terrain  are 
sent  to  the  rear,  cavalry  will  still  have  an  advantage  over 
foot  troops  in  that  they  carry  no  packs  and  are  stimulated 
by  the  assurance  of  safety  upon  regaining  their  horses. 

The  further  use  of  cavalry  in  delaying  actions  is  fully 
illustrated  by  the  following  extracts. 

RETIRING   BY   SUCCESSIVE    FORMATIONS. 

Retire  by  alter-  Ext.  No.  195.  —  I  received  orders  to  retire  behind 
barricades.  I  moved  back  by  alternate  platoons,  at  the 
same  time  checking  the  rebel  advance  till  we  arrived  at 
the  barricades. 

(Capt.  Forman,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  376.) 

Ext.   No.   196.  —  Their   cavalry   having  turned   our 

Retire  b     sue-  J 


positions,  flanks,  we  were  compelled  to  fall  back  which  was  done 
'  by  taking  successive  positions  till  we  reached  the  town. 

(Genl.  J.  Wheeler,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  410.) 
Brigades  sue-  Ext.   No.    197.  —  I  received  orders  to  retire  my  com- 


mand  behind  the  line  of  the  2d  Brigade  and  reform  them, 

Hranily  Station. 

;-  which  was  done,  and  I  then  held  a  position  under  cover 
of  which  the  2d  Brigade  withdrew  and  again  took  up  a 
position  near  the  river. 

(Brig.  Genl.  H.  E.  Davies,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I, 
p.  386.) 

when  outflank-          Ext.   No.    198.  —  Upon   being   repulsed,    the    enemy 
and  take*upnew  commenced  extending  his  flanks  which  his  numerical  su- 

positions.  .  ,,.  .... 

,  Penority  enabled  him  to  do,  compelling  me  to  form  fresh 


Tenn.,  Oct.  7,  i8(>3.  j-nes  «n  t|ie  ^^  ^^  withdraw  those  he  was  enveloping. 
(Col.  G.  B.  Hodge,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, 
p.  728.) 
Lmeretires  sue-          Ext.  No.   199.  —  The  retreat  under  a  heavy  fire  of 

cessively  by  regi-          .,,  rr  .    .  . 

ment.  artillery  and  small  arms,  was  effected  in  perfect  order, 

tionalTeiinS  Dec"  the  regiments  falling  back  in  succession  to  advantageous 

29,  1863. 


75 

points,  and  then  fighting  until,  having  checked  the  enemy 
sufficiently,  they  could  gain  another  point  of  vantage. 

(Maj.  Genl.  W.  T.  Martin,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.    548.) 

Ext.  No.  200. — The  regiment  fell  back  slowly  and    Regiment   re- 

.  tires  successively 

in  good  order  for  some  distance  by  alternate  battalions,  by  battalions. 


and  then  resumed  its  march  in  column. 

(Lieut.  Col.  T.  M.  Browne,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
p.  276.) 

Ext.    No.    201.  -  1    Was   Ordered   tO    fall   back   as    SUC-     Brigade  retires 
i  •  r  j    •  T\  IT  successively     by 

cessive  lines  were  formed  in  my  rear.     My  regiment  was  regiment. 


formed  some  seven  or  eight  times  during  the  day  on  the 
rear  and  flanks  of  the  brigade. 

(Maj.  C.  T.  Cheek,  5th  Ky.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32, 
Part  I,  p.  310.) 

Ext.  No.  202.  —  Now  the  fighting  became  fierce  and    Regiment 
desperate,  charge  after  charge  received  and  as  often  re- 
pulsed.     I  found  it  impossible  to  hold  a  given  line  longer 
than  to  deliver  a  single  volley.    In  this  manner  we  fought 
our  way  back  five  miles. 

(Lieut.  Col.  J.  B.  Park,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p. 
828.) 

Ext.  No.  203.  —  Each  regiment  then  fell  back  alter-    Regiments  fan 
nately  and  formed  lines  for  two  miles,  when  we  reached  two 


Shoal  Creek,  and  I  found  to  my  surprise,  the  6th  111.  pack  ^°fl Cim.' AIa> 
train,  artillery  and  ambulances  all  safe  on  the  opposite 
side,  and  the  regiment  dismounted  to  cover  the  crossing. 
(Col.  D.  E.  Coon,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I,  p.  585.) 

Ext.   No.  204.— The  first   position   held  by   Stuart    stuart    retires 
was  about  three  miles  west  of  Middleburg.     Here  he  de-f^tloTan^ 
layed  the  enemy  as  long  as  prudence  permitted,  and  then  ^^bur  Va 
retired  en  echelon  of  regiments,  covered  by  his  artillery.  June21>1863-' 
This  order  of  retiring  was  maintained  throughout  the  en 
tire  day,  and  at  no  time  was  the  enemy  able  to  cause  any 
serious  disorder  in  his  ranks. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  308.) 


76 
stampede    en-          Ext.   No.  205.  —  The  Yankees  pressing  on  my  rear 

sues  because  the  ,-,       .  P 

retirement  is  not  captured  8  men.     Such  management  I  never  saw  before. 

made   success-  . 

iveiy.  Had  the  batteries  retired  by  echelon,  and  the  cavalry  in 

*"the  same  way,  we  could  have  held  our  position  or  driven 


back  their  cavalry  by  a  counter  charge  from  ours.     But 
a  retreat  was  ordered  and  a  disgraceful  stampede  ensued. 
(Col.  T.  T.  Munford,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12,  Part  I, 
p.  731.) 

Brigades  faii          Ext.  No.  206.  —  I  determined  to  draw  off  as  soon  as 

ToineTsTiTie  we  cou^  do  so  successfully,  and  for  this  purpose  ordered 

Tenn.,  NOV.  s,  'ss!  McCulloch's  brigade  to  dismount  and  skirmish  with  the 

enemy  until  Siemens  could  be  formed  in  his  rear  to  cover 

his  retreat.     This  was  accomplished  easily  and  in  good 

order,  each  brigade  forming  alternately  in  rear  of  the 

other  until  we  were  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  R.  Chalmers,  ':.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  I,  p.  248.) 

COMMENTS. 

From  reading  these  extracts  it  is  clear  that  the  usual 
method  of  withdrawing  was  by  alternate  successive  for 
mations.  It  is  possible,  at  times,  to  pit  the  whole  fight 
on  one  good  strong  position.  In  this  case,  when  the 
smash  comes,  it  will  be  every  m-an  for  himself  (Ext.  No. 
205).  No  mention  has  been  observed,  in  any  of  the  re 
ports,  of  intentionally  using  this  latter  method  in  a  de 
laying  action. 

It  will  frequently  happen  that  when  circumstances, 
not  known  to  the  firing  line,  render  a  retirement  desira 
ble,  that  a  successful  retirement  may  be  made  under  cover 
of  the  confusion  caused  by  a  vigorous  attack  (Exts.  191, 
218,440,441). 

In  the  method  of  retiring  by  alternate  formations, 
battalions  or  regiments  seem  to  be  the  favorite  tactical 
units  (Exts.  199,  200,  201,  203,  204). 

We  find  in  Extract  204  Stuart's  cavalry  keeping  this 
up  for  an  entire  day  by  first  getting  back  to  the  new  line 
alternate  regiments  supported  by  artillery  whose  fire  cov- 


77 

ered  the  withdrawal  of  the  advanced  line.  Sometimes  the 
movement  was  executed  alternately  by  platoons  (Ext. 
195),  and  sometimes  by  entire  brigades  (Exts.  197,  206). 

ATTACK   AND   DEFENSE   OF   A    RIVER   CROSSING — FORDS. 

Ext.  No.  207. — I  advanced  rapidly  to  the  creek,  but    Dismounted 

men  ford  and  at- 

findingf  it  impossible  from  abrupt  and  miry  banks  to  cross tack  a  battery. 

Culpeper,  C.   H., 

with  horses,  I  dismounted  100  men  with  carbines,  who,  Va.,  Sept.  is, i86». 
wading  and  swimming  the  stream,  charged  rapidly  up  the 
hill  towards  the  battery. 

(Col.  Mann,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  127.)' 

Ext.  No.  208. — The  reserve  brigade  was  ordered  to    Dismounted 

~    .  ,-,  r        men   attack   the 

effect  a  crossing  at  Servers  Ford;  this  was  done  in  fine  ford  supported 

by  mounted  men. 

style  by  Col.  Lowell,  who  threw  over  dismounted  men,    opequau  creek, 
closely  supported  by  the  5th  U.  S.  Cavalry  and  part  of   ' 
the  2d  Mass.  Cav.  mounted. 

(Brig.  Genl.  W.  Merrittt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I,  p. 
443.) 

Ext.   No.  209. — The  enemy,  about  300  strong,  oc~  ar[^v  Cc°aVvari?v 
cupied  a  well  chosen  position  behind  earthworks  upon  the  |°a^*  rough 
opposite  side,  commanding  the  bridge.     The  bridge  was  Swor^?  take 
already  on  fire,  but  the  9th  Ohio  Cav.,  92d  111.  Mtd.  Inf.  g  Hear  jjanrjgi, 
(Dismounted)  gallantly  dashed  through  the  swamp,  the 
men  wading  in  the  water  up  to  their  arm  pits,  crossed  the 
stream  on  trees  felled  by  our  pioneers,  and  under  cover 
of  a  rapid  fire  of  artillery,  gallantly  carried  the  works, 
driving  the  enemy  in  confusion  toward  the  town  of  Barn- 
well. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  47,  Part  I, 
p.  858.) 

Ext.   No.  210. — They  made  another  attempt  some    Enemy  allowed 
distance  leftward,  and  were  suffered  to  get  well  into  the  the  stream  before 

0  firing  on  them. 

stream  without  molestation,  when  Captain  Forrest  at 
tacked  with  vigor,  and  repulsed  them  with  loss. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest"s  Cavalry, 
p.  239.) 

Ext.  No.  211. — The  Federals  were  forced  to  retire  d^JvaarcyrSs1^1J 
to  their  fortifications,  eastward  of  the  stream,  which  is  shallow  ford,  and 


78 
dismount  on  the  some  250  yards  broad  at  this  point,  but  shallow,  and  with 

other  side  to  at-  " 

tack  field  works,  an  excellent  ford,  across  which,  under  cover,  secured  by 
eight  pieces  of  artillery  that  had  been  previously  placed 
in  a  favorable  position,  the  Confederates  dashed  boldly 
in  the  face  of  the  Federals.  Dismounting  his  men  as 
soon  as  they  reached  the  other  bank,  they  were  formed 
as  infantry,  and  pushed  up  with  the  loss  of  eight  or  ten 
men  killed  or  wounded  before  the  Federals  abandoned 
their  position. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  355.) 
TO  recross  art-          Ext.  No.  212. — I  determined  to  recross  the  river. 

illery  is  sent  with 

the  c?osr8inOCOver  ^s  ^le  enemy  began  a  brisk  attack  on  my  skirmishers,  I 
Morton's  Ford,  directed  them  to  stand  firm  and  at  once  sent  my  main 

Va.,  Nov.  27,  1863. 

body  across  the  ford,  having  my  guns  in  position  and 
placing  a  battalion  in  the  houses  at  the  ford,  I  ordered 
the  skirmishers  in  at  the  gallop.  They  retired,  followed 
closely  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  which  were  checked  by  the 
guns  and  the  men  posted  at  the  ford  and  the  whole  com 
mand  crossed  the  river  without  losing  a  man. 

(Brig.  Genl.  H.  E.  Davies,  Jr.  R.R.,  Vol.29,  Parti, 
p.  815.) 

BRIDGES. 

cavalry  crones          Ext.  No.  213. — Another  battalion  of  the  same  regi- 

bri  dge   under 

cover  of  artillery.  men t  was  dismounted  and  placed  as  near  the  bridge  as 
N.c.°,ApJfl  17/65!  shelter  could  be  found.  The  second  shot  from  our  artil 
lery  dismounted  the  rebel  gun,  a  few  more  discharges 
drove  them  from  their  rifle  pits,  when  the  dismounted 
battalion  charged  across  the  bridge  on  the  sleepers  and 
drove  the  rebels  from  the  ford. 

(Brig.  Genl.  A.  C.  Gillem,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  335.) 
cavalry  crosses          Ext.  No.  214. — The  enemy  occupied  a  strong  posi- 

b ridge    under  J 

cover  of  carbine  tion  on  the  opposite  side  of  Broad  Run  which  could  only 
Position  fire,  be  crossed  at  a  bridge  and  a  ford  one  mile  below.  After 

oct.ri%di863D)  Va"  a  determined  effort  of  over  two  hours,  General  Custer 
had  succeeded  in  pushing  his  command  up  to  the  bridge 
and  on  the  hills  to  the  right  of  the  road  overlooking  the 


79 

enemy's  position.  I  ordered  General  Custer  to  charge  the 
bridge.  The  charge  was  successfully  made,  the  buildings 
on  the  opposite  side  were  gained  and  held  by  our  sharp 
shooters  and  in  a  few  minutes  General  Custer'  s  entire 
brigade  had  crossed. 

(Genl.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  382.) 
Ext.  No.  215.—  Lieut.  Col.  Pritchard  commanding 
the  3d  Ohio  Cav.  had  orders  to  push  forward  and  save  ^SThaV  been 


the  double  bridges  over  the  Flint  River.     He  carried  out 


his    orders    faithfully   and   energetically    and    saved   t 
bridges,  although  every  preparation  had  been  made  toAl 
burn  them,  and  captured  the  battalion  which  had  been  left 
to  destroy  them.    Captain  Hudson  led  his  battalion  at  the 
gallop  over  these  unknown  bridges,  dashed  into  the  rebel 
battalions  with  sabers,  and  captured  the  entire  force. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
445.) 

Ext.  No.  216.—  From  there  a  charge  was  ordered,  chavrges  ?udc 
and  was  executed  with  such  precipitancy  that  the  guard  Sv 
at  the  bridge,  consisting  of  a  force  of  fifty  men,  was  com-  aip|intRiverneai, 
pletely  surprised,  receiving  no  knowledge  of  our  approach  Aji.ui™i865:  Ga" 
until  the  head  of  the  column  struck  the  bridge  at  the  gal 
lop,  which  was  swept  like  a  hurricane,  not  allowing  the 
enemy  time  to  fire  a  volley.    A  few  scattering  shots  were 
fired,  but  to  no  effect.     The  whole  force  then  broke  and 
fled. 

(Lieut.  Col.  B.  D.  Pritchard,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  465.) 

Ext.  No.  217.—  I  again  moved  forward  at  a  f  ast 
trot  in  order  to  be  on  time  to  save  the  bridge  over  the 
Tabesofkee  Creek.  Here  we  found  the  enemy  in  line, 
about  300  strong,  and  attacked  them.  The  advance 
charged,  mounted,  over  the  burning  bridge  until  stopped 
by  the  plank  being  torn  up.  They  then  dismounted,  as 
did  also  the  two  advance  companies,  and  I  double  quicked 
them  across  the  bridge,  and  after  a  sharp  fight  of  about 
five  minutes,  drove  the  enemy  off  in  confusion.  In  the 
meantime  I  had  part  of  the  companies  at  work  extinguish- 


80 

ing  the  fire  on  the  bridge,  the  men  carrying  water  in  their 
hats,  caps,  and  everything  else  available.  The  fire  was 
sufficiently  suppressed  in  about  fifteen  minutes  to  admit 
of  horsemen  crossing,  and,  leaving  men  still  at  work 
against  the  flames,  I  crossed  the  command  and  pushed  on. 
(Lieut.  Col.  F.  White,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
458.) 

Retiring  across          Ext.   No.  218.— At   2:00   p.    m.    Wheeler    had   his 

wagon  trains  and  horses  carried  to  the  south  side  of  the 

o™eatteckvifnd  riyer-     HC  tnen  charged  the  enemy's  line  and  before  they 

cover ro1itunder  could  recover  from  their  consternation,  he  had,  by  a  rapid 

,  movement,  reached  the  river  with  his  dismounted  men 

Led  horses  and 

are  sent  ancl  hurried  them  across  the  pontoons,  cut  loose  the  bridge 
and  swung  it  around  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  just 
as  the  enemy  in  force  reached  the  other  bank. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  196.) 

COMMENTS. 

In  the  attack  of  a  ford  or  bridge,  the  whole  trick  con 
sists  in  keeping  down  the  enemy's  fire  till  the  crossing 
can  be  effected  and  a  deployment  made  on  the  opposite 
side.  This  may  be  done  by  rifle  fire  (Ext.  214),  artillery 
fire  (Exts.  209,  213),  or  by  both  combined  (Ext.  212). 
The  method  of  employing  it  will  depend  upon  the  ground. 
If  high  banks  overlook  the  crossing,  position  fire  (Ext. 
214)  is  desirable.  Often  a  bold  clash  will  turn  the  trick 
(Exts.  211,  215,  216,  217).  This  method  is  particularly 
applicable  where  the  defenders  can  be  surprised  (Ext. 
216). 

Extract  212  furnishes  a  good  illustration  of  with 
drawing  from  the  firing  line  and  crossing  while  under 
fire.  Under  these  circumstances,  horses  and  trains  should 
be  sent  ahead  (Ext.  218). 

The  method  here  used  by  General  Wheeler  will  often 
be  possible,  namely,  deliver  a  vigorous  attack  and  cross 
under  cover  of  the  confusion  caused  to  the  enemy's  ranks. 

The  cutting  loose  of  one  end  of  a  pontoon  bridge 
was  also  resorted  to  by  Lee's  army  when-  crossing  the 
Potomac  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 


81 

Usually  some  method  can  be  found  by  which  the 
crossing  can  be  turned.  The  mobility  of  cavalry  will  en 
able  it  to  reconnoitre,  in  a  short  time,  a  considerable 
distance  to  both  flanks  of  the  crossing,  while  other  troops 
are  engaging  the  enemy's  attention  in  front.  If  a  cross 
ing  can  be  found,  it  will  be  cheaper  to  turn  the  position 
than  to  force  it. 

When  the  defense  is  sufficiently  strong,  the  enemy 
will  suffer  more  by  permitting  his  column  to  get  well  into 
the  stream  (Ext.  210). 


82 
CHAPTER  VI. 

MISCELLANEOUS  TACTICS. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   BOONEVILLE. 

This  battle  is  described  in  Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol. 
I,  p.  156.  It  is  well  worth  the  study  of  every  cavalry 
officer.  As  it  was  the  first  fight  where  Sheridan  com 
manded  independent  cavalry,  and  is  so  full  of  good  cav 
alry  tactics  that  it  is  here  quoted  in  full. 

Sheridan  at  this  time  showed  a  fine  conception  of 
the  correct  use  of  cavalry.  The  details  of  the  battle  were 
well  known  to  General  Grant,  and  probably  had  a  mater 
ial  influence  on  the  latter  when  he  recommended  Sheri 
dan  for  the  command  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

It  resulted  in  Sheridan's  immediate  promotion,  gave 
him  the  command  of  an  infantry  division,  brought  his 
sterling  qualities  to  the  attention  of  higher  commanders, 
and  who  shall  say  that  it  did  not,  in  this  indirect  manner, 
have  an  important  bearing  on  the  destiny  of  the  nation, 
cavalry   out-          Ext.  No.  219.— On  the  morning  of  July  1,  1862,  a 
cavalry  command  of  between  five  and  six  thousand  men, 
under  the  Confederate  General  James  R.  Chalmers,  ad 
vanced  on  two  roads  converging  near  Booneville.     The 
head  of  the  enemy's  column  on  the  Blackland  and  Boone 
ville  road  came  in  contact  with  my  pickets  three  miles 
and  a  half  west  of   Booneville.     These  pickets,   under 
Lieutenant  Leonidas  S.  Scranton,  of  the  Second  Michi 
gan  Cavalry,  fell  back  slowly,  taking  advantage  of  every 
tree  or  other  cover  to  fire  from  till  they  arrived  at  the 
ubbornl  ™?n  Point  where  the  converging  roads  joined.     At  this  junc- 
™W       tion  there  was  a  stron§"  Position  in  tne  Protecting  timber, 
and  here  Scranton  made  a  firm  stand,  being  reinforced 
presently  by  a  few  men  he  had  out  as  pickets  on  the  road 


out. 


83 

to  his  left,  a  second  company  I  had  sent  him  from  camp, 
and  subsequently  by  three  companies  more,  all  now  com 
manded  by  Captain  Campbell.  This  force  was  dismount 
ed  and  formed  in  line,  and  soon  developed  that  the  enemy 
was  present  in  large  numbers.  Up  to  this  time  Chalmers  Advance,  by 
had  shown  only  the  heads  of  his  columns,  and  we  had  ^not^pio^d 

11,  <  .  till  compelled  to 

doubts  as  to  his  purpose,   but  now  that  our  resistance do  80  b? fire- 
forced  him  to  deploy  two  regiments  on  the  right  and  left 
of  the  road,  it  became  apparent  that  he  meant  business, 
and  that  there  was  no  time  to  lose  in  preparing  to  repel 
his  attack. 


Battle  of  BooneYille 
Julj  /s.e  J86?, 

JJHilt 


to 


Full  information  of  the  situation  was  immediately 

J      -frompt  report 

sent  me,  and  I  directed  Campbell  to  hold  fast,  if  possible, 
till  I  could  support  him,  but  if  compelled  to  retire  he  was 
authorized  to  do  so  slowly,  taking  advantage  of  every 
means  that  fell  in  his  way  to  prolong:  the  nVhtinsr.  Be- 

,,  •     T  .       ,  .  Stubborn  reiiet- 

tore  this  I  had  stationed  one  battalion  of  the  Second  Iowaance  b>r  advance 

-r,  ..,  troops  enables 

m  Booneville,  but  Colonel  Edward  Hatch,  command  ing  StJ  melt  rthe 


that  regiment,  was  now  directed  to  leave  one  company  attack- 

for  the  protection  of  our  camp  a  little  to  the  north  of 

the  station,  and  take  the  balance  of  the  Second  Iowa, 

with  the  battalion  in  Booneville  except  two  saber  com-    Digmounted 

panics,  and  form  the  whole  in  rear  of  Captain  Campbell,  poTtSd  bymouUnPt- 


84 
ed  troops  which  to  protect  his  flanks  and  support  him  by  a  charge  should 

are  ordered    to  . 

eharge  if  the  en-  ^  enemv  break  his  dismounted  line. 

emy  breaks   the  J 

dismounted  line.          While  these  preparations  were  being  made,  the  Con 
federates  attempted  to  drive  Campbell  from  his  position 
Fire  is  reserved  by  a  direct  attack  through  an  open  field.     In  this  they 

till    the    enemy     J  -      .       ~  ,.« 

gets  within  thirty  failed,  however,  for  our  men,  reserving  their  fire  until 
the  enemy  came  within  about  thirty  yards,  then  opened 
on  him  with  such  a  shower  of  bullets  from  our  Colt's 
rifles  that  it  soon  became  too  hot  for  him  and  he  was 
repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  Foiled  in  this  move, 
Chalmers  hesitated  to  attack  again  in  front,  but  began 
overlapping  both  flanks  of  Campbell's  line  by  force  of 
numbers,  compelling  Campbell  to  retire  toward  a  strong 
position  I  had  selected  in  his  rear  for  a  line  on  which  to 
make  our  main  resistance. 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  saw  this  withdrawing  he  again 
charged  in  front,  but  was  again  as  gallantly  repelled  as 
in  the  first  assault,  although  the  encounter  was  for  a 
short  time  so  desperate  as  to  have  the  character  of  a 
hand  to  hand  conflict,  several  groups  of  friend  and  foe 
using  on  each  other  the  butts  of  their  guns.  At  this 
juncture  the  timely  arrival  of  Colonel  Hatch  with  the 
Second  Iowa  gave  a  breathing  spell  to  Campbell,  and 
made  the  Confederates  so  chary  of  direct  attacks  that  he 
was  enabled  to  retire ;  and  at  the  same  time  1  found  op 
portunity  to  make  disposition  of  the  reinforcement  to  the 
best  advantage  possible,  placing  the  Second  Iowa  on  the 
left  of  the  new  line  and  strengthening  Campbell  on  its 
right  with  all  the  men  available. 

In  view  of  his  numbers,  the  enemy  soon  regained 
confidence  in  his  ability  to  overcome  us,  and  in  a  little 
while  again  began  his  flanking  movements,  his  right  pass 
ing  around  my  left  flank  some  distance,  and  approaching 
our  camp  and  transportation,  which  I  had  forbidden  to 
be  moved  out  to  the  rear.  Fearing  that  the  enemy  would 
envelop  and  capture  the  camp  and  transportation,  I  de 
termined  to  take  the  offensive, 
commander  Remembering-  a  circuitous  wood  road  that  I  had 

makes   thorough  .  t  r 

"  become  familiar  with  while  making  the  map  heretofore 


85 


Forlorn  hope. 


mentioned,  I  concluded  that  the  most  effective  plan  would  rounding  his 
be  to  pass  a  small  column  around  the  enemy's  left,  by  kn^wiedgew^ich 

fit"  11-11-  isof    immense 

way  of  this  road,  and  strike  his  rear  by  a  mounted  charge  advantage  to  him 

J  &     when  hia  camp  te 

simultaneously  with  an  advance  of  our  main  line  on  hisattacked- 
front.     I  knew  that  the  attack  in  rear  would  be  a  most  ed^mSan^us- 
hazardous  undertaking,  but  in  face  of  such  odds  as  the  rear?1 
enemy  had  the  condition  of  affairs  was  most  critical,  and 
could  be  relieved  only  by  a  bold  and  radical  change  in  our   Sheridan  stakes 
tactics;  so  I  at  once  selected  four  saber  companies,  two*^^S?o?one 
from  the  Second   Michigan  and  two   from  the  Second  w°Ins-S  * 
Iowa,  and  placing  Captain  Alger,  of  the  former  regiment, 
in  command  of  them,  I  informed  him  that  I  expected  of 
them  the  quick  and  desperate  work  that  is  usually  im 
posed  on  a  forlorn  hope. 

To  carry  out  the  purpose  now  in  view,  I  instructed 
Captain  Alger  to  follow  the  wood  road  as  it  led  around 
the  left  of  the  enemy's  advancing  forces,  to  a  point  where 
it  joined  the  Blackland  road,  about  three  miles  from 
Booneville,  and  directed  him,  upon  reaching  the  Black- 
land  road,  to  turn  up  it  immediately,  and  charge  the  rear 
of  the  enemy's  line.  Under  no  circumstances  was  he  to 
deploy  the  battalion,  but  charge  in  column  right  through 
whatever  he  came  upon,  and  report  to  me  in  front  of 
Booneville,  if  at  all  possible  for  him  to  get  there.  If  he 
failed  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line,  he  was  to 
go  ahead  as  far  as  he  could,  and  then  if  any  of  his  men 
were  left,  and  he  was  able  to  retreat,  he  was  to  do  so 
by  the  same  route  he  had  taken  on  his  way  out.  To  con 
duct  him  on  this  perilous  service  I  sent  along  a  thin,  Useofgui(3e- 
sallow,  tawny-haired  Mississippian  named  Beene,  whom 
I  had  employed  as  a  guide  and  scout  a  few  days  before, 
on  account  of  his  intimate  knowledge  of  the  roads,  from 
the  public  thoroughfares  down  to  the  insignificant  by 
paths  of  the  neighboring  swamps.  With  such  guidance 
I  felt  sure  that  the  column  would  get  to  the  desired  point 
without  delay,  for  there  was  no  danger  of  its  being  lost 
or  misled  by  taking  any  of  the  many  by-roads  which 
traversed  the  dense  forests  through  which  it  would  be 


86 

obliged  to  pass.  I  also  informed  Alger  that  I  should 
take  the  reserve  and  join  the  main  line  in  front  of  Boone- 
ville  for  the  purpose  of  making  an  advance  of  my  whole 
force,  and  that  as  a  signal  he  must  have  his  men  cheer 
loudly  when  he  struck  the  enemy's  rear,  in  order  that 
my  attack  might  be  simultaneous  with  his. 

A  commander  I  gave  him  one  hour  to  go  around  and  come  back 
w?°h3<?ra^?ng  through  the  enemy,  and  when  he  started  I  moved  to  the 
helms  put  ail  of  front  with  the  balance  of  the  reserve,  to  put  every  thing  I 

his  reserves  into 

the  firing  line,  had  into  the  fight.  This  meant  an  inestimable  advantage 
to  the  enemy  in  case  of  our  defeat,  but  our  own  safety 
demanded  the  hazard.  All  along  the  attenuated  line 

Prearranged  ,      ~    .          .      ,. 

signal  for  simui-  the  fighting  was  now  sharp,  and  the  enemy  s  tiring  md'i- 

taneous   attack  J 

canno^  usually  cateci  sucn  numerical  strength  that  fear  of  disaster  to 
Alger  increased  my  anxiety  terribly  as  the  time  set  for 

the  cheering1  arrived  and  no  sound  of  it  was  heard.     Re- 
Time   agree-  , 
ment  better  than  lying-  however,  on  the  fact  that  Beene  s  knowledge  of  the 

a  sound  signal.       •> 

roads  would  prevent  his  being  led  astray,  and  confident 
of  Alger's  determination  to  accomplish  the  purpose  for 
which  he  set  out,  as  soon  as  the  hour  was  up  I  ordered 
my  whole  line  forward.  Fortunately,  just  at  this  mo 
ment  a  locomotive  and  two  cars  loaded  with  grain  for 
my  horses  ran  into  Booneville  from  Corinth.  I  say  for 
tunately,  because  it  was  well  known  throughout  the  com 
mand  that  in  the  morning,  when  I  first  discovered  the 
large  numbers  of  the  enemy,  I  had  called  for  assistance; 
and  my  troops,  now  thinking  that  reinforcements  had 
courage  of  arrived  by  rail  from  Rienzi,  where  a  division  of  infantry 
a™e?iefethatpa*  was  encamped,  and  inspired  bv  this  belief,  advanced  with 

siBtance  had   ar-  T   ,       , 

rived.  renewed  confidence  and  wild  cheering.     Meantime 

the  engineer  of  the  locomotive  blow  his  whistle  loudly, 
so  that  the  enemy  might  also  learn  that  a  train  had  come; 
and  from  the  fact  that  in  a  few  moments  he  began  to 
give  way  before  our  small  force,  I  thought  that  this 
stratagem  had  some  effect.  Soon  his  men  broke,  and  ran 
in  the  utmost  disorder  over  the  country  in  every  direc 
tion.  I  found  later,  however,  that  his  precipitous  retreat 
was  due  to  the  pressure  on  his  left  from  the  Second  Iowa, 


87 

in  concert  with  the  front  attack  of  the  Second  Michigan, 
and  the  demoralization  wrought  in  his  rear  by  Alger, 
who  had  almost  entirely  accomplished  the  purpose  of  his 
expedition,  though  he  had  failed  to  come  through,  or  so 
near  that  I  could  hear  the  signal  agreed  upon  before 
leaving  Booneville. 

After  Alger  had  reached  and  turned  up  the  Black- 
land  road,  the  first  thing  he  came  across  was  the  Con 
federate  headquarters;  the  officers  and  orderlies  about 
which  he  captured  and  sent  back  some  distance  to  a  farm 
house.  Continuing  at  a  gallop,  he  soon  struck  the  rear 
of  the  enemy's  line,  but  was  unable  to  get  through,  nor 
did  he  get  near  enough  for  me  to  hear  his  cheering;  but 
as  he  had  made  the  distance  he  was  to  travel  in  the  time 
allotted,  his  attack  and  mine  were  almost  coincident,  and 
the  enemy,  stampeded  by  the  charges  in  front  and  rear, 
fled  toward  Blackland,  with  little  or  no  attempt  to  cap 
ture  Alger's  command  which  might  readily  have  bee** 
done.  Alger's  troops  soon  rejoined  me  at  Booneville,  Good  cavalry 
minus  many  hats,  having  returned  by  their  original  route.  Si^to^lSF  i5 
They  had  sustained  little  loss  except  a  few  men  wounded  way  out 
and  a  few  temporarily  missing.  Among  these  was  Alger 
himself,  who  was  dragged  from  his  saddle  by  the  limb 
of  a  tree  that,  in  the  excitement  of  the  charge,  he  was 
unable  to  flank.  The  missing  had  been  dismounted  in 
one  way  or  another,  and  run  over  by  the  enemy  in  his 
flight ;  but  they  all  turned  up  later,  none  the  worse  except 
for  a  few  scratches  and  bruises.  My  effective  strength 
in  this  fight  was  827  all  told,  and  Alger's  command  com 
prised  ninety  officers  and  men.  Chalmers'  was  composed 
of  six  regiments  and  two  battalions,  and  though  I  have 
been  unable  to  find  any  returns  from  which  to  verify  his 
actual  numbers,  yet,  from  the  statements  of  prisoners  and 
from  information  obtained  from  citizens  along  his  line 
of  march,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  he  had  in  action  not  less 
than  five  thousand  men.  Our  casualties  were  not  many 
—forty-one  in  all.  His  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
considerable,  his  most  severely  wounded — forty  men — 


88 

falling  into  our  hands,  having  been  left  at  farm  houses 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  battle  field. 
Sheridan  dis-          The  victory  in  face  of  such  odds  was  most  gratify- 

obeys  orders,  but  .  ..,.'.  . 

on  account  of  his  jng-  anci  as  it  justified  my  disinclination — in  fact,  refusal 

complete  victory  J 

"stifled8  ^Had  — to  retire  from  Booneville  without  fighting  (for  the  pur- 
whippfitm^hit  Pose  °f  saving  my  transportation,  as  directed  by  superior 
lraevnt  mltterdiff"  authority  when  I  applied  in  the  morning  for  reinforce 
ments),  it  was  to  me  particularly  grateful.     It  was  also 
very  valuable  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  increased  the 
confidence  between  the  officers  and  men  of  my  brigade 
A  victory  in- and  me,  and  gave  us  the  balance  of  the  month  not  only 
ence  between fiof- comparative  rest,  but  entire  immunity  from  the  dangers 
of  a  renewed  effort  to  gobble  my  isolated  outpost.     In 
addition  to  all  this,  recommendation  from  my  immediate 
superiors  was  promptly  tendered  through  oral  and  writ 
ten  congratulations ;  and  their  satisfaction  at  the  result  of 
the  battle  took  definite  form  a  few  days  later,  in  an  ap 
plication  for  my  promotion. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  pp.  156  to  165  inclusive.) 

COMMENTS. 

General  Sheridan  here  displayed  the  same  character 
istics  which  he  afterwards  displayed  in  the  valley.  He 
loved  a  fight  and  disobeyed  orders  to  withdraw  in  order 
to  save  his  transportation.  He  here  used  the  same  tac 
tics  which  were  so  popular  with  Forrest,  viz: — Holding 
the  enemy  in  front  while  a  turning  movement  attacked 
him  simultaneously  in  rear.  He  had  made  a  thorough 
reconnaissance  of  the  surrounding  country  and  mapped 
it.  He  personally  knew  every  road  and  trail  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  his  camp  and  utilized  them  to  the  best  advantage. 
His  outposts  were  well  out  and  resisted  stubbornly  till 
the  main  body  could  form  for  defense. 

In  our  drill  it  is  often  thought  that  if  the  attack  can 
get  to  within  two  hundred  yards,  a  charge  will  be  prac 
ticable.  Such  will  seldom  ever  be  the  case.  We  here 
find  Sheridan's  men  holding  their  fire  till  the  enemy  gets 
within  thirty  yards.  They  were  armed  with  revolving 


89 

carbines  and  could  deliver  a  rapid  fire  as  fast  as  with  our 
present  rifle. 

It  will  be  noticed  often  in  these  extracts  that  fire  is 
held  till  the  enemy  gets  to  within  very  short  range. 

It  will  be  noted  that  prearranged  signals  which  de 
pend  on  sound  are  not  to  be  relied  upon.  Sound  signals 
failed  in  the  battles  of  Seven  Pines,  Malvern  Hill,  Gettys 
burg,  and  many  others  during  the  rebellion.  A  time  sig 
nal  is  better  if  the  conditions  are  known  to  the  com 
mander.  In  case  a  time  signal  is  agreed  upon,  care  should 
be  exercised  to  see  that  watches  agree. 

We  here  see  the  commander  playing  with  the  cour 
age  of  his  men,  and  keeping  up  their  spirits  by  making 
them  believe  in  conditions  which  did  not  exist. 

In  this  fight  Sheridan  staked  his  whole  reputation 
on  the  result.  The  people  of  the  United  States  seem  to 
lay  great  stress  on  a  commander  gaining  a  victory  in  his 
first  fight.  All  through  the  war  we  see  many  careers 
ruined  because  the  commander  was  unfortunate  in  his 
first  fight,  while  those  who  were  fortunate  were  greeted 
as  heroes  and  were  permitted  to  continue  with  their 
former  experience  to  support  them  in  future  operations. 

A  commander  is  not  justified  in  withdrawing  from  a 
fight  till  he  has  put  all  his  reserves  into  the  firing  line. 

CAVALRY  SHOULD  NOT  SURRENDER. 

Ext.   No.  220. — Forrest  declared  that  he  would  lead    Forrest's  cav- 
forth  all  who  desired  to  accompany  him,  and  then  in-ofryFonaDonei- 

,   .  son   when   17,000 

quired  how  many  would  make  the  attempt.     The  answer  troops  surrender 
was  unanimous  that  they  would  follow  him  to  the  last. 
Orders  were  issued  accordingly  for  an  immediate  move 
ment.    About  4  o'clock  a.  m.  Forrest  was  ready  and  took 

Cavalry  should 

the  road  through  Dover.     About  500  officers  and  men not  surrender, 
formed  the  column.     *     *     *     Thus   assured,   Forrest  Tenn.,  Feb.  15, '62! 
returned  to  his  command,  that  meanwhile  had  continued 
on  the  road   to  the  crossing  of  the  creek  eastward  of 
Dover.     The  creek  expanded  by  backwater  to  a  breadth 
of  about  100  yards,  lined  with  ice,  it  was  supposed  to  be 
"swimming."     Forrest  dashed  through  the  ice  as  their 


90 

pioneer  just  as  he  had  but  lately  been  their  scout.  Pass 
ing  entirely  across,  the  water  proved  not  deeper  than  to 
the  saddle  skirts.  The  whole  command  now  moved  over 
and  took  up  the  march  for  Cumberland  City. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  91.) 

cavalry  of  the          Ext.   No.  221. — Upon   hearing   that   the   Army   of 
er^virginia^do  Northern  Virginia  had  surrendered,  the  men  generally 

not  at  first   sur-      .  ,,-.,.,  ,   . 

render  at  Appo-  dispersed  and  rode  off  to  their  homes,  subject  to  reassem- 

mattox. 

Appomattox,v»  blingf  for  a  continuation  of  the  struggle.     I  rode  out  in 

Aprlf9,1865.  °        ,  .    . 

person  with  a  portion  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee  s  division,  the 
nearest  to  me  at  the  time,  and  previous  to  the  negotia 
tions  between  the  commanders  of  the  two  armies.  It  will 
be  recalled  that  my  action  was  in  accordance  with  the 
views  I  had  expressed  in  the  council  the  night  before — 
that  if  a  surrender  was  compelled  the  next  day,  I  would 
try  to  extricate  the  cavalry,  provided  it  could  be  done 
without  compromising  the  action  of  the  commanding 
general. 

(Maj.  Genl.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  C.   S,,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46, 
Parti,  p.  1303.) 

Escape  of  the          Ext.   No.  222. — At  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry, 

SSSr?  Harp"  1862,  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis,  8th  N.  Y.  Cavalry  marched 

sept.  14, 1862.     ouj.  at  tjie  iieac|  of  1,500  horsemen  and  not  only  escaped 

surrender,  but  inflicted  serious  loss  on  the  Confederates 

by  capturing  Longstreet's  ordnance  train. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  122.) 

Ext.   No.  223. — Heavy  masses  of  rebel  cavalry  were 

Cutter  cuts  way  .  .  .  r  t 

out,  when   sur-  seen  covennsr  the  heipfhts  in  front  ot  mv  advance;  my 

rounded,     with  J 

saber.  rear  guard  was  hotly  engaged  with  a  superior  force  and 

Brandy  Station.        «  1       •  1      n       1 

Va..  oct,  11, 1863.  a  heavy  column  was  enveloping  each  flank.  Leaving 
the  6th  and  7th  Michigan  Cavalry  to  hold  the  force  in 
rear  in  check,  I  formed  the  5th  Michigan  Cavalry  on  my 
right  in  column  of  battalions ;  on  my  left  I  formed  the 
1st  Michigan  Cavalry  in  column  of  squadrons.  After 
ordering  them  to  draw  their  sabers  I  informed  them  that 
we  were  surrounded,  and  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  open 


91 

a  way  with  our  sabers.  They  gave  three  hearty  cheers 
and  the  band  struck  up  Yankee  Doodle  which  excited  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  command  to  the  highest  pitch.  Simul-|10i^leYankee 
taneously  both  regiments  moved  forward  to  the  attack. 
After  a  series  of  brilliant  charges  we  succeeded  in  reach 
ing  the  river  which  we  crossed  in  good  order. 

(Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  390.) 

Ext.  No.  224. — I  was  finally  completely  surround-    cutting  way 
ed  and  compelled  to  abandon  everything  that  would  im-    Kear  Lovejoy 
pede  me  in  order  to  cut  my  way  through.     I  took  Colonel  29,Ai864.' 
Jones  with  me  and  got  through  1,200  men  by  a  charge  in 
column,  and  crossed  the  river  below  Franklin. 

Brig.  Genl.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II, 
p.  762.) 

Ext.  No.  225. — General    Van    Dorn    attacked    and    cavalry  refuse 

to  surrender. 

captured  the  town  of  Holly  Springs,  Mississippi,  on  the  Holly  springs, 
20th  of  December.  The  attack  was  sudden  and  over 
powering,  and  the  garrison  was  speedily  captured.  Six 
companies  of  the  6th  Illinois  Cavalry  under  the  brave 
Major  Mudd,  refused  to  surrender  and  cut  their  way 
through  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  and  escaped. 

(History  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Brackett,  p.  266.) 

Ext.   No.  226. — At  5  :00  p.  m.  my  patrols  and  pick- 

ets  reported  the  enemy  in  force  in  my  rear.     I  formed 

the  5th  Iowa  in  charging  column  on  the  pike.     The  1 6th 

Illinois,  dismounted,  on  the  right  and  the  8th  Michigan,    The  formation 

•L  WftS      n°*     ^°r    an 

dismounted,  on  the  left  of  the  pike;  led  horses  of  both  attack  but  to  cut 

'  .        a  way  out  when 

regiments  to  follow  at  safe  distance  in  their  respective  surrounded. 

rears;  the  14th  Illinois  was  placed  in  column  of  fours  to 

the  left  and  rear  of  the  8th  Michigan  and  parallel  to  the 

5th  Iowa.     As  soon  as  the  enemy's  fire  was  drawn,  the 

dismounted  men  were  to  immediately   fall  back,  mount 

and  follow  out  the  5th  Iowa  which  was  to  go  through 

with  sabers.     In  fifteen  minutes  we  struck  the  enemy  in 

line  barricaded  and  posted  in  out  houses  and  buildings. 

The  movement  was  entirely  successful. 

Out  of   1,500  brought  out  safe  not  more  than  30    opinion  that 
were  missing.     Permit  me  to  add  the  fact  of  growing  lot%?  captured" 


92 


93 

confidence   amongst   our   troops  that  good  cavalry  can    Duck  River 

,  ,  Tenn.,  Nov.  28,  '64! 

never  be  captured. 

(Maj.  J.  M.  Young,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I,  p.  604. 

IMPROPER  USE  OF  CAVALRY. 

Ext.  No.  227. — The  officers  and  men  were  in  pretty  of 
good  condition,  so  far  as  health  and  equipment  were  con-gjJ*JJ 
cerned,  but  their  horses  were  thin  and  very  much  worn 
out  by  excessive,  and,  it  seemed  to  me,  unnecessary 
picket  duty,  the  picket  line  almost  encircling  the  infantry 
and  artillery  camps  of  the  army,  covering  a  distance,  if 
stretched  out  on  a  continuous  line,  of  nearly  60  miles. 

The  enemy,  more  wise,   had  been  husbanding  the    During  winter 

horses  should  be 

strength  and  efficiency  of  his  horses  by  sending  them  to  J|°tr^%erat£ey 
the  rear,  in  order  to  bring-  them  out  in  the  spring  in  good    Rapidan  to  the 

Jamet,  Apr.  1864 

condition  for  the  impending  campaign. 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
787.) 

Ext.   No.  228. — As  it  was  difficult  to  overcome  the    cavalry  should 

,  ,.   ,  ...  .  .        not  be  wasted  for 

established  custom  of  wasting  cavalry  for  the  protection  the  protection  of 
of  trains,  and  for  the  establishment  of  cordons  around  a    Rapidan  to  the 

.     ...  ,  .  ,  .  James,  Apr.  1864. 

sleeping  infantry  force,  we  had  to  bide  our  time. 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
787.) 

Ext.  No.  229.— The  enemy  here  again  made  an  Cannot  oppose 
error  in  tactics  by  sending  a  large  force  to  attack  my  £®ge  fo?ceCby°a£ 
rear,  thus  weakening  his  force  in  front,  enabling  me  to  rear  with  a\arge 
throw  all  my  strength  on  that  which  opposed  my  front,  °Yei'iow  Tavern 

j   /-    1  *.     1  •      r  vi  11  j  Va..  May  11, 1884. 

and  fight  this  force  with  a  small  rear  guard. 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
790.) 

Ext.  No.  230. — -Ouster's  charge,  with  Chapman  on  Cavalry should 
his  flank,  was  brilliantly  executed;  first  at  a  walk,  then 
at  a  trot,  then  dashing  at  the  enemy's  line  and  battery, 
capturing  the  guns  and  gunners  and  breaking  the  line, 
which  was  simple  enough  to  receive  the  charge  in  a 
stationary  position.  In  this  assault  General  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart,  commanding  the  enemy's  cavalry,  was  mortally 
wounded. 


94 

(Genl.   P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
790.) 
Marching  cav-          Ext.  No.  231. — On  the  morning-  of  the  23d  I  was 

airy  in  rear  of  in- 

ra?n™strtoncav-        e        to  Proceec^  via  New  Castle,  in  rear  of  the  train 
alry-  and  in  rear  of  the  rest  of  the  army.     From  that  time  till 

Lynchbnrg  Cam 
paign,  June,  1864.  the  arrival  of  my  division  at  Loup  Creek  it  was  marched 

in  the  rear.  No  opportunity  has  been  offered  to  obtain 
forage  or  subsistence  for  the  men,  everything  having 
been  taken  by  the  troops  marching  in  my  front.  As  a 
consequence  many  of  the  men  of  my  command  have 
perished  by  the  roadside  from  hunger  and  fatigue,  whilst 
their  horses  fell  bv  the  way  from  the  same  cause.  I 

Night     march-  J  J 

iefypbadefor°cabve. would  respectfully  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  my 

marching  has  been  done  principally  during  the  night 

time,  thus  affording  little  opportunity  for  rest  or  sleep. 

(Brig.  Genl.  A.  N.  Duffle,  R.  R.,  Vol.  37,  Part  I,  p. 

144.) 

COMMENTS. 

When  Sheridan  took  command  of  the  cavalry  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  he  found  the  conditions  as 
stated  in  Extract  227.  The  horses  had  been  worn  out 
in  doing  picket  duty  around  an  infantry  camp  on  a  line 
of  nearly  sixty  miles ;  while  the  Confederates  habitually 
sent  their  horses  to  the  rear  in  winter  to  recuperate.  The 
use  of  cavalry  for  train  guards  is  not  to  be  encouraged. 
It  is  a  great  waste  of  cavalry  and  besides  the  duty  can  be 
better  done  by  infantry.  In  case  of  an  attack  the  in 
fantryman  from  the  ground  can  do  much  more  effective 
shooting  than  can  a  man  on  a  horse.  The  rate  of  speed 
of  a  train  being  much  slower  than  the  rate  of  march,  of 
cavalry,  it  is  very  wearing  on  horses  to  hold  them  down 
to  the  rate  of  travel  of  the  train. 

The  marching  of  cavalry  in  rear  of  infantry  trains 
means  that  there  will  be  nothing  left  for  the  cavalry  to 
eat,  and  when  this  condition  is  combined  with  night 
marching  the  situation  could  not  be  worse  for  a  cavalry 
command  (Ext.  231). 


95 

Extract  229  illustrates  an  error  in  the  use  of  cavalry 
where  Stuart  tried  to  bring  Sheridan  to  a  fight  by  attack 
ing  his  rear.  Sheridan  fought  to  the  rear  with  a  small 
rear  guard  and  kept  on  his  Richmond  raid  without  seri 
ous  opposition. 

STREET   FIGHTING. 

Ext.   No.  232.  —  A   fierce   fight   at   once   began.      I    street  fighting. 
made  the  men  force  their  way  into  the  houses  whence    The  offensive 
they  were  fired  upon.     Details  were  posted  in  the  middle  septf?!  1862'. 
of  the  street  in  front  of  every  house,  to  fire  on  the  in 
mates  when  they  showed  themselves  and  prevent  them 
from  maintaining  an  accurate  and  effective  fire.     Other 
details  were  made  to  break  doors  of  the  houses  and  enter 
them.     Artillery  was  brought  into  the  town  and  turned 
upon  the  houses  in  which  the  most  stubborn  resistance 
was  kept  up. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.   No.  233.  —  The  street  through  which  he  neces-    Formation  for 

street  fighting  is 

sarily  passed  was  so  narrow  that  his  regiment  could  only  column  of  fours. 
be  operated  in  column  of   fours.     A  sufficient  interval 


was,  however,  preserved  between  his  squadrons,  which    Attack  by  suc- 
were  employed  successively  in  charging  the  head  of  the  eaechS  forming  in 

,  rear  after  deliv- 

enemy  s   advancing  column.      As   one   squadron   retired  ering  its  wow. 

r  ji  1  r  •         •  r      •  •  Booiisboi'0,   Md., 

irom  the  charge,  to  torm  again  in  rear  ot  the  regiment,  Sept.  15,  1862. 
the  one  in  front  took  up  the  battle.     By  a  rapid  series  of 
\vell  executed  attacks  the  9th  regiment  thus  covered  the 
retreat  of  the  remainder  of  the  brigade  and  gave  it  time 
to  take  position  w7est  of  Boonsboro. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  ].  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  125.) 

Ext.  No.  234.  —  I   had   pressed   up    to   within    500    Dismounted 

troops  clear  the 

yards  when  the  enemy  retired  precipitately  through  the  \°™ 

town.     I  charged  half  way  through  the  main  street,  an 

on  the  left,  but  a  hot  fire  from  the  enclosures  and  gardens  Va>)  Sept-  24)  1864> 

forced  me  back.     I  now  dismounted  five  squadrons  of  the 

1st  N.  Y.,  cleared  the  town,  and  charged  through  with 

the  rest  of  my  command. 


96 


(Brig.  Genl.  T.  C.  Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I,  p 
476.) 


NIGHT   OPEBATIONS. 


This  is  a  fine          Ext   No.  235.  —  On  October  28,  1863,  a  part  of  the 

illustration  of  o  ,    -p,-    •    •  r     ,        .  0  ,      „ 

-Ulvision  °*  the  12th  Corps  under  Brig.  Genl.  Geary, 


?tudyxtensivecami>ecl  at  Wauhatchie  two  and  one-half  miles  from  the 

Wauhatchie,  llth  Corps. 
Tenn.,  Oct.  28,  29, 

Between  12  midnight  and  1  :00  a.  m.  on  a  bright 
moonlight  night,  his  camp  was  attacked  and  the  attack 
repulsed. 

When  the  attack  began,  General  Hooker  immediate 
ly  ordered  General  Carl  Schurz  to  double  quick  his  di 
vision  to  the  aid  of  Geary,  and  at  the  same  time  sent 
word  to  General  Howard,  who  was  in  immediate  com 
mand  of  both  divisions,  that  such  orders  had  been  given. 

General  Schurz  started  promptly  with  three  brigades, 
marching  at  their  head.  Each  brigade  had  orders  to  fol 
low  the  one  in  front  of  it.  Schurz,  while  en  route,  re 
ceived  orders  to  occupy  a  neighboring  hill.  The  brigade 
ordered  there  got  off  the  road  and  into  a  boggy  thicket 
where  it  was  obliged  to  halt  ;  but  it  eventually  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  hill.  The  second  brigade  did  not  follow 
the  first  and  halted  without  orders.  The  third  brigade, 
not  having  orders  to  halt,  marched  past  the  second.  Then 
an  aide  of  General  Howard  began  to  give  orders  in  the 
name  of  his  general,  and  the  two  brigades  were  formed 
in  line  of  battle  with  no  enemy  near.  At  about  this  time 
a  few  prisoners  were  brought  in  and  an  order  was  issued 
to  escort  them  to  Chattanooga  ;  one  entire  brigade  started 
off  with  them. 

General  Hooker  came  up  and  found  everything  be 
ing  done  except  relieving  General  Geary's  small  com 
mand  ;  lie  thereupon  got  mad  and  made  remarks, 

Finally  one  brigade  reached  Geary  at  5  :30  a.  m. 
followed  by  another  at  7  :00  a.  m. 

Schurz  asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry  and  was  held 
blameless.  The  court  found  that  "It  was  right  and 


97 

proper  that  he  (Hooker)  should  give  expression  to  his 
righteous  indignation  in  his  official  report." 

The  whole  operation  is  a  fine  illustration  of  night 
maneuvers,  when  undertaken  after  dark  in  an  unknown 
country.  It  is  believed  that  all  the  points  are  covered  by 
this  concrete  example. 

(See  the  report  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
31,  Parti,  p.  206.) 

Ext.   No.  236.  —  Remaining  in  possession  of  the  pike    Friendly  troops 
for  half  an  hour  we  withdrew  upon  the  approach  of  sev- 
eral  bodies  of   infantry,  which,  coming  up  in  opposite 
directions,  by  mistake  got  to  shooting  into  each  other30'18 
and  fired  several  volleys  before  finding  out  their  error. 

(Brig.  Genl.  L.  S.  Ross,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part 
I,  p.  770.) 

Ext.  No.  237.  —  I   reached  the  head  of  Winslow's    Formation  for 


brigade  at  4  o'clock  and  found  the  troops  marching-  to  before  dart  £8 

,1  •..  .  the  attack  made 

the  position  assigned  them  by  General  Upton      WinslowJU8t  after  dark. 

,.  .  .  over  a  short  dis- 

dici  not  arrive  till  after  dark,  but  General  Upton  pro- tance- succeeds- 


posed  to  make  the  assault  in  the  night,  and  coinciding  Apr.^isS. 
with  him  in  judgment,  I  ordered  the  attack.  Three  hun 
dred  men  of  the  3d  Iowa  were  dismounted  and  moved 
forward  and  forced  across  the  road  under  a  heavy  fire 
of  artillery.  At  8  :00  p.  m.  the  troops  were  ready.  Gen 
erals  Upton  and  Wrinslow  directed  the  movement  in  per 
son.  The  troops  dashed  forward ;  during  the  attack  the 
rebel  guns  threw  out  perfect  storm  of  canister  and  grape. 
General  Upton  swept  away  all  opposition  and  took  pos 
session  of  the  foot  and  railway  bridges. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  363.) 

COMMENTS. 

A  very  poor  opinion  is  held  of  night  operations. 
Their  chief  use  will  be  limited  to  an  attack  over  a  short 
space  of  ground  directly  to  the  front  after  the  troops 
have  worked  into  position  by  daylight  as  illustrated  in 
Ext.  237. 


98 

Another  application  will  be  where  the  troops  can 
work  into  position  under  the  cover  of  darkness  and  make 
the  attack  at  daybreak  (Ext.  275). 

correct  use  to  Ext.  Njo.  238.  —  During  the  period  of  my  immedi- 
afr^corps*  a  '  v"  ate  control  of  the  Corps,  I  tried  to  carry  into  effect,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  view  I  had  advanced  before  and  dur 
ing  the  opening  of  the  Wilderness  campaign,  i.  e.,  "that 
our  cavalry  ought  to  fight  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  our 
infantry  the  enemy's  infantry"  ;  for  there  was  great 
danger  of  breaking  the  spirit  of  the  Corps  if  it  was  to 
be  pitted  against  the  enemy's  compact  masses  of  foot 
troops  posted  behind  intrenchments,  and  unless  there  was 
some  adequate  tactical  or  strategical  advantage  to  be 
gained,  such  a  use  of  it  would  not  be  justified. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  p.  453,  Vol.  I.) 
Battle  tactics          Ext.   No.  239.  —  Our   line  of  battle  in  corps  front 

of  a  corps,  three  ..  .     ,     . 

lines.  was  always  formed  in  one  way.     Each  brigade  detached 


front  one  of  its  regiments  to  cover  its  whole  front,  often  half 

one-half    mile. 

2d  line  have  a  m^e  l°n£'  w^^  a  chain  of  skirmishers.     Two  more 

drawn  labers.      regiments  followed  behind  each  wing  at  about  200  yards 

apart,    in   line,    with   sabers    drawn.      The   rest   of   the 

8d  line  in  col-     L 

umn  of  fours.      brigade  formed  a  third  line  in  column  of  fours. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  18.) 

For  the  offen-          -^xt-   ^°'  ^40.  —  The  only  principle  to  establish  for 

SStabedaSan?tn€  employment  of  a  body  of  cavalry  as  considerable  as 

andnfora^nutuai  the  division  is  the  division  of  this  mass  of  troops  into 

many  lines  arranged  for  mutual  support.    The  disposing 

lines  in  echelons  should  be  considered  as  most  favorable 

for  safe  offensive. 

(Cooke's  New7  Cavalry  Tactics,  p.  266.) 

A  straight  line          Ext.  No.  241.  —  The  enemy  was  dismounted  behind 

the  crest  of  a  hill.    Their  formation  was  defective  in  that 

instead  of  forming  a  straight,  uniform  line,  they  were 

formed  in  the  shape  of  a  "V,"  perhaps  to  meet  my  move- 

A  sharp  salient  ment  to  ^an^  them.    When  we  charged  over  the  hill,  al- 

?iineeak  part  °f  though  the  enemy  had  some  advantage  in  firing  upwards, 

it  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  fact  that  the  men 

upon  their  flanks  could  not  fire  at  us  at  all,  while  our 


99 


whole  line  could  fire  without  difficulty  upon  any  portion 
of  their  formation.  After  a  short,  but  hot  fight,  they 
gave  way. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.  No.  242. — This    movement    was    made    at    a    Marching  a 
walk,  with  three   divisions  on  the  same  (plank)  road— cavalry  corps> 
making  a  column  of  about  13  miles  in  length — march 
ing  by  the  flank  of  the  enemy.    I  preferred  this,  however,  t^n^^S 
to  the  combinations  arising  from  separate  roads,  com- meS  !sn  gimmei- 
binations  rarely  working  as  expected,  and  generally  fail-  n  R^wan  to  the 
ing,  unless  subordinate  commanders  are  prompt  and  fully  JaB 
understand  the   situation;  besides,   an   engagement  was 
imminent,  and  it  was  necessary  that  the  force  be  well  to 
gether. 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
789.) 

Ext.  No.  243. — There  was  no  lack  of  courage,  but    Evils  of  a  di- 

111  ,.  .       e  vided  command. 

clearly  an  absence  of  concert  and  of  sustained  movement  Yazoo city,  Miss., 
in  this  operation;  and,  worst  of  all,  a  divided  command,  Mar> 5>  18< 
for  though  General  Richardson  claimed  to  be  the  senior, 
he  waived  the  chief  command  in  deference  to  the  fact 
that  General  Ross  had  a  superior  knowledge  of  the  the 
atre  of  operations.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  each 
brigade  was  handled  in  the  attack  as  a  separate  force, 
with  little  regard  to  the  movements  or  purposes  of  the 
other — an  incongruity  in  war  utterly  hostile  to  success. 
(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  405.) 


100 


CHAPTER  VII. 


SECUEITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


ADVANCE   GUARD. 


Advance  guard          Ext.   No.  244.  —  Captain     Rup-er,     who     took    and 

preceded    by          .         . 

guides.  maintained  his  position  at  the  head  of  the  advance  guard, 


in  charge  of  the  guides,  and  who  conducted  the  column, 
and  whose  services  were  almost  indispensable  to  me. 

(Maj.  Genl.  L.  H.  Rousseau,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II, 
p.  909.) 

HOW  to  enter  a  Ext.  No.  245.  —  On  arriving  at  Woodstock  the 
scouts  dashed  through  the  town  followed  by  the  advance 
guard. 

(Maj.  C.  C.  Brown,  22d  N.  Y.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46, 
Part  I,  p.  532.) 

Morgan  has  a          Ext.  No.  246.  —  Morgan   appreciated   the   necessity 

permanent     a  d- 

vance  guard.  of  having  an  advance  guard  which  could  be  thoroughly 
relied  on,  and  disinclined  to  trust  to  details  changed  every 
day  for  that  duty,  had  organized  a  body  of  twenty-five 
selected  men.  men  selected  with  great  care  from  the  entire  force  under 
his  command,  to  constitute  a  continuous  advance  guard 
for  the  expedition.  So  well  did  this  body  perform  its 
duty  that  it  became  an  honor  eagerly  sought  and  a  reward 

Selection  a  re-  ,      J 
ward  for  bravery,  for  gallantry. 

This  guard  habitually  marched  at  a  distance  of  400 
order  of  march,  yards  in  front  of  the  column.  Three  videttes  were,  as 
connecting  files,  placed  between  it  and  the  column  with 
distances  of  100  yards.  Their  duties  were  to  transmit  in 
formation  and  orders  between  the  column  and  the  ad 
vance  guard,  and  to  regulate  the  gait  of  the  former  so 
that  it  would  not  press  too  closely  on  the  latter.  Six 
videttes  were  thrown  out  in  front  of  the  guard;  125 
yards  in  front  of  the  main  body  of  the  advance  guard 


101 

was  a  group  of  four  riding  in  pairs  with  a  distance  of  50 
yards  between  each  pair,  and  125  yards  in  front  of  them 
was  the  other  pair.  It  was  found  best  to  keep  the  same 
men  always  on  the   same  duty.     The  advance  videttes 
were  required  to  carefully  examine  on  all  sides  and  re-    investigating 
port.     When  they  came  to  cross  roads  one  or  both  gal 
loped  down  them  as  the  case  might  require  for  200  or    Places  of  such 
300  yards  and  remained  till  men  were  sent  from  the  head  SSrs  IS?  tol 
of  the  column  to  relieve  them,  when  they  returned  to™ 
their  posts.     As  soon  as  they  notified  the  commander  of 
the  advance  guard  that  they  were  about  to  leave  their 
posts,  he  took  measures  to  supply  their  places.     The  two 
videttes  next  to  them  in  the  chain  galloped  to  the  front, 
and  the   other   two  moved   up   respectively  fifty   yards. 
Two  men  were  sent  from  the  guard  to  fill  the  places  of 
the  last. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.  No.  247.— The  size  of  an  advance  guard  for  a  Formation  of 
corps  should  be  one  brigade.  In  the  point  should  be  a advance  guard* 
sergeant  and  two  men,  connecting  files  should  extend 
back  for  a  mile  100  yards  apart,  then  about  30  men  with 
connecting  files  for  another  mile,  total  70  men;  then  the 
leading  brigade  with  a  battery.  In  this  way  signals  can 
be  transmitted  back  two  miles  in  two  minutes.  At  each 
side  road  the  leading  man  rides  out  one  quarter 
mile  or  more  and  all  the  connecting  files  move  up.  When 
the  last  file  goes  past  the  lookout  takes  his  place  in  rear. 
The  employment  of  flankers  and  skirmishers,  unless  the 
enemy  is  known  to  be  near,  hardly  pays  for  the  con 
sumption  of  horse  flesh  occasioned  by  constantly  riding 
over  broken  ground.  The  flanking  should  be  done  by 
scouts  who  travel  light. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  The  Lessons  of  a  Decade,  p. 
90.) 


102 

COMMENTS. 

Attention  is  invited  to  the  system  of  advance  guard 
as  used  by  Morgan  (Ext.  246). 

Captain  Whittaker  also  highly  recommends  this  sys 
tem  (Ext.  247). 

The  system  prescribed  in  the  cavalry  drill  regulations 
will  find  little  application.  In  a  close  country  the  flank 
ing  groups  cannot  be  used,  and  in  an  open  country  a 
more  open  formation  will  be  used. 

SCBEENING. 

screening  the          Ext.  No.  248. — During  Sherman's  march  to  the  sea 

march  of  an  in-  !•*••«•« 

lantry  column,    his  cavalry  was  commanded  by  Kilpatnck. 

The  infantry  marched  in  four  strong  columns.  The 
cavalry  repeatedly  attacked  barricades  both  mounted  and 
dismounted.  The  enemy  was  not  able  to  touch  a  train 
or  annoy  the  flanks. 

The  cavalry  crossed  the  entire  front  of  the  army 
three  times,  and  marched  541  miles  in  33  days. 

(General  Kilpatrick,  R.   R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  366;  also, 
General  Sherman,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  368.) 
screens  the          Ext.  No.  249. — From  the  evening  of  June  12th  till 

withdrawal  of  in- 

fantry  from  the  2  a.  m.  of  the  14th  Mclntosh  s  brigade  covered  the  rear 

battle  line. 

of  the  army,  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  Long's  bridge 
and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  reached  Charles  City 
court  house.  On  the  15th  and  16th  both  brigades  were 
kept  unceasingly  active  in  making  demonstrations  from 
Philip's  house  and  St.  Mary's  church  upon  the  enemy  be 
tween  White  Oak  Swamp  and  Malvern  Hill. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  884.  Covering  of  Grant's  army  while  crossing  the 
James.) 

screening  the          Ext   No-  250.— So  skillfully    was    this    movement 

Suitrj?*     oftar  screened  by  the  disposition  which  Stuart  made  of  his 

from^wiSchwrter!  cavalry  that  General  Patterson  does  not  appear  to  have 

Va>' July  18'186L  been  aware  of  it  until  the  21st  of  July,  on  which  day 

Johnston's  forces  were  actively  engaged  at  Bull  Run. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  34.) 


103 
Ext.  No.  251. — To  conceal  my  movements  as  far  as   cavalry  screens 

.  .       1  ,       ,  the    movements 

possible  from  the  enemy,  Brig.  Genl.  Ashby,  who  has  re-  of  infantry, 
mained  in  front  of  Banks  during  the  march  against  Mil-  ^jfaj  i?ai862.1" 
roy,  was  directed  to  continue  to  hold  that  position  till 
the  following  day,  when  he  was  to  join  the  main  body, 
leaving,  however,  a  covering  force  sufficient  to  prevent 
information  of  our  movements  crossing  our  lines. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  T.  J.  Jackson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12, 
Part  I,  p.  701.) 

Ext  No.  252. — May  7,  1864,  crossed  Taylor's  ^ch^cterMie 
Ridge,  through  Nickajack  Trace,  forced  back  the  rebel  corps befoi*  and 
cavalry,  covering  and  masking  the  movements  of  the  ^e^a^,  e*., 
20th  Corps. 

May  8,  moved  to  Villanow  and  opened  communica 
tion  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Led  the  advance 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  Resaca,  drove  the 
enemy's  cavalry  and  infantry  skirmish  line  back  behind 
his  works,  masking  the  movements  of  our  infantry  un 
til  the  force  of  the  enemy  was  too  great  to  contend  with 
longer,  when  I  was  relieved  by  the  infantry  and  the  com 
mand  took  post  on  the  right  of  our  army  then  in  line  of 
battle  before  Resaca. 

(Genl.  J.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p.  857.) 

Ext.  No.  253. — You  may  depend  upon  it,  we  can    Enemy's  inteu- 

r  .    .        tions  cannot  be 

never  discover  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy,  or  divine  discovered  as 

J  long   as  he  fills 

his  intentions,  so  long  as  he  fills  the  country  with  a  cloud 
of  cavalry.     We  must  break  through  that  and  find  him.  alry* 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  Hooker,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p. 
45.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  subjects  of  security  and  information  are  dis 
tinctly  different.  Security  embraces  advance,  rear  and 
flank  guards,  outposts  and  screening;  while  information 
embraces  all  kinds  of  reconnaissance,  the  employment  of 
a  spy  and  scout  system,  and  the  strategic  use  of  cavalry. 

Security  will  usually  find  troops  on  the  defensive 
(Ext  250),  while  reconnaissance  and  the  strategic  use  of 


104 

cavalry  will  usually  involve  them  in  combat.     (Ext.  252.) 
See  Strategic  Use  of  Cavalry. 

The  defeat  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  may  prevent  it 
from  gaining  information  of  the  main  body  that  is  fol 
lowing.  (Ext.  252.) 

The  offensive  screen  will  naturally  result  from  a 
cavalry  fight  just  preceding  a  battle,  and  not  far  from 
the  main  body.  (Ext.  252.)  (299.) 

The  defensive  screen  is  well  illustrated  in  extract 
253. 

The  formations  used  by  cavalry  on  screening  duty 
will  necessarily  be  different  from  those  used  when  seek 
ing  information.  In  screening  cavalry  may  be  disposed 
as  indicated  in  extract  253.  In  this  case,  if  the  enemy 
approaches,  the  screen,  in  falling  back,  gathers  strength 
as  it  retires ;  while  the  cavalry  seeking  the  information 
will  try  and  break  the  screen  and  locate  the  enemy's  main 
body.  In  order  to  do  this,  officer's  patrols  may  be  sent 
out  which  will  endeavor  to  locate  the  weak  points  in  the 
screen.  The  aggressors  can  then  concentrate  their  forces 
in  an  effort  to  break  the  screen  (Ext.  253)  (299)  at  the 
weak  point,  leaving  the  duty  of  screening  their  own 
forces  to  the  divisional  cavalry. 

Screening  means  separation,  while  the  penetration 
of  an  enemy's  screen  means  concentration. 

OUTPOSTS. 

pickets  should  Ext.  No.  254.— On  October  31,  1863,  the  4th  Ind. 
pSfll.  be  sup"  Cav.  went  into  Fayetteville  and  put  out  unsupported 
pickets  at  the  principal  exits  of  the  town.  At  about  8 
p.  m.  twenty  men  appeared  from  the  town  and  in  answer 
to  the  challenge  said,  "Friends  to  relieve  the  pickets." 
They  advanced  and  shot  down  the  pickets  and  passed  on 
and  fired  on  the  videttes. 

(Maj.  J.  P.  Leslie,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  236.) 
Ext    No    255. — My  pickets  were  attacked  at     10 

Reserve  found 

useful.  o'clock  this  morning  by  a  small  scouting  party.     I  im 

mediately  pursued  them  with  the  reserve,  capturing  six, 
etc. 


105 

(Col.  Wm.  J.  Palmer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p. 
440.) 

Ext.  No.  256.  —  The  division  marched  to  Auburn;  I  Division  picket* 
established  my  headquarters  about  a  mile  from  Auburn, 
throwing  out  my  picket  a  distance  of  ^4  mile  beyond. 

(M.  H.  Avery,   10th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29, 
Part  I,  p.  368.) 

Ext.  No.  257.  —  On  Nov.  28,  about  noon,  the  pickets    outpost  givet 

r     ,  ,,  .  .  notice   of    the 

gave  notice  of  the  enemy  s  advance  at  various  fords  and  enemy's  advance 

at  several  points 

in  such  force  as  to  leave  no  doubt  of  his  intention.  at  the  same  time. 


(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part 
p.   550.) 

Ext.  No.  258.  —  In  May,  1862,  Morgan's  squadron 
went  into  Lebanon,  Tenn.,  and  quartered  three  companies  lead8  to  disaster. 
in  buildings,  and  put  horses  in  stables;  the  night  was 
rainy  and  bleak  and  the  pickets  sought  shelter  in  a  neigh 
boring  house.  The  next  mornig  the  Federal  cavalry  sur 
prised  the  picket  and  then  the  town  and  captured  nearly 
all  of  Morgan's  command  and  all  of  his  horses. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.  No.  259.  —  Morgan's  death  occurred  because  of    unguarded  by- 

roads  should  not 

quartering  in  towns  and  also  because  of  improper  out-  be  left  in  rear  of 
post  duty.  The  picket  was  posted  beyond  a  by-road 
through  which  the  enemy  entered.  "The  town,  had  the 
instructions  been  obeyed  and  the  pickets  correctly  posted, 
would  have  been  perfectly  protected.  The  enemy  gained 
admittance,  unchallenged,  through  an  unaccountable  error 
in  the  picketing  the  roads  on  the  left." 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.    No.   260.  —  Orders  issued   by   General   Bragg 
May  29th,  1862,  for  retreat  from  Corinth,  direct: 

3d.     At  10:00  p.  m.  retrograde  movement  to  com 
mence  as  already  indicated. 

4th.     At  12  :00  p.  m.  rear  guard  to  follow  the  move 
ment. 

5th.     Outposts  will  be  called  in  at  9:00  p.  m.,  their    outposts  re- 

1  placed    by   cav- 

places  supplied  by  cavalry.  fryyretreeat  infan" 


106 

camp  fires  kept          6th.     Three  rockets  at  3  :00  a.  m.  to  be  sent  up  by 
the  cavalry ;  camp  fires  will  be  kept  up. 

The  above  orders  were  sent  to  Col.  Joseph  Wheeler, 
who  entirely  misled  the  Federal  forces  as  to  what  was 
confronting  them  the  next  day. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  7.) 
cavalry  covers          Ext.  No.  261. — During  Bragg's  retreat  from  Perry- 

the  retreat  of  an     .„,,«,.  -,  ,    ,,  r  i  • 

army.  ville,  Wheeler  s  cavalry  covered  the  retreat  of  his  army. 

From  Bryantville  General  Bragg  wrote  Wheeler:  "Your 
services  have  been  most  valuable  and  brilliant.  No  cav 
alry  force  was  ever  more  handsomely  handled  and  no 
army  better  covered."  While  covering  Bragg's  army 
Wheeler's  cavalry  was  engaged  in  thirty  engagements 
and  innumerable  skirmishes. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  25.) 

COMMENTS. 

.  Outposts  should  be  well  out  and  so  arranged  that 
the  advance  troops  can  be  promptly  supported  as  illus 
trated  by  the  battle  of  Booneville.  (Ext.  219.) 

The  evils  resulting  from  the  absence  of  supports  are 
illustrated  by  extracts  254,  258;  while  the  advantages  of 
supports  are  likewise  illustrated  by  extracts  255  and  257. 

The  %  mile  from  the  main  body  of  a  division  out 
post  (Ext.  256)  is  regarded  as  altogether  too  little.  If 
the  outpost  is  well  out,  care  should  be  exercised  that  by 
roads  do  not  enter  behind  the  outpost.  (Ext.  259.) 

Divisional  cavalry  remains  on  outpost  till  the  in 
fantry  outposts  are  posted.  It  should  then  be  brought 
in  behind  the  infantry  lines.  If  this  is  not  done,  the 
horses  will  all  be  rendered  unserviceable  by  excessive 
work  in  a  very  short  time.  Only  enough  should  be  left 
out  to  do  the  patrolling  in  front  of  the  infantry  outpost 
The  divisional  cavalry  may  be  sent  out  again  early  in  the 
morning  to  take  up  the  duties  of  the  infantry  while  the 
latter  is  withdrawn.  (Ext.  260.) 


107 

FLA.NK  GUARD. 

Ext.  No.  262.  —  The  22d  N.  Y.  Mounted  Rifles  were    Flank  guard  of 

infantry  column. 


nanry  coumn. 

detailed  to  guard  the  flank  of  the  infantry  and  were  re-  Brpeditio* 
tained  on  duty  with  the  infantry  till  the  expedition  re-  R->  Dec-  7-12'  1864' 
turned. 

(Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  C.  H.  Smith,  R.  R.,  Vol.  42,  Part 
I,  p.  649.) 

Ext.  No.  263.  —  During  this  movement  his  rear  and  cavalry  acts  as 
flanks  were  covered  by  Stuart's  cavalry,  and  he  received  ?SSd  atod  Jack- 
correct  information  concerning  the  Federal  forces,  which  ^MMMBM,'  Aug. 
were  now  rapidly  concentrating  upon  him. 

(Jackson's  retirement  from,  Manassas  Aug.  2d, 
1862.  Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  103.) 

Ext.    No.   264.  —  During   the   engagement,    Colonel    cavalry  Pro- 

A    11  «,i  ±'  e  i  •  tects  the  flank  of 

Asnby,  with  a  portion  of  his  command,  including  Chew's  infantry  during 
battery,    which  rendered  valuable  service,   remained  on    Kerartowi,  Y*., 
our  right,  and  not  only  protected  our  rear  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Valley  turnpike,  but  also  served  to  threaten  the 
enemy's  front  and  left.     Colonel  Ashby  fully  sustained 
his   deservedly  high   reputation  by  the  able  manner  in 
which  he  discharged  the  important  trust  confided  to  him. 
(Maj.  Genl.  T.  J.  Jackson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12, 
Parti,  p.  383.) 

Ext.  No.  265.  —  In    countries    infected    with  guer-    Flftnk 
rillas  and  bushwhackers,  flankers  will  have  to  be  used  to  buthwnacktr8up 
scour  the  country  and  beat  them  up  on  the  flank. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  a  Decade,  p.  91.) 


COMMENTS. 


The  use  of  cavalry  as  a  flank  guard  for  other  troops 
will  most  frequently  ocur  while  on  the  march.  (Exts. 
262,  263,  273.) 

In  battle,  cavalry  will  frequently  be  found  on  the 
flank  of  infantry  either  as  a  support  or  as  a  part  of  the 
firing  line.  (Exts.  264,  272.) 


108 

CONVOYING   RAILROAD   TRAINS. 

Guarding   the          Ext.   No.  266. — Trains  are    run    to  and  from  the 

rear  of  Sherman's  . 

army  against  tront  in  sections  under  convoy.     One  follows  another  as 
airy.  close  as  may  be,  so  as  to  be  able  to  assist  each  other  in 

case  of  attack.  Each  train  or  section  has  a  strong  guard ; 
when  forces  are  combined  quite  an  army  can  be  organ 
ized  on  the  roadside  for  the  defense  of  the  cars.  At  any 
rate,  no  mere  guerrilla  force  can  capture  a  train.  All 
the  bridges  are  stockaded  and  the  towns  fortified,  so  that 
a  run  of  a  few  miles  brings  a  train  into  a  place  of  com 
parative  safety. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  265.) 

position  of  the          Ext.   No.   267. — Again,   at  the   time   and  place  of 

commaader  dur-  j  0.  ,  ,  . 

ing  an  advance,  danger  btuart  was  always  present.  He  habitually  rode 
with  his  advance  guard  and  was  ever  ready  to  seize  and 
improve  an  opportunity. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  164.) 

Active  cavalry          Ext.  No.  268. — February  2,  1863, 

plays     the    mis-  r^.        -..-..  -r-^ 

chief  with  the  The  Honorable  E.  M.  Stanton.     *     *     * 

communications 

One  rebel  cavalryman  takes  on  an  average  three  of 
our  infantry  to  watch  our  communications,  while  our 
progress  is  made  slow  and  cautious,  and  we  command 
the  forage  of  the  country  only  by  sending  large  train 
guards.  *  *  * 

(Sig.)    W.  S.  ROSECRANS,  Maj.  Gen. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  78.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  annoyance  caused  by  cavalry  to  a  line  of  com 
munications  is  illustrated  in  extract  268,  where  Rose- 
crans  states  that  one  cavalryman  takes  three  infantrymen 
to  watch  his  line  of  communications.  Extract  266  also 
verifies  this  statement.  If  the  total  number  of  men  who 
were  watching  Sherman's  line  of  communications  while 
at  Atlanta  were  known  it  would  probable  be  more  than 
three  infantrymen  to  each  cavalryman. 


109 

WEAKNESS   OF   A    FLANK. 

Ext.  No.  269.—  At  the  court  house  Wickham's  brig-  fla^akncss  of  a 
ade  was  struck  in  the  flank  by  a  gallant  charge  and  scat- 
tered  in  all  directions.  s,i864. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  878.) 

Ext.  Nb.  270.  —  'The  attack  on  the  enemy  was  made    u«e  of  caval 
about  3  :00  p.  m.  by  a  left  half  wheel  of  the  whole  line, 


with  a  division  of  cavalry    turning    each  flank  of  the    cedarCreek,va., 
enemy,  the  whole  line  advancing. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  33.     Battle  of  Winchester  or  Cedar  Creek.) 

Ext.   No.   271.  —  In  the  affair  at   Fisher's  Hill   thea  weakness  of 

flank    causes   a 

cavalry  ^ave  way,  but  it  was  flanked.     This  could  have  Panic- 

Fisher's  Hill, 

been  remedied  if  the  troops  had  remained  steady,  but  a  va.,  sept.  2-2,  1864. 
panic  seized  them  at  the  idea  of  being  flanked,  and  with 
out  being  defeated,   they  broke,  many  of  them  fleeing 
shamefully. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  Jubal  A.  Early,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43, 
Part  I,  p.  558.) 

Ext.    No.    272.  —  As    soon   as   General    Gregg   was    At  Gettysburg 
aware  of  Stuart's  presence  he  wisely  assumed  the  ag- 
gressive,  and  forced  upon  Stuart  a  battle  in  which  he 
had   nothing  to  gain  but  the  glory   of  fighting;   while  July  ^  1863< 
Gregg  himself  had  performed   the  paramount  duty   of 
protecting  the  right  flank  of  the  Federal  army. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  341,  Gettysburg  campaign.) 

Ext.  No.  273.  —  During  the  campaigns  of  the  Caro-  campaign  of 
linas,  1865,  Sherman  used  his  cavalry  to  protect  his  leftc^r^piote^s 
flank  and  trains  against  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  shlrman??rmyf 
Wheeler  and  Hampton. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  57,  Part  I.) 

Ext.  No.  274.  —  This  change  having  been  made,  a    stuart  threat- 


strong  line  of  skirmishers  displayed  by  the  enemy  was  right*  at 
evidence  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  gained  our  right,    Gettysburg,  Pa., 
and  were  about  to  attack,  with  a  view  of  gaining  the  rear  Jn 
of  our  line  of  battle.     The  importance  of  successfully 


110 

resisting  an  attack  at  this  point,  which,  if  succeeded  in  by 
the  enemy,  would  have  been  productive  of  the  most 
serious  consequences,  determined  me  to  retain  the  brigade 
of  the  Third  Division  until  the  enemy  were  driven  back. 
(Brig.  Genl.  D.  McM.  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part 
I,  p.  956.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  great  advantages  in  having  cavalry  on  the  flanks 
is  here  further  illustrated.  Its  great  mobility  enables  it 
to  acomplish  the  results  reported  in  extracts  270  and  271; 
while  its  presence  on  the  flanks  will  check  a  turning 
movement  of  the  hostile  cavalry.  (Exts.  272,  274.) 

SURPRISE. 

surprise.  Ext.  No.  275. — The  enemy  during  the  night,  under 

Wade  Hampton,  taking  advantage  of  the  darkness  of  the 
night  and  the  inclemency  of  the  weather,  it  being  quite 
rainy,  moved  heavy  columns  of  cavalry  through  the 
open  pine  woods  to  the  vicinity  of  our  camp,  preparatory 

improper  out-  to  attacking  the  camp  at  daylight  on  the  following  morn- 
posts. 

ing. 

At  early  dawn  we  were  awakened  from  our  slum 
bers  by  the  deadly  missile  and  fiendish  shouts  of  the  rebel 
cavalry  charging  into  our  camp  in  three  different  places, 
rear  and  both  flanks. 

individual          It  was  individual  bravery  that  saved  the  day  on  this 
kjuJuw'g  cross  occasion ;  men  fighting,  not  in  organized  bodies,  but  be- 
fo!ai865S' C"  Mar<  hind  trees,  stumps,  and  anything  that  could  afford  pro 
tection.     Many  of  the  men  fought  almost  in  a  state  of 
nudity,  not  having  had  time  to  dress  themselves  before 
the  rebels  were  upon  them. 

(Maj.  C.  T.  Cheek,  5th  Ky.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  47, 
Parti,  p.  899.) 

Avoid  encios-  Ext.  No.  276. — Captain  Thornton  sent  his  men  in- 
^lar  Ft.  Brown,  side  a  corral  to  feed  their  horses  and  soon  followed  him- 
Texae,APr.2V46'.  gelf  He  foun(j  fas  command  suddenly  surrounded  and 

the  entire  command  was  killed  or  captured. 

(History  of  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Brackett,  p.  55.) 


Ill 

COMMENTS. 

It  is  an  old  military  maxim  that  a  surprise  is  inex 
cusable. 

INFORMATION. 

Ext.  No.  277. — The  cavalry  that  crossed  at  Seneca    information 
Ford  have  passed  on  up  through  Westminster  and  Han- 
over  some  6,000  to  8,000  strong.     The  people  are  all  so 
frightened   that  accurate  information  is  not  to  be   ob- 
tained. 

(Maj.  Genl.  G.   G.    Meade,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I, 
p.  69.) 

Ext.    NO.    278.—  A  model  report 

Gettysburg,  June  30 — 10:40  p.  m.      c^mander™ ' 
I  have  the  honor  to  state  the  following  facts:     A.  campaign8 bJaieg 

PT  T  *  1 1 1  1863. 

.  Mills  corps,  composed  of  Anderson,  Heth  and  Pen- 
der,  is  massed  back  of  Cashtown,  9  miles  from  this  pace. 
His  pickets,  composed  of  infantry  and  artillery,  are  in 
sight  of  mine.  There  is  a  road  from  Cashtown  running 
through  Mummasburg  and  Hunterstown  on  to  York 
pike  at  Oxford,  which  is  terribly  infested  with  roving 
cavalry  detachments.  Rumor  says  Ewell  is  coming  over 
the  mountains  from  Carlisle.  One  of  his  escort  was  cap 
tured  today  near  Heidlersburg.  He  says  Rodes,  com 
manding  a  division  of  Swell's,  has  already  crossed  the 
mountains  from  Carlisle.  When  will  the  reserve  be  re 
lieved,  and  where  are  my  wagons?  I  have  no  need  of 
them,  as  I  can  find  no  forage.  I  have  kept  General 
Reynolds  informed  of  all  that  has  transpired.  The  in 
closed  is  in  reply  to  my  last  dispatch. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JNO.  BUFORD, 

Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers. 
To  General  Alfred  Pleasonton. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Parti,  p.  924.) 

T?    4-    AT        0*7  o  A          T  Truthful    but 

r^xi.  JNO.  Z/5A. — 1  entered  this  place  at  11  a.  m.  to-inexperienced 

4  -  ^  HI  6  G    GXftggGrfttG 

day.  Found  everybody  in  a  terrible  state  of  excitement fnemTwh^n 
on  account  of  the  enemy's  advance  upon  this  place.  HeSSSmSSt"  °f 
had  approached  within  half  a  mile  of  the  town  when 


112 

the  head  of  my  column  entered.  His  force  was  terribly 
exaggerated  by  reasonable  and  truthful  but  inexperienced 
men.  On  pushing  him  back  toward  Cashtown,  I  learned 
from  reliable  men  that  Anderson's  division  was  march 
ing  from  Chambersburg,  by  Mummasburg,  Abbottstown, 
on  toward  York. 

(Genl.  Jno.  Buford,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  923.) 

Keeping  touch.          Ext.  No.  279.  —  About  1  :30  p.  m.  today  I  discovered 
oetB28!i863?'Ala''  tne  eneniy  retiring.     My  command  is  following  closely. 
(Maj.  Genl.  S.  D.  Lee,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part 
I,  p.  29.) 

Absence  of          Ext.  Nfo.  280.  —  No  report  had  been  received  that 

Stuart's    cavalry 

S??*?  General  ^ie  Federal  Army  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  the  ab- 
e  sence  of  the  cavalry  rendered  it  impossible  to  obtain  ac- 
curate  information.     *     *     *     By  the  route  he  pursued, 


concenTration.  °f  the  Federal  Army  was  interposed  between  his  command 
campaign,8  bjanl,  and  our  main  body,  preventing  any  communication  with 
him  until  his  arrival  at  Carlisle.  The  march  toward 
Gettysburg  was  conducted  more  slowly  than  it  would 
have  been  had  the  movements  of  the  Federal  Army  been 
known. 

(General  R.  E.  Lee,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  p.  307.) 


SPIES. 


Execution  of  a  Ext.  No.  281.  —  A  spy  from  the  enemy,  who  came 
into  my  camp  soon  after  my  arrival,  was  killed  by  my 
order. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wm.  W.  Averell,  R.  R.,  Vol.  37,  Part 
I,  p.  147.) 

uee  of  false          ^xt  ^°'  ^^*  —  Sheridan  suspected  two  of  his  spies 
spies.  Of  playing  double.    He  had  them  shadowed  and  found  his 

suspicions  to  be  correct.     Instead  of  letting  them  know1 
that  he  was  aware  of  their  treachery  he  utilized  their 
services  to  give  false  information  to  the  enemy. 
(See  Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  11,  p.  109.) 


113 

SCOUTS. 

Ext.  No.  283. — Scouts    should    go    in  pairs,   well    scout  organiza 
tion  necessary, 
mounted,  leave  saber  and  packs  with  baggage  train,  and 

live  off  the  country.  A  well  organized  scout  organization 
should  be  kept  at  headquarters.  They  should  not  dress 
in  the  enemy's  uniform,  (p.  85.)  Horses  should  be 
shod  with  rubber  pad  shoes. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  a  Decade,  p.  86.) 

Ext.  No.  284.— 
To  General  Garfield. 

General  Crittenden  wishes  to  know  if  you  intend  to    couriers  or  re 
establish  a  line  of  couriers  between  department  head 
quarters  and  his  own  at  Shellmound.     *     *     * 

(Sig.)  J.  J.  McCooK,  Aide  de  Camp. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  III,  p.  348.) 

Ext.  No.  285. — I  at  once  prepared  to  establish  a  line    Line  of  cour- 
of  couriers  to  Loudon  and  Kingston,  and  the  5th  Ohio ie: 
Cavalry  was  assigned  to  that  duty. 

(General  Eli  Long,  Comg.  2d  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31, 
Part  II,  p.  563.) 

COMMENTS. 

This  shows  that  the  use  of  relay  posts  is  not  entirely 
a  German  idea,  but  was  used  in  our  Civil  War. 

Ext.  No.  286.— At  this  moment  (4:00  p.  m.)  I  re-  strength  of 
ceived  information  from  Colonel  Garrard  that  the  enemy  ^TmelaSto 
was  crossing  infantry  at  Fain's  Island  Ford  and  that  an  point.  &  given 
officer  of  his  command  had  watched  them  wading  the  Pain's  island 

r  Ford,  Tenn.,  Jan. 

stream  for  more  than  an  hour,  estimating  the  force  at28'1864- 
three  brigades. 

(Brig.  Genl.  S.  D.  Sturgis,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
P-  1370 

Ext.  No.  287.— 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

June  28,  1863—4:45  p.m. 
Maj.  Genl.  H.  W.  Halleck,  General-in-Chief. 

The  following  statement  has  been  furnished  me.  It 
is  confirmed  by  information  gathered  from  various  other 
sources  regarded  as  reliable. 


114 

I  propose  to  move  this  army  tomorrow  in  the  di 
rection  of  York. 

GEO.  G.  MEADE,  Major  General. 

illustrates  the          Thomas  McCammon,  blacksmith,  a  good  man,  from 

amount  of  valu- 

that  ^STe 1 0°^-  Hagerstown,  left  there  on  horseback  at  11  a.  m.  today. 

zlnnse(if  the/Ko  Rebel  cavalry  came  first  a  week  ago  last  Monday.     Gen- 
'  eral  Jenkins  having  1,200  mounted  infantry,  said  to  be 
^ked  from  Jackson's  men,  and  300  or  400  cavalry  of 

i863paign'  June<  m's  own.  The  cavalry  went  back  and  forth,  out  of  Penn 
sylvania,  driving  horses  and  cattle,  and  the  first  infantry 
came  yesterday  a  week  ago — General  Ewell's  men.  He 
came  personally  last  Saturday,  and  was  at  the  Catholic 
church  Sunday,  with  General  Rodes  and  two  other  gen 
erals.  On  Monday  he  left  in  the  direction  of  Green- 
castle,  in  the  afternoon,  Rodes  having  left  the  same 
morning.  Rebel  troops  have  passed  every  day,  more  or 
less,  since ;  some  days  three  or  four  regiments  or  a  brig 
ade,  and  some  days,  yesterday,  for  instance,  all  of  Long- 
street's  command  passed  through  excepting  two  brigades. 
Saw  Longstreet  yesterday.  He  and  Lee  had  their  head 
quarters  at  Mr.  Grove's,  just  beyond  the  town  limits, 
toward  Greencastle,  last  night,  and  left  there  this  a.  m. 
at  8  o'clock.  Think  A.  P.  Hill  went  through  last  Tues 
day.  Heard  from  J.  D.  Roman,  prominent  lawyer  and 
leading  Confederate  sympathizer,  who  was  talking  in 
the  clerk's  office  last  night;  said  that  their  officers  re 
ported  their  whole  army,  100,000  strong,  now  in  Mary 
land  or  Pennsylvania,  excepting  the  cavalry.  Mr.  Logan, 
register  of  wills,  and  Mr.  Protzman,  very  fine  men  in 
Hagerstown,  have  taken  pains  to  count  the  rebels,  and 
could  not  make  them  over  80,000.  They  counted  the  ar 
tillery;  made  it  275  guns.  Some  of  the  regiments  have 
only  175  men — two  that  I  saw,  150.  Largest  regiment 
that  I  saw  was  a  Maryland  regiment,  and  that  was  about 
700.  Don't  think  their  regiments  would  range  400.  Great 
amount  of  transportation;  great  many  wagons  captured 
at  Winchester.  Horses  in  good  condition.  Ewell  rides 
in  a  wagon.  2,000  comprise  the  mounted  infantry  and 


115 

cavalry.  Saw  Wilcox's  brigade  wagons  yesterday  or  day 
before.  Saw  Kershaw's  wagons  in  town  yesterday. 
Kershaw's  brigade  is  in  McLaw's  division,  Longstreet's 
corps.  Know  Hood  and  Armistead.  Have  passed 
through  Hood's  division  and  Armistead's  brigade.  Pick- 
ett's  division  is  in  Longstreet's  corps.  The  Union  men 
in  Hagerstown  would  count  them,  and  meet  tonight.  Of 
ficers  and  men  in  good  condition;  say  they  are  going  to 
Philadelphia.  Lots  of  Confederate  money;  carry  it  in 
flour  barrels,  and  give  $5  for  cleaning  a  horse;  $5  for 
two  shoes  on  a  horse,  rather  than  50  cents  United  States 
money. 

(R.  R,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  65.) 

Ext.   No.  288.  —  'Stuart's  march  was  not,  however,     March    of 

1  i         >~«  •       T  1  1  i      -MI      /-  Stuart's   column 

unobserved.     Captain  Logan,    12th  111.   Cav.,   who   had  observed  for 

1  three    and  one- 

charge  of  the  pickets  in  the  vicinity,  was  apprised  bv  ahalfhours- 

Chambersburg 

citizen  as  early  as  half  past  5  o  clock  that  the  enemy  was  Raid.  Oct.  1862. 
crossing  at  McCoy's  Ferry,  and  he  immediately  moved 
out  his  reserve  to  support  of  his  interior  pickets,  who  had 
been  attacked  but  not  surprised.     He  remained  in  ob 
servation  of  Stuart's  column  until  9  o'clock  a.  m. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  139.) 

Ext.  No.  289.  —  Climbing  a  tree,  about  7  p.  m.,  For-    important 
rest  sought  to  satisfy  himself  of  the  situation,  and  dis- 
covered  the  enemy  in  a  disordered  retreat  into  Chatta 
nooga,  which  lay  in  full  view  beneath  him,  a  scene  of  wild 
chaos  and  tumult.    This  state  of  affairs  was  immediately    Reportmadeto 
communicated,  in  written  dispatches,   both  to  Generals  PTr?off?seat  the 
Bragg  and  Polk.  -^  n  a  r  y 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  p.f863.ge'  Sept  21> 
351.) 

Ext.  No.  290.  —  Marching  by    roads    unfrequently    information  of 
traversed  and  bridle  paths,  he  would  have  kept  his  mo- 


,•  r      .1  ,.  ,.  .        .        by  the  blowing  of 

tions  perfectly  secret  but  for  a  system  of  communicating  horns. 
intelligence  adopted  about  this  time  by  the  Home  Guards 
of  southern  Kentucky.     Conch  shells  and    horns    were 
blown  along  his  route  by  these  fellows,  the  sound  of 


116 

which,  transmitted  a  long  distance,  traveled  faster  than 
his  column. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext-  No-  291.—  I  learned  that  it  was  his  intention 
w°thoutai>Ce?tng  to  withdraw  from  the  enemy's  front,  and  this,  too,  on 
TFiiher'8  Hiii,  tne  indefinite  report  of  a  signal  officer  that  a  "brigade  or 
?»-,  sept.  22,  is*:  division"  of   Confederates  was  turning  his  right  flank, 
and  that  he  had  not  seriously  attempted  to  verify  the  in 
formation. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  p.  43.) 
Boldness  of          Ext.   Nb.   292.  —  During  the  evening  and  night  of 

scouting   parties 

encecao1  ^firge  ^  ^^»  ™  boldness  of  the  enemy's  scouting  parties, 


wjt]1  which  we  had  been  coming  in  collision  more  or  less 

Movement  to  the 

James,  June,  1864.  every  day,  perceptibly  increased,  thus  indicating  the  pres 
ence  of  a  large  force,  and  thus  evidencing  that  his  shorter 
line  of  march  had  enabled  him  to  bring  to  my  front  a 
strong  body  of  cavalry. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  419.) 

caDi8tpS8redndips-  On  April  4,  1865,  Sheridan  captured  a  dispatch. 
signed  by  Lee's  Commissary  General,  which  he  forwarded 
to  its  destination.  As  a  result  of  this  dispatch  several 
trains  of  rations  were  sent  as  ordered  and  captured  by 
Sheridan,  who  was  on  the  lookout  for  them.  The  fol 
lowing  is  the  dispatch  with  Sheridan's  comments  : 
Ration  return  Ext.  No.  293.  —  "The  Army  is  at  Amelia  Court 

a   basis    for    an 

?ne£y'sest?ength  House,  short  of  provisions.     Send  300,000  rations  quick- 
Pursuit  after  ly  to  Burkville  Junction.'1' 

D  a  t  T  i  e   oi    five    * 

rorks,  Apr.  i,  '65.  There  was  thus  revealed  not  only  the  important  fact 
that  Lee  was  concentrating  at  Amelia  Court  House,  but 
also  a  trustworthy  basis  for  estimating  his  troops. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  p.  175.) 

important  dis-          Ext.   No.  294.  —  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
Ee  sent8in  dupii-  that  General  Grant  should  receive  these  dispatches  with- 

cate. 

After  battle  of  out  chance  of  failure,  in  order  that  I  might  depend  abso- 

Waynesboro,  Va.,  „  . 

Mar.  2,  1865.  lutely  on  securing  supplies  at  the  White  House  ;  there 
fore  I  sent  the  message  in  duplicate,  one  copy  overland 
direct  to  City  Point  by  two  scouts,  and  the  other  down 
the  James  River  in  a  small  boat. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  p.  120.) 


117 


COMMENTS. 

The  information  obtained  from  independent  cavalry 
by  strategic  reconnaissance  is  much  more  accurate  and 
valuable  than  that  obtained  from  civilians.  The  former 
will  be  trained  military  observers  (Ext.  278),  while  the 
latter,  under  stress  of  excitement,  will  either  not  know  or 
terribly  exaggerate.  (Exts.  277,  278A.)  Occasionally 
intelligent  citizens  will  be  found  who,  in  a  systematic 
way,  go  about  the  matter  of  observing  an  enemy  passing 
through  a  town  and  succeed  in  getting  a  report  to  the 
general  of  their  own  forces.  (Ext.  287.)  This  extract 
is  a  fine  illustration  as  to  what  may  be  accomplished  by 
intelligent  civilians.  It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  Gen 
eral  Meade  was  careful  to  verify  it  from,  other  sources. 

The  information  obtained  from  spies  will  be  more 
or  less  valuable,  depending  upon  the  reliability  of  the  spy, 
his  intelligence  and  opportunity  for  observation.  Even 
a  spy  that  plays  double  may  be  utilized.  (Ext.  282.) 

A  well  organized  scout  system  should  be  maintained 
in  every  army.  (Ext.  283.)  All  officers  should  be 
trained  in  the  matter  of  estimating  the  number  of  troops 
seen.  (Exts.  286,  288.)  Autumn  maneuvers  furnish  an 
excellent  opportunity  to  make  application  of  this  valuable 
accomplishment.  A  number  of  officers  should  be  detailed 
daily  to  observe  and  report  on  the  number  of  troops  seen. 

It  is  desirable  to  send  important  duplicate  reports 
to  different  superiors.  Each  report  should  mention  the 
fact  that  a  duplicate  one  has  been  sent  to  the  other  su 
perior.  (Exts.  289,  294.) 

A  novel  method  of  communicating  information  is 
illustrated  in  extract  290. 

A  commander  who  hastily  acts  on  information  with 
out  seeking  to  verify  it  will  usually  make  a  mistake. 
(Ext.  291.) 

It  will  always  be  necessary  to  have  at  headquarters 
a  bureau  of  information,  where  different  reports  can  be 
compared  and  conclusions  drawn  from  the  multitude  of 
reports  received.  (Exts.  287,  292,  293.) 


118 

The  absence  of  information  is  as  much  of  a  handi 
cap  to  a  commander  as  the  possession  of  it  is  an  advan 
tage.  (Ext.  280.)  Had  Stuart's  cavalry  been  present 
at  Gettysburg  to  furnish  Lee  with  information,  the  field 
would  have  been  in  Lee's  possession  instead  of  in 
Meade's.  (Ext.  280.)  Lee  then  could  have  fought  a  de 
fensive  battle,  which  he  was  never  known  to  lose. 

When  contact  is  gained  the  cavalry  should  not  again 
lose  it.  (Ext.  279.) 

STRATEGIC   USE   OF   CAVALRY. 

stuart  keepa          Ext.  No.  295.  —  My  command  has  been  fighting  al- 
most  constantly  for  four  days.     *     *     *     General  Bu- 


days,  o°fr  movl  ford  sent  a  party  to  the  top  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  that  saw 

ment    of     Lee's  ,  ,       , 

army.  a  rebel  camp  about  two  miles  long  on  the  Shenanaoan, 

ansdtr8creeegnicng.se  Just  below  Ashby's  GaP-     The  atmosphere  was  so  hazy 

Gettysburg  that  they  could  not  make  out  anything  more  beyond. 
"»  (General  A.  Pleasonton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p. 

913.) 

strategic  use.  Ext.  No.  296.  —  During  the  entire  movement  (  Sher- 

P»?giai8Mh  Cam"  man's  march  to  the  sea)  I  kept  my  superiors  fully  in 
formed  of  the  strength  and  all  the  movements  of  the 
enemy. 

(General  J.  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  411.) 
Ext.  No.  297.  —  Regarding  his  dispositions  at  Bev- 

How  to  defend  _  -™  IT  n^.u 

a  river  line.  An  erlev  Ford,  Brandy  Station,    or    Fleetwood,  June  ytn, 

example  of  good  *  ,  •      1, 

strategy.  1353    General  Stuart  says:     "On  a  field  geographically 

Fleetwood.  Va.,  ,  .  ,  , 

June  9,  1863.  so  extensive,  and  much  of  it  wooded,  presenting  to  the 
enemy  so  many  avenues  of  approach,  I  deemed  it  inju 
dicious  to  separate  my  command  into  detachments  to 
guard  all  the  approaches,  as  in  such  case  the  enemy  could 
concentrate  upon  any  one  and,  overwhelming  it,  take  the 
others  in  detail.  *  *  *  I  conceived  it  to  be  my  policy 
to  keep  my  command  concentrated,  except  sufficient  to 
watch  and  delay  the  enemy  as  to  his  real  move,  and  then 
strike  him  with  my  whole  force." 

(General  J.  E.  B.   Stuart,  C.   S.,  R.   R.,  Vol.  27, 
Part  II,  p.  681.) 


119 

Ext.  No.  298. — About  midnight  I  received  a  com-    strategic  ob- 
munication  asking  that  I  obtain  early  information  of  the3eJJ,**tetj  Va 
enemy's  movements  in  the  direction  of  Sperryville.  Agree- i8a6™paign'  Oct>' 
ably  to  my  orders,  Colonel  Gregg,  commanding  2d  Brig 
ade,  sent  one  regiment  to  obtain  the  required  informa 
tion.     I  directed  the  2d  Brigade  to  move  to  the  east  side 
of  the  Rappahannock,  leaving  one  regiment  on  the  west 
side  to  be  in  a  position  to  support  the  1st  Maine  should 
it  be  compelled  to  return. 

(D.  McM.  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  356.) 

Ext.  No.  299. — Believing-  this  attack  of  the  enemy,    A  fine  illustra 
tion  of  strategic 

who  had  shown  only  cavalry  and  artillery,  was  but  a  u«e  of  cavalry. 

f     .  f        ,  T          1          1    ^  James  City,  Va., 

cover  of  the  movement  of  other  troops,  I  ordered  Gen- Oct.  10,  ises. 
eral  Davis  to  make  an  attack  from  his  right  and  discover, 
if  possible,  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  The  attack 
was  made  and  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  driven  back  three 
miles  and  a  heavy  column  of  infantry  and  a  large  wagon 
train  discovered  to  be  moving  in  the  direction  of  Wood- 
ville. 

(Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  381.) 

Ext.  No.  300. — By  great  activity,  watchfulness  and    successful 

J  strategic  use. 

good  judgment  on   the  part   of   General   Hatch,   every    Florence  A  i a ., 
movement  of  the  enemy  and  indication  of  his  intention 
were  promptly  reported  to  Generals   Stanley,   Schofield 
and  Thomas. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I, 
p.  556.) 

Ext.  No.   301. — Colonel    Coon's    brigade    made  a .  Reconnaissance 

in  force  disclose* 

forced  reconnaissance,  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  force,  fJntreynemy>8  in~ 
and  after  a  severe  engagement,  discovering  the  march  of  A1®h5£j  CiJeis^' 
the  rebel  infantry,  was  compelled  to  join  the  main  force 
on  the  east  side  of  the  creek. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I, 
p.  557.) 

Ext.  No.  302. — The  question  then  arose  in  my  mind    cavalry  fights 
whether  I  should  pursue  my  course  on  to  Lynchburg, m 
leaving  General  Early  in  my  rear,  or  to  go  out  and  fight  n^  Cleave  *arle 
him  with  my  cavalry  against  his  infantry  and  what  cav-  ** 


120 

Expedition   to  a^ry  he  could  collect,  defeat  him,  and  open  a  way  through 

M*r™i865?'  Va>'Rock  Fish  Gap,  and  have  everything  in  my  own  hands 

for  the  accomplishment  of  that  portion  of  my  instruc 

tions  which  directed  the  destruction  of  the  Central  Rail 

road  and  the  James  River  Canal. 

I  decided  upon  the  latter  course. 
(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part 
I,  p.  476.) 

Stuart's  chick-          Ext.   No.   303.—  June    11,    1862,   General  J.   E.   B. 
strateg?/  success.  Stuart  was  ordered  to  take  only  such  men  and  horses 
as  could  stand  the  expedition  and  make  a  "scout  move 
ment"  to  the  rear  of  McClellan's  army  with  a  view  of 
-  intelligence  of  his  operations,  communications, 


Successful  raid  ,          ,  .  -  .,  «... 

increases    conn-  etc.,  and  to  return  as  soon  as  the  object  of  the  expedition 

dence     in    com-  /~n  •   1     i 

mander,  and  was  accomplished.  This  was  known  as  the  Chickahominy 

morale  of  nis 

command.          Raid.     The  results  following  were  increased  morale  of 

the  Confederate  cavalry;  loss  in  confidence  in  McClellan; 

Has  a  depress-  accurate  information  as  to  the  location  of  the  Federal 

ing  effect  on  the 

enemy.  army,  and  incidentally  the  capture  of  165  prisoners,  260 

Chickahominy  _ 

Raid,  jaoe  i2-i5,  horses,  destruction  of  two  schooners  and  seventy-five 
wagons. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  52.) 
strategic  use  of          Ext.  No.  304.  —  General  Lee  reports:     'The  cavalry 

Confederate  cav 

alry.  of  the  army,  at  the  time  of  these  operations,  was  much 

Chancellorsville  •      ,    i  ,    j 

campaign,  April,  reduced.  To  its  vigilance  and  energy  we  were  indebted 
for  timely  information  of  the  enemy's  movements  before 
the  battle,  and  for  impeding  his  march  to  Chancellors 
ville." 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  228.) 

same  as  above.          Ext.   No.  305.  —  Hidden  in  the  woods,   Stuart  re 

mained  in  observation  of  the  enemy  for  a  long  time. 

staff  officer  Satisfied  that  he  was  witnessing  the  movement  of  a  large 

sent  to  make  re-  part  Q£  Meade>s  armv,  Stuart  sent  Major  Vcnable,  of  his 

6      sbjunf  sta^'  to  convey  tm's  information  to  General  Lee. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  392.) 


121 

Ext.   No.   306. — Cavalry  that    sticks    close  to  the    Theoretical 
Army  loses  half  its  strength.     It  must  be  employed  on81 
distant  expeditions  to  cut  the  enemy's  lines,  to  be  worth 
its  cost  in  strategic  combinations.    For  its  full  strategical 
effect  cavalry  is  obliged  to  live  on  the  country  after  the 
first  three  days. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  63.) 

COMMENTS. 

Cavalry  operating  strategically  will  be  on  the  offen 
sive  and  a  considerable  distance  from  its  main  body, 
while  the  opposing  cavalry  will  be  defensively  screening 
its  own  forces.  Extract  295  well  illustrates  this  matter, 
in  which  it  appears  that  Pleasonton's  cavalry  fought 
Stuart's  for  four  days  and  then  only  succeeded  in  slipping 
a  small  strategic  patrol  through,  which  observed  and  re 
ported  the  Confederate  camp. 

Cavalry  operating  strategically  will  endeavor  to 
break  through  the  enemy's  screen  and  observe  the  num 
bers  and  dispositions  of  the  enemy  and  what  they  are 
doing. 

Cavalry  can  be  screening  defensively,  and,  while 
using  good  strategy,  will  not  be  strategically  used.  ( Ext. 
297.)  Cavalry  performing  a  defensive  role  may  take  the 
offensive  and  thus  be  used  strategically.  (Ext.  299.)  A 
forced  reconnaissance  amounts  to  a  strategic  use.  (Ext. 
301.) 

The  strategic  use  will  require  great  activity,  watch 
fulness  and  good  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  command 
er.  (Exts.  296,  300.) 

Tactical  use  may  also  involve  the  use  of  strategy. 
(Ext.  302.)  Here  Sheridan  concluded  to  fight  the 
enemy's  infantry  rather  than  leave  it  in  his  rear. 

A  successful  raid  may  be  merged  with  strategic  use 
depending  upon  the  object  of  the  raid.  (Ext.  303.)  In 
the  reference  quoted,  other  important  results  followed 
which  were  unforeseen;  such  as  the  effect  on  the  enemy, 
increased  morale  of  the  raiders,  etc. 

While  cavalry  strategically  used  may  not  get  all  the 


122 

information  desired,  it  may  assist  the  commander's  plans 
so  as  to  produce  great  tactical  results.  (Ext.  304.) 

When  cavalry,  on  a  strategic  mission,  obtains  val 
uable  information,  a  staff  officer  should  be  sent  with  it  to 
the  commanding  general.  The  messenger  will  then  be 
able  to  answer  questions  and  make  explanations,  thus 
elucidating  matters  which  would  otherwise  remain  ob 
scure  to  the  commanding  general.  (Ext.  205.) 

For  its  full  strategic  effect,  cavalry  will  be  employed 
on  distant  expeditions  and  be  obliged  to  live  on  the  coun 
try.  (Ext.  306.)  When  war  is  declared  it  should  there 
fore  be  well  organized  at  its  war  strength  and  ready  to 
move  on  very  short  notice.  Skeleton  organization  or 
war  inflation  will  deprive  cavalry  of  its  mobility  and 
therefore  its  strategical  importance  at  a  time  when  it  is 
most  needed. 


123 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


MISCELLANEOUS  USE  OF  CAVALRY. 


BRIDGES  —  CONSTRUCTION  OF. 


Ext.   No.  307.  —  General    Forrest    learned    that    it    improvised 


would  be  necessary  to  bridge  Hickahala  Creek,  a  deep  from  tel 

poles   and   the 

stream  running  60  feet  broad,   with    full    banks.     He  floor  of   neigh 

boring  mills. 

spread  detachments  about  to  collect  lumber  from  the  cot-    Bridge  60  feet 

.    long  made^in  60 

ton-gm  floors,  which  they  carried   four  miles  on  their  minutes. 

shoulders.     At  the  creek  they  found  a  narrow  flatboat  Memphis,0  Aug.* 

about  20  feet  long.     Out  of  grapevines  a  strong  twisted 

cable  was  made  and  fastened  to  a  tree  on  each  side  of 

the  river.     They  cut  down  dry  cedar  telegraph  poles  and 

fastened   them   together   with     grapevines   for    floating 

piers.     These  were  attached  to  the  grapevine  cable  with 

grapevines  and  the  flatboat  was  attached  likewise  in  the 

center  as  a  pontoon.     Telegraph  poles  were  used   for 

balks  and  on  these  the  flooring  from  the  gin  mills  was 

placed.    The  bridge  was  completed  in  sixty  minutes.   The 

command  began  crossing  at  once  in  column  of  twos,  the 

men  leading  their  horses,  and  the  artillery,  unlimbered, 

was  taken  over  by  hand.     Six  miles  beyond,  Cold  Water 

River,  twice  as  wide,  was  crossed  in  the  same  way.   The 

bridge  over  the  latter  stream  was  constructed  in  less  than 

three  hours. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  535.) 

Ext.  No.  308.  —  It  was  found  on  examination  that  Mountedtroo  . 
the  railroad  bridge  at  the  White  House  had  been  but  Cards'  iom  su?- 
partially  burned,  and  could  be  repaired,  and  General  Her-  t?yn£Sf  Sake 

•j,  ^1  •       1    j  1-  1  railway  bridge 

ntt  was  at  once  put  on  this  duty.  By  sending  mounted  passable  for  cav- 
parties  through  the  surrounding  country,  each  man  bring-  Rapidan  to  the 
ing  back  a  board,  it  was  made  passable  in  one  day.  S<3.es'  Apr"Augl 


124 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
792.) 

improvised          Ext.  No.  309.  —  Today  we  built  a  novel  bridge  over 
one  of  the  creeks.     Our  artillery  had  mired  down  and 


and  fence  rails.  .  .1iri  .  r       i       r^  1  T  T    j. 

it  was  impossible  for  the  column  to  ford.  General  Upton 
ordered  every  trooper  to  carry  a  fence  rail  on  his  shoul 
der,  and  when  we  came  to  the  crossing  we  found  a  couple 
of  caissons  in  midstream,  for  a  foundation,  and  on  them 
rested  two  forked  pine  trees  for  piers,  across  which  ran 
saplings  for  stringers;  every  man  threw  his  fence  rail 
for  a  flooring,  and,  swaying  and  swinging,  the  command 
crossed  the  rude  bridge. 

(The  Last  Campaign,  by  E.  N.  Gilpin,  published  in 
the  Cavalry  Journal.) 

Bridge  bunt  of  Ext.  No.  310.  —  We  crossed  Mud  River  that  night 
on  a  bridge  constructed  of  three  flat  bottom  boats  laid 
endwise,  tightly  bound  together  and  propped,  where  the 
water  was  deep,  by  beams  passing  under  the  bottom  of 
each  one  and  resting  on  the  end  of  the  next;  each  re 
ceiving  this  sort  of  support,  they  mutually  braced  each 
other.  Planks  were  placed  across  the  intervals  between 
the  boats  and  the  horses,  wagons  and  artillery  were 
crossed  without  trouble.  The  bridge  was  built  in  about 
two  hours. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

cavalry  are          Ext.  No.  311.  —  I  immediately  made  a  heavy  detail 

their  own  pion-  .    .  ,          ,     .  ,  , 

eers.  from  the  2d  Iowa  Cavalry  to  finish  a  bridge  across  the 

Aia.??cF.  iJ$L  ln  Hatchie,  which  the  7th  111.  Cav.  had  been  sent  in  advance 
to  construct. 

(Col.  D.  E.  Coon,  2d  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part 
I,  p.  580.) 

At  night  cav-  Ext.  312.  —  Col.  Chapman  reached  the  Chickahominy 
fiTaceoTflre^d  just  after  dark,  expecting  to  find  the  bridges  ready  for 
&dedwEi!e°8ii>nehim  to  cross.  The  officer  in  charge  of  the  pontoons 

toneers  construct  .  .        _,  -   ,Tr  .. 

abridge.  seemed  somewhat  timid.    General  Warren,  commanding 

^,  the  5th  Corps,  would  give  him  no  assistance.  Colonel 
Chapman  was  therefore  compelled  to  take  the  matter  in 
hand.  The  stream  at  this  place  divided  into  two  branches, 


125 

leaving  a  small  island  in  the  center,  and  was  unford- 
able.  Colonel  Chapman  dismounted  the  22d  N.  Y.  and 
3d  Ind.  The  former  pushed  along  the  stream  to  a  point 
about  50  yards  above  the  site  of  the  old  bridge,  and  by 
means  of  fallen  trees  and  overhanging  limbs  succeeded  in 
getting  across.  The  3d  Ind.,  launching  a  pontoon, 
pushed  across  in  the  face  of  a  sharp  fire  from  the  enemy, 
posted  on  the  south  bank  of  the  stream  in  a  line  of  rifle 
pits  hastily  formed,  and  dashed  at  the  rebels,  driving 
them  in  confusion  from  the  works.  Nothing  could  have 
been  more  steady  and  dashing  than  the  conduct  of  these 
two  regiments.  The  night  was  very  dark,  the  difficulties 
to  be  overcome  by  no  means  trifling,  and  the  enemy's 
strength  entirely  uncertain.  The  whole  affair  did  not  re 
quire  over  half  an  hour ;  the  bridge  was  soon  constructed, 
and  by  midnight  the  entire  brigade  had  crossed. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  883.) 

Ext.  No.   313. — I  was  ordered  to  bridge  the  river    Bridge  bunt 

•  r  from  scows  and 

if  possible.     This  I  effected  by  means  of  scows  or  ferry-  piank. 
boats,  lashed  together,  anchored,  and  covered  with  lum-  Maya°3,  ig&. 
ber  procured  by  tearing  down  the  store-houses  of  the 
ferry.     The  bridge   was   amply   sufficient   to   cross  the 
corps. 

(Col.  T.  C.  Devin,  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36, 
Parti,  p.  836.) 

Ext.  No.  314. — The  17th  Cavalry  was  detached  to    cavalry    force 

and    hold    cross- 
make   a   demonstration   as   if   we   intended   to   cross   at  ing   while    en- 

gineers  construct 

Jones    Perry.      Iwo  canvas  pontoon  boats  were  put  upp°ntoon- 

.     ,  Rapidan  to  the 

beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy  s  guns,  and  then  taken  to  James,  Apr.,  1864. 
the  river  banks  by  the  engineers,  preceded  by  a  regiment 
of  Custer's  brigade,  who  drove  the  enemy  from  the  op 
posite  bank,  while  the  boats  were  put  in  the  river  and 
two  squadrons  dismounted  ferried  over  at  once  and  held 
the  opposite  bank  till  the  pontoon  bridge  was  laid. 

(Brig.  Genl.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part 
I,  p.  804.) 


126 

cavalry  make         Ext.  No.  315. — Selma  was  taken  April  2d,   1865. 
?onggeove7r  Aia-  April  3d  pontoons  were  ordered  to  be  constructed  in  the 

bama    River,     .  ,         _  _.     . 

without  assist-  city  shops.    April  6th  canvas  pontoon  tram  under  Major 

ance  of  engineers        •'  . 

Hubbard  arrived.    Major  Hubbard  was  ordered  to  begin 

the  construction  of  a  bridge  over  the  Alabama  River. 

pieted  in6  three          April  8th  the  bridge  was  completed.    It  consisted  of 

30  canvas  pontoons,    16  wooden  pontoons  made  in  the 

city  shops,  and  3  barges.    General  Wilson  states  that  the 

bridge  was  870  feet  long.     Major  Hubbard  states  that 

the  bridge  was  700  feet  long.     Forty-nine  boats  would 

bridge  50  bays,  which  at  17J/2   feet  each  would  make  a 

bridge  875  feet  long.     By  reason  of  strong  current  the 

cro78800°withvalariyi  bridge  was  broken  twice  while  being  crossed.     It  was 

?8aipthreeVays  repaired  and  on  April  10th  the  three  cavalry  divisions, 

while  the  bridge  .  . 

d  consisting  of  I/, 000  men,  and  all  equippage  had  crossed 
d* ancl  the  bridge  was  dismantled.     The  bridge  was  con- 
A  Wilson's  Raid,  structed  by  cavalry. 

(Major  Hubbard,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  412, 
and  Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  p.  362.) 

Rate  of  cross-          Ext.  No.   316. — April  8th,  at  4:10  p.  m.,  I  com 
ing    pontoon  27  i-k  •  1 

men  per  minute  nienced   crossing:   the   Alabama    River   on   the   pontoon 

or  two  miles  per 

hour.  bridge    (870  feet  loner)    which  had  that  moment  been 

Wilson's    Raid,  ,         „.   oc. 

Apr.,i865.  completed,  and  had  the  entire  division  across  by  7  :Z5 
p.  m.,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  crossing  had  to 
be  stopped  three  times  in  consequence  of  damage  done 
to  the  bridge  by  driftwood.  The  division  consisted  of 
about  5,500  men.  The  rate  of  crossing  was  27  or  28 
men  per  minute,  or  about  two  miles  per  hour. 

(Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  Com'd.  Div.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Parti,  p.  442.) 

COMMENTS. 

In  these  extracts  we  see  how  resourceful  cavalry 
must  be.  We  find  them  bridging  wide  streams  and  other 
wise  doing  their  own  pioneer  work.  The  pioneer  work 
naturally  belongs  to  cavalry.  To  be  sure,  engineers  can 
do  it,  but  they  are  seldom  in  the  right  place  at  the  right 
time  for  cavalry.  If  this  work  is  going  to  fall  to  the 
cavalry,  as  it  did,  then  cavalry  should  have  men  regu- 


127 

larly  trained  and  organized  to  do  it.  In  the  volunteer 
cavalry  will  be  found  men  who  can  be  collected  into  an 
improvised  pioneer  detachment,  as  was  Wilson's  in  1865. 
(Ext.  315.)  The  Engineer  Corps  has  a  mounted  detach 
ment  for  the  purpose  of  accompanying  cavalry  troops. 
They  are  numerically  so  small,  and  in  time  of  war  their 
services  would  be  in  such  demand  for  other  duties,  that 
the  pioneer  work  would  again,  just  as  it  did  during  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion,  fall  to  the  cavalry  service.  The 
pioneer  organization,  then,  ought  to  be  in  the  cavalry  and 
not  in  the  engineers. 

USE   OF   CAVALRY   TO   STOP   ROUTED   INFANTRY. 

Ext.  No.  317.— The  5th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  attached  to    Cavalry used to 

,.    ,    ,        ,       i          j  stop   routed    in- 

division  headquarters,  was  immediately  deployed  across  fantry. 

the  fields,  and,  together  with  the  officers  and  orderlies  of  (ceda?creSek%rct: 

19  1864 

the  division  staff,  did  much  to  prevent  the  infantry  go 
ing  to  the  rear,  and  forced  everyone  to  stop  and  form 
line. 

(Brig.  Genl.  W.  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  449.) 

Ext.  No.  318. — I  found  large  numbers  of  the  in-    Routed  troops 

j  j  checked    by   use 

fantry  retiring    by    regiments,    companies,    squads  and  of  the  saber  and 
stragglers.     With  some  difficulty  I  checked  the  rout  at    cedar  creek,  va. 

.        Oct.  19,1864. 

this  point,  it  being  necessary  in  several  instances  to  fire 
on  the  crowds  retiring  and  to  use  the  saber  frequently. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Thos.  C.  Devin,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  478.) 

Ext.  No.   31-9. — On  the  8th  instant  a  Federal  cav-    cavalry  used  as 
airy  force,  from  300  to  400  strong,  landed  at  Greenville,    indian  Bayon, 

-»«-•  n^t  •      t-  '  r    f  c   ici       j  Miss..  June 8, 1864. 

Miss.  This  force  consisted  of  four  companies  of  land 
cavalry"  sent  up  from  Vicksburg,  the  rest  were  cavalry 
of  the  marine  boats,  and  the  raid  was  under  General 
Ellet  of  the  Marines. 

(Captain  Perry  Evans,  9th  Tex.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
39,  Part  I,  p.  232.) 

Ext.  No.  320.— The  nature  of  the  battle  was  such    cry 
that   cavalry  could   not  be  used   in   front;   I   therefore 
formed   ours   into   line  in  rear   to   stop   stragglers — of 


128 

Tenn.,  whom  there  were  many.  When  there  would  be  enough 
of  them  to  make  a  show,  and  after  they  had  recovered 
from  their  fright,  they  would  be  sent  to  reinforce  some 
part  of  the  line  which  needed  support,  without  regard  to 
their  companies,  regiments  or  brigades. 

(Memoirs  of  General  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  I,  p.  344.) 

SWIMMING   STREAMS. 

Regiment          Ext.  No.  321. — The  larger  portion  of  my  regiment 

swims   Tennesee  J 

River.  swam  their  horses,  and  lost  several  horses,  some  arms, 

Meridian  Expe 
dition,  Jan.,  1864.  but  no  men. 

(Col.  J.  P.  C.  Shanks,  7th  Ind.  Cav.,  across  the 
Tennessee  River,  Jan.  25,  1864,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
p.  272.) 

Naked  men          Ext.   No.   322. — Brownlow   performed   one   of   his 
only8  rguns  and  characteristic  feats  today.     I  ordered  a  detachment  to 

ammunition. 

jane  9, 1864.  cross  at  Cochran  s  Ford.  It  was  deep,  and  he  took  them 
over  naked ;  nothing  but  guns,  cartridge  boxes  and  hats. 
They  drove  the  enemy  out  of  their  rifle  pits,  captured  a 
non-commissioned  officer  and  three  men,  and  the  two 
boats  on  the  other  side.  They  would  have  got  more,  but 
the  rebels  had  the  advantage  in  running  through  the 
bushes  with  clothes  on.  It  was  certainly  one  of  the  fun 
niest  sights  of  the  war,  and  a  very  successful  raid  for 
naked  men  to  make. 

(Brig.  Genl.  E.  M.  McCook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part 
II,  p.  761.) 

riyearVaafyniCgTt          Ext-   No-   323.— The    river    being    very  deep  and 
PaiTnt"n  muddy,  they  had  to  swim  the  horses.    It  being  very  dark, 
01'  **  it  could  only  be  done  by  the  aid  of  boats  or  canoes; 
three  of  the  latter  were  found  on  the  opposite  shore. 
The  canoes  were  laden  with  arms  and  equipments  and 
three  men  placed  in  each,  who  guided  the  horses  across. 
Daylight  the  next  morning  found  them  (283  men)  com 
paratively  safe  upon  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 

(Lieut.  Col.  H.  P.  Lampson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part 
II,  p.  784.) 


129 

Ext.    No.    324.  —  Two   of    Capehart's    (regiments)    TWO  regiments 
swam  the  river  above  the  bridge,  charged  Rosser  and8^e"vaen'doah 

routed   him.  River,  Mar.  1,1865. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I, 
p.  475.) 

Ext.  No.  325.  —  The  dismounted  men  and  prisoners    Dismounted 

f       ,     ,  .  ..  .  men   cross  swift 

forded  the  stream  in  groups  of  fifty  or  sixty,  holding:  stream  m  groups 

r  J  J  '  &  by  locking  arms 

each  other  by  the  arm.     It  was  impossible  for  a  single 


footman  to  ford,  the  water  being  breast  high,  with  a 
rapid  current. 

(Col.  J.  L.  Thompson,  N.  H.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46, 
Part  I,  p.  529.) 

Ext.  No.  326.  —  We  reached  Johnson's  Ferry  at  sun-  cavalry  brigade 

J  J  crosses  large  river 

down.  I  ordered  the  8th  Iowa  to  begin  crossing  at  ona 
and  at  sundown  the  next  day  the  whole  command  (65 
officers  and  1,734  men)  was  west  of  the  Black  Warrior 
River,  the  men  with  their  equipments  crossing  in  a  single 
flatboat  and  the  horses  swimming,  losing  only  two  or 
three. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  T.  Croxton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  421.) 

Ext.  No.   327.  —  April  15th  began  crossing  Sipsey    cavalry  bri- 

T?      i  r*   11  t  1    -r  •  Sade    crosses   in 

rork  at   Calloway  s  and  Lindsays   Ferries,   having  no  two  days  at  two 

.  &  crossings  with 

means  of  crossing  men  and  equipments  but  in  canoes  and 


the  horses  by  swimming.     April  1  7th  all  were  over  (  65  in 

ty.  1    i  T>A  \  Wilson's  Raid, 

officers  and  1,734  men).  APr.i5,i865. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  T.  Croxton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  423.) 

Ext.  No.  328.  —  Enough  debris  of  the  old  bridge  re-    cavalry  cross 
mained   to    facilitate   the   construction   of   another.      As^mmingTjy 

,  ,  '     their  side. 

large,  abandoned  warehouse  was  at  hand,  and  the  party    ckickahominy 
was  at  once  set  to  work  to  tear  down  this  house  and  con-  fseT'  June  14' 
vey  the  timbers  to  the  bridge.     In  a  wonderfully  short 
time  a  footway  was  constructed,  over  which  the  cavalry 
men  at  once  commenced  to  pass,  holding  the  bridles  of 
their  horses  as  they  swam  by  their  side. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  64.) 


130 

cavalry  crosses          Ext.   No.   329. — Meanwhile,  the  animals,  detached 
byTw^m  m !  neg  from  the  vehicles  and  artillery,  were  being-  driven  into 

animals  and  fer 
rying  guni  and  the  river  and  made  to  swim  across,  as  also  the  horses  of 

wagons. 

Dec.,  1862.  the  cavalry.  Quite  as  many  as  1,000  animals  were  at 
one  time  in  the  river,  which  was  about  600  yards  broad 
with  favorable  banks.  The  ferriage  of  the  artillery  and 
wagons  was  very  much  slower.  Loaded  upon  the  old 
flatboat,  it  was  poled  up  stream  a  distance  of  nearly  half 
a  mile,  and,  pushed  out  into  the  stream,  was  caught  and 
carried  by  the  current  gradually  to  the  other  bank.  On 
its  return  trip  the  process  was  reversed.  By  this  means 
about  1,000  cavalry,  5  pieces  of  artillery  with  caissons, 
60  wagons  and  4  ambulances  crossed  the  Tennessee  River 
from  12  :00  m.  till  8:00  p.  m.  with  one  flat  bottom  boat. 
(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  220.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  is  not  believed  that  large  organizations  did  much 
swimming  with  the  troopers  on  their  horses.  Rivers  of 
any  magnitude  must  be  crossed  either  by  bridging  or  by 
ferrying  the  men  and  equipments  and  swimming  the 
animals.  (Ext.  239.) 

Streams  necessitating  a  swim  of  from  fifty  to  sixty 
feet  may  be  crossed  by  large  commands,  but  those  neces 
sitating  a  longer  swim  should  only  be  tried  by  organiza 
tions  that  have  been  previously  trained.  Untrained 
horses  quickly  lose  their  heads,  paw  the  air  and  finally 
go  over  backwards.  Even  if  the  trooper  is  floating  by 
the  horse,  he  will  be  compelled  to  let  go  with  grave 
danger  to  himself,  though  he  may  be  a  good  swimmer. 
Under  such  circumstances  a  line  of  lariats  with  empty 
canteens  for  floats  should  be  stretched  across  the  stream 
on  the  down-stream  side.  Men  who  lose  their  horses 
can  quickly  gain  the  line  marked  by  the  floating  canteens 
and  reach  the  shore  with  no  difficulty.  The  line  should 
be  held  by  men  on  shore,  who  can  move  it  up  or  down 
stream.  If  possible,  a  row  boat  should  be  kept  manned 
and  ready  to  take  out  men  who  lose  their  horses.  A  large 


131 

blanket  roll  will  furnish  buoyancy  till  the  blanket  gets 
wet  through.  It  is  better  to  leave  the  rifle  in  the  scab 
bard.  Then  it  will  surely  go  ashore  with  the  horse.  If 
held  in  the  hand,  and  the  horse  goes  over,  it  is  sure  to 
be  lost. 

PLUNDER  — PILLAGE. 

Ext.   No.    330. — The  commanding  general   directs    Pillage.  Brand. 
that  any  person  found  guilty  of  such  disgraceful  conduct ing' 
be  stripped  of  his  uniform,  his  head  shaved,  then  branded 
on  his   left  cheek  with   the   letter   T   as   a   Thief,   and 
drummed  out  of  the  service. 

(G.  O.  No.   11,  Hq.  Army  of  the  Ohio,  Aug.  31, 
1863.    R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  IV,  p.  262.) 

Ext.  No.  331. — Every  crime  in  the  catalogue  of  in-    Effect  of  Pm- 

r  i          i  •         1     T    i     1  •  aSe  on  troops. 

tamy  has  been  committed,  I  believe,  except  rapine  and    Moorefieid,   w. 
murder.      Pillage   and   sack    of   private   dwellings   took Va" Ang>  ?' w 
place  hourly.     I  believe  a  higher  tone  of  morals  and  dis 
cipline  may  be  infused  in  any  soldier.     Had  there  been 
less  plunder   there  would   have   been   more  fighting  at 
Moorefieid  on  Sunday. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Bradley  T.  Johnson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
43,  Parti,  p.  8.) 

Ext.   No.   332. — .General  Wheeler's  command  was    plunder  de- 
much  demoralized  by  plunder,  and  officers  and  men  be-2Sff"" 
haved  unbecomingly  on  this  trip,  thinking  more  of  their 
plunder  than  of  fighting  the  enemy. 

(Maj.  Genl.  S.  D.  Lee,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part 
I,  p.  25.) 

Ext.  No.  333.— Word  was  sent  to  Gordon  and  Ker-  victory  incom- 
shaw  to  swing  around  and  advance  with  their  divisions, 
but  they  stated  in  reply  that  a  heavy  force  of  cavalry 
had  got  in  their  front,  and  that  their  ranks  were  so  de- 
pleted  by  the  number  of  men  who  had  stopped  in  the 
camps  to  plunder  that  they  could  not  advance  them. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  J.  A.  Early,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43, 
Part  I,  p.  562.) 


132 

By  stopping  to         Ext.  No.  334.  —  The  enemy,  eager  to  plunder,  failed 

plunder,  victory  irn  TTT  «•     1  1 

fs  turned  to  de-  to  promptly  follow  us  up.  We  rallied  and  at  once  ad 
vanced  upon  him.  We  retook  the  cavalry  camp,  and,  en 
couraged  by  our  success,  charged  the  enemy,  who  was 
endeavoring  to  harness  up  the  battery  horses,  and  plun 
dering  my  headquarters,  not  twenty  steps  distant,  and 
finally  forced  him  out  of  the  camp  with  great  slaugh 
ter.  We  re-established  our  line  and  for  an  hour  and  a 
half  foiled  every  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  retake  it. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  47,  Part  I, 
p.  861.)   " 

After  captur-          Ext.  No.  335.  —  The  cavalry  corps  commanded  by 
*5enb£t  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  which  captured  Selma,  Ala.,  April 


-  2,  1865,  was  composed  of  well  organized  and  disciplined 
tdent.to  x"  troops.     Lieut.  Col.  E.  Kitchell,  98th  111.,  says  :     "I  kept 

Apr6  2*1865  A  k''  my  men  together  till  after  we  went  into  camp,  and  did 
not  permit  them  to  straggle  or  go  in  search  of  plunder 
or  captured  property  in  the  city,  although  quite  a  num 
ber  of  them,  following  the  general  example,  did  find  their 
way  there  during  the  night  time." 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Parti,  p.  452.) 

pursuit  discon-          Ext.  No.  336.  —  I  am  now  to  record  the  fact  that  so 
advance  troops  many  of  Ashby's  command,  both  cavalry  and  infantry, 

stop  to  pillage.  .     ,  .    ,  ,. 

Winchester,  forgetful  of  their  high  trust  as  the  advance  of  a  pursuing 
army,  deserted  their  colors,  and  abandoned  themselves 
to  pillage  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  necessary  for 
that  gallant  officer  to  discontinue  further  pursuit. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  T.  J.  Jackson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12, 
Parti,  p.  704.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  branding  of  men  as  ordered  in  extract  330 
would  not  now  be  permitted.  (A.  W.  38,  98.)  The 
Constitution  prohibits  cruel  and  unusual  punishments, 
and  since  branding  would  be  so  classed,  it  was  not  legal 
at  the  time  of  the  order  quoted.  Pillage  is  a  serious 
military  offense  and  calls  for  drastic  punishment.  The 
deplorable  condition  of  discipline  resulting  from  pillage 
is  described  in  extracts  331,  332.  The  offense  is  so  grave 


133 

that  A.  W.  42  authorizes  the  death  penalty.  In  time  of 
victory,  men  who  stop  to  plunder  will  neutralize  the  ad 
vantages  gained  (Exts,  333,  336)  and  sometimes  con 
vert  a  victory  into  a  defeat.  (Ext.  334.)  Plundering 
is  very  difficult  to  stop,  even  among  well  disciplined 
troops.  (Ext.  335.) 

PURSUIT. 

Ext.  No.  337. — The  next  day  I  received  orders  from    R0uted  enemy 
Maj.  Genl.  Sheridan  to  start  out  at  daylight  and  whip 282* 
the  rebel  cavalry  or  get  whipped  myself.     *     *     *          vaSiihey "Smp^l^ 

After  a  spirited  engagement  for  about  two  hours,18 
the  enemy,  seeing  that  they  were  being  flanked  and  se 
verely  pressed  in   front,  gave  way  in  great  confusion, 
which  was  immediately  taken  advantage  of  by  both  di 
vision  commanders. 

The  enemy  endeavored  to  rally  several  times,  but 
were  unable  to  stand  the  desperate  charges  made  by  our 
men,  and  they  were  driven  in  a  perfect  rout  for  twenty 
miles. 

(Maj.  Genl.  A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  431.) 

Ext.  No.  338. — His  retreat  was  so  rapid  that  pur-    pursuit  by  dis- 
suit  by  dismounted   men   was  impossible,    and   the    1  st  iSipos?ibied  n 
Mich.,  supported  by  two  regiments  of  the  reserve  brig-  jaS^V^6 
ade,  were  sent  forward  and  drove  the  enemy  for  two 
miles,  returning  with  many  prisoners. 

(Brig.  Genl.  G.  A.  Custer,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  819.) 

Ext.   No.  339.— It  now  became  apparent  that  the    Bear  pursuit 
enemy,  in  following  up  our  rear,  had  made  a  great  mis- S8^  u  i  t 
take,  and  he  began  to  see  it,  for,  when  we  leisurely  took 
the  Negro  Foot  road  to  Richmond,  a  doubt  arose  in  his  James'  May' 1864t 
mind  as  to  whether  his  tactics  were  good,  whereat  he 
immediately  hauled  off  from  the  rear,  and  urged   his 
horses  to  the  death  so  as  to  get  in  between  Richmond 
and  our  column. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  790.) 


134 

Parallel  pur-  Ext.  340.  —  Having  notified  the  commanding  general 
SURlpidaCnee?o8'theon  the  morning  of  June  8th  that  Sheridan,  with  a  heavy 
1864™  es'  Jnne  8'  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  had  crossed  the  Pamunkey, 
I  was  ordered  to  take  one  division  in  addition  to  my  own 
and  follow  him.  Supposing  that  he  would  strike  at  Gur- 
donsville  and  Charlottsville,  I  moved  rapidly  with  my 
division  so  as  to  interpose  my  command  between  him 
and  the  places  named  above,  at  the  same  time  directing 
Maj.  Genl.  Fitzhugh  Lee  to  follow  as  speedily  as  pos 
sible.  In  two1  days'  march  I  accomplished  the  object  in 
view  —  that  of  placing  myself  ini  front  of  the  enemy. 

(Maj.  Gen.  Wade  Hampton,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36, 
Parti,  p.  1095.) 

Rear  pursuit.  Ext.  No.  341.  —  The  enemy,  after  being  charged  by 

valley  o?tn8di°864  our  §"a^ant  cavalry,  were  broken,  and  ran;  they  were  fol 
lowed  by  our  men  on  the  jump  twenty-six  miles. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  S'heridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  31.) 

Ext.  No.  342.  —  The  pursuit  was  immediately  con- 
Method    of 

fSi^urgsuituccess~  tinue(t   Knipe   and   Hatch  moving  in  parallel   columns 
Franklin,  Tenn.,  alone  the   Columbia   pike,   Johnson  down   the   Carter's 

Dec.  17,  1864. 

Creek  pike,  and  Croxton  on  the  Lewisburg  pike.  The 
flanking  columns  were  directed  to  push  rapidly  forward 
and  endeavor  to  pass  around  the  flanks  of  the  enemy's 
rear  guard,  composed  almost  entirely  of  infantry,  while 
a  strong  force  of  skirmishers  across  the  pike  should  press 
it  continuously  and  compel  it  to  form  line  as  frequently 
as  possible. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I, 
p.  565.) 

Pursuit  not  Ext-  N'°-  343.  —  Hoping  the  cavalry  would  soon 
come  up,  the  artillery,  followed  by  the  infantry,  was 
pressed  forward  for  two  hours,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
>  venting,  by  artillery  fire,  a  reforming  of  the  enemy,  but 
as  nothing  was  heard  of  the  cavalry,  and  as  but  little  or 
nothing  could  be  accomplished  without  it  in  the  ex 
hausted  condition  of  the  infantry,  between  which  and  the 


x" 


135 

enemy  the  distance  was  constantly  increasing,  I  ordered 
the  halt. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  T.  J.  Jackson,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12, 
Part  I,  p.  7QC  ) 

COMMENTS. 

It  is  desiiable  to  have  a  well  organized  mounted 
force  ready  to  take  up  the  pursuit  in  case  of  victory. 
(Ext.  338.)  The  approved  method  of  making  a  pursuit 
is  described  in  extract  342,  namely,  flanking  columns 
should  take  up  the  pursuit  on  parallel  roads,  endeavoring 
to  cut  in  on  the  enemy's  column  (Sheridan  at  Appomat- 
tox),  while  troops  following  in  rear  endeavor  to  compel 
the  enemy  to  deploy  as  frequently  as  possible.  Only  the 
parallel  pursuit  can  meet  with  great  results  when  cavalry 
is  pursuing  cavalry.  (Exts.  339,  340.) 

Fresh  infantry  can  pursue  defeated  infantry,  but 
exhausted  infantry  cannot.  In  this  case  cavalry  is  neces 
sary.  (Ext.  343.) 

The  distance  that  a  pursuit  should  be  kept  up  will 
depend  upon  the  progress  of  the  general  engagement.  If 
cavalry  defeats  cavalry  at  the  beginning  of  a  battle,  they 
should  not  pursue  to  the  extent  of  becoming  disorgan 
ized,  but  should  rally  and  be  kept  in  readiness  to  con 
tribute  to  the  general  result.  A  decisive  cavalry  victory 
would  amount  to  nothing  if  the  general  engagement  was 
lost.  If  an  enemy  is  defeated  in  a  general  engagement, 
then  there  should  be  no  limit  to  the  pursuit.  In  that 
case,  push  it  as  far  and  as  long  as  possible.  (Exts.  337, 
341.) 

RAIDS. 

Ext.  No.   344. — Should  a  raid  be  contemplated,  a    conditions 
strong  diversion  should  be  made  in  its  favor  by  an  at-SJS™ble    to   a 
tack  on  the  enemy  in  force,  or  a  demonstration  to  his  bn?g{dVa?,  Set  25, 
opposite  flank.     No  raid  could  succeed  if  attacked  and1863'' 
compelled  to  fight  at  its  outset.     To  prepare  and  start 
a  raiding  party  after  a  general  action  has  commenced, 
and  when  the  enemy's  attention  is  diverted,  would  be 
much  more  favorable  for  its  success. 


136 

(General  Alfred  Pleasonton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part 
II,  p.  383.) 
Sheridan's          Ext.   No.   345.  —  In  May,    1864,  General   Sheridan 

Richmond  raid. 

made  a  raid  on  Richmond,  Va.  He  was  gone  16  days; 
average  march,  18  miles;  longest  march,  30  miles.  Horses 
that  failed  were  shot  by  the  rear  guard. 

(See  Sheridan's  report,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p. 
792.) 

method  'of*  '£>n-  Ext-  Na  ^46.  —  His  favorite  strategy  on  his  impor- 
ductingaraid.  tant  expeditions  or  "raids"  was  to  place  himself  by  long 
and  swift  marches  —  moving  sometimes  for  days  and 
nights  without  halt  except  to  feed  horses  —  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  territory  where  were  the  objects  of  his  en 
terprise.  He  relied  on  this  method  to  confuse,  if  not  to 
surprise,  his  enemy,  and  prevent  a  concentration  of  his 
forces.  He  would  then  strike  right  and  left.  He  rarely 
declined  to  fight  advancing,  but  after  commencing  his 
retreat  he  would  use  every  effort  and  stratagem  to  avoid 
battle. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

successful  raid          Ex^   ^o.   347.  —  Grierson  continued  his  movement 

fw?yvsfrorm°thewith  about   1,000  men,  breaking  the  New  Orleans  and 

"bto^ibdd,  Jackson  railroad,  arriving  at  Baton  Rouge  May  2d.   This 

Apr.-May,  i»        ra^  was  Qf  g-reat  importance,  for  Grierson  had  attracted 

the  attention  of  the  enemy   from  the  main  movement 

against  Vicksburg. 

(Memoirs  of  General  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  I,  p.  489.) 
if  raiding  party          Ext.   No.   348.  —  The  close  of  a   raid   is  the  point 
of  greatest  danger.     If  a  commander  cannot  join  his 


pay  for  the  loss  r  ,  ,    ,  .  1,1  T  r 

of   men   and  army  in  safety  all  his  work  may  be  thrown  away.     If 

horses.  J  J  , 

he  has  to  cut  his  way  through,  the  losses  in  men  and 
horses  will  more  than  counterbalance  the  gains  of  the 
raid.  (P.  93.) 

Duties  of  the  A  cavalry  general  on  a  raid  must  be  always  awake, 
or  at  least  take  as  little  sleep  as  nature  will  permit.  He 
must  surround  himself  with  pickets  that  stretch  for  miles 
and  keep  his  corps  encamped  in  as  small  a  space  as  pos- 

woods  the  best  sible.     Woods  are  best  for  this  purpose,  on  many  ac- 


137 

counts.  They  hide  the  number  of  troops,  furnish  fuel 
for  fires,  and  hitching  posts  for  horses.  They  are  easily 
defensible  in  case  of  surprise  or  attack,  and  by  pushing 
out  pickets  to  the  edge  of  the  open  ground  the  grand 
requirements  of  a  perfect  camp  ground  are  fulfilled,  viz., 
wood,  water  and  security.  Water  is  almost  invariably 
to  be  found  in  or  near  the  woods.  Security  against  at 
tack  is  gained  by  felling  a  few  trees  on  the  flanks  of  the 
camp  to  entangle  an  enemy  in.  In  the  summer,  by  tak 
ing  the  precaution  to  camp  early,  and  put  out  the  fires 
after  dark,  a  whole  corps  of  cavalry  may  be  buried  in 
the  woods  without  giving  a  sign  of  its  presence. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  a  Decade,  p.  95.) 

Ext.  No.  349.  —  Kilpatrick  started  on  the  night  of    Any  damage 

done   to   a   rail- 

the    18th   of   August   to   reach   the   Macon   road   about  road  by  any  cav 

alry    expedition 

Tonesboro.     He  succeeded  in  doing  so,  and  passed  en-  is  soon  repaired. 

J  '  Kilpatrick's 

tirely  around  the  Confederate  lines  of  Atlanta,  and  was  Rgaw,  Aug.  18-22, 

back  again  in  his  former  position  on  our  left  by  the  22d. 

These  little  affairs  contributed,  however,  but  very  little 

to  the  grand  result.     They  annoyed,  it  is  true,  but  any 

damage  thus  done  to  a  railroad  by  any  cavalry  expedi 

tion  is  soon  repaired. 

(Memoirs  of  General  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  II,  p.    172.) 

Ext.  No.  350.  —  As  many  of  my  cavalry  are  still  un-    Raid  leaves 

J  J  J  cavalry  unservic- 

serviceable  from  the  effects  of  Stoneman's  raid,   I  am  !J^.a^  thfe  be- 

too  weak  to  cope  with  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  if  as  ^gjfburs  cam" 

large  as  represented. 

(Genl.  Jos.  Hooker,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  33.) 
Ext.  No.  351.  —  Upon  the  suggestion  of  the  former 

officer  (Stuart)  that  he  could  damage  the  enemy  and  de-stuart's  cavalry 

.  .  -    1          •  •         •      1  •  during   Gettys- 

lay  his  passage  of  the  river  by  getting  in  his  rear,  he  was 


authorized  to  do  so,  and  it  was  left  to  his  discretion  q^a^e  ?nforma- 
whether  to  enter  Maryland   east  or  west  of  the 
Ridge;  but  he  was  instructed  to  lose  no  time  in  placing 


his  command  on  the  right  of  our  column  as  soon  as  he  it  also  fe 

.  .  cavalry  much  re- 

could  perceive  the  enemy  moving  northward.  be\?andnmnbm~ 

It  was  expected  that  as  soon  as  the  Federal  Army  should  condition- 
cross  the  Potomac,  General  Stuart  would  give  notice  of  campaign,  ises. 


138 

its  movements,  and  nothing  having  been  heard  from  him 
since  our  entrance  into  Maryland,  it  was  inferred  that 
the  enemy  had  not  left  Virginia.  *  *  *  The  move 
ments  of  the  army  preceding  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  had 
been  much  embarrassed  by  the  absence  of  the  cavalry. 
*  *  *  The  ranks  of  the  cavalry  were  much  reduced 
by  its  long  and  arduous  march,  repeated  conflicts,  and  in 
sufficient  supplies  of  food  and  forage. 

(General  R.  E.  Lee,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  pp.  316, 
321,  322.) 


COMMENTS. 


A  raid,  to  be  successful,  will  have  to  be  started 
without  much  preparation.  If  suspected  by  the  enemy, 
it  will  not  succeed.  A  strong  diversion  should  be  made 
in  its  favor,  as  stated  in  extract  344. 

The  most  successful  raider  the  war  produced  was 
Morgan.  His  method  is  described  in  extract  346. 

Raids  are  seldom  worth  their  cost  in  horse  flesh, 
and  the  damage  done  to  the  cavalry  will  operate  later  to 
the  detriment  of  the  raiders,  as  illustrated  by  Stoneman's 
raid  (Ext.  350),  which  left  the  Federal  cavalry  weak  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  and  Stuart's 
raid  (Ext.  351),  which  left  his  ranks  reduced  after  his 
long  march,  and  left  General  Lee  without  the  informa 
tion  he  had  a  right  to  expect,  and  further  much  em 
barrassed  him  in  the  movements  of  his  army  preceding 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

It  may  well  be  doubted  if  Sheridan's  Richmond  raid 
was  worth  its  cost.  He  accomplished  no  lasting  results 
except  the  death  of  Stuart,  while  he  left  Grant's  army 
without  its  eyes,  while  Lee,  by  use  of  his  cavalry,  was 
enabled  to  ascertain  Grant's  movements  and  successfully 
interpose  his  army  between  the  Federal  army  and  Rich 
mond  at  the  North  Anna. 

If  the  raiders  cannot  rejoin  in  safety,  the  raid  may 
be  counted  as  a  failure. 


139 


The  most  successful  raid  during  the  war  was  Grier- 
son's  (Ext.  347),  which  drew  a  large  number  of  troops 
away  from  opposing  Grant"s  army  when  it  was  ma 
neuvering  Pemberton  into  Vicksburg.  Since  Grierson 
marched  with  only  1,000  men,  he  did  not  greatly  deplete 
the  Federal  forces. 

The  results  of  a  raid  will  necessarily  be  temporary 
and  the  damage  soon  repaired;  and,  as  stated  by  Grant, 
they  "contribute  very  little  to  the  grand  result."  (Ext. 
349.) 

Successful  raids  will  generally  be  made  in  a  friendly 
country,  or  at  least  in  a  country  where  many  sympa 
thizers  are  found  to  give  information. 

As  long  as  Morgan  stayed  in  Kentucky  and  Ten 
nessee  he  was  completely  successful;  but  as  soon  as  he 
crossed  the  Ohio  River,  where  he  could  no  longer  obtain 
the  information  necessary  to  enable  him  to  elude  his  pur 
suers,  his  raid  was  a  most  complete  failure. 

CAPTURE   OF   STEAMBOATS. 

Ext.  No.  352.  —  During  the  same  month  a  party  of 
cavalry  from  the  10th  111.  and  the  1st  Ark.  cavalry,  un- 
der  Lieut.  Col.  Stewart,  captured  a  steamboat  near  Van 
Buren,  Arkansas,  and  about  300  prisoners. 

(History  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry,  by  Brackett,  p.  277.) 

Ext.  No.  353.  —  On  April  13  Major  John  F.  Wes- 
ton  captured  and  brought  to  Montgomery  three  steam- 
boats  loaded  with  cotton,  bacon,  salt  and  corn, 

(Col.  W.  Cooper,  4th  Ky.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part 
I,  p.  433.) 

Ext.  No.  354.  —  Dispatch  to  N.  Y.  Herald:     Nash- 

M1         T  .,  A         ,TT1        , 

ville,  Jan.   14.  —  Wheeler  s  rebel  cavalrv,  with  a  batterv 

f  ...  J}  J 

of  artillery,  attacked  three  or  four  boats  at  Harpeth 
Shoals  yesterday.  One  or  two  hundred  sick  and  wounded 
were  captured  and  the  men  paroled.  One  gunboat  sur 
rendered.  Her  guns  were  thrown  overboard  and  the 
boat  burned.  The  others  also  taken  were  burned. 

(Campaigns  of  Wheeler  and  His  Cavalry,  p.  64.) 


capture  of 
by 


Jan"  1863< 


cavalry  cap 

ture  three  steam- 

boats. 


cavairycap- 

ture  gunboat  and 

other  boats  load' 

ed  with  wound- 

ed- 


140 


CHAPTER  IX. 


TRAINS,  TRANSPORTATION  AND  SUPPLIES. 


TRAINS — WHERE  MARCHED;   ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE. 

cavalry  field          Ext.  No.  355. — In  the  Savannah  campaign  the  cav- 

t  rain  s,    where  .  .  . 

marched.  alry  field  trains  marched  with  the  trains  of  the  infantry 

Savannah  Cam 
paign,  1864.         columns,  while  the  cavalry  did  the  screening  and  pro 
tected  the  flanks. 

(Col.  Heath,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  400.) 

Supplytrainan  Ext.    No.    356. The    Supply    train   Was    a   heavy   en- 

encumbrance  to 

n  cumbrance  during  the  whole  march;  it  caused  a  week's 


enemy's  country.  W1 

Meridian 
dition,  Jan 


Meridian  Expe-  delay,  while  it  was  little  use  to  the  main  column,  which 
lived  off  the  country  nearly  all  the  time  and  could  have 
done  so  entirely. 

(Col.  G.  E.  Waring,  Jr.,  Comg.  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
32,  Part  I,  p.  264.) 

Disposition  of          Ext.   No.   357. — With  all  his  camp  equipage — ex- 

field  trains  when  ~.  .,    .  ,    .  ... 

battle  is  expect-  cept  two  tent  flies — packed  in  wagons  and  in  readiness 
Fieetwood,  Va.,  for  an  early  start,  Stuart  himself  bivouacked  on  the  night 
of  the  8th  on  Fieetwood  Hill.  *  *  *  Every  scrap 
of  camp  was  removed  toward  Culpeper  Court  House, 
and  there  remained  nothing  upon  the  hill  except  the  ad 
jutant  and  his  couriers. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
pp.  263,  269.) 

Cavalry   trains  Ext.    No.    358. 

are    an    encum- 

brance  to  cavalry  Kingston,   Mav   23,    1864. 

column. 

Cam"  Colonel  Long,  Commanding  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Cavalry  with  a  train  is  worse  than  useless.  Let 
your  train  fall  in  with  the  infantry  when  your  cavalry 
can  act  effectively  on  the  south  flank  of  Blair's  column. 
*  *  *  (Sig.)  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Maj.  Genl.,  Cmdg. 
(R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  IV,  p.  296.) 


141 

Ext.  No.  359. — The  train  was  strongly  guarded  by    Guard  in  front 

,    and    rear    of   a 

a  corps  front  and  rear,  but    the    flanks  were  exposed,  long  train  is  not 

sufficient. 

While  the  12th  and  /th  regiments  kept  up  a  brisk  skir-    Near  Ely  Ford, 

,  .  Va,   Nov.  27, 1863'. 

mish  with  the  corps  that  was  marching  in  rear,  I  suc 
ceeded  in  destroying  35  or  40  wagons,  brought  8  loaded 
with  ordnance  stores,  7  ambulances,  230  mules  and 
horses,  and  95  prisoners  with  the  loss  of  2  men  killed 
and  3  wounded. 

(Brig.  Genl.  T.  L.  Rosser,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29, 
Parti,  p.  904.) 

Ext.  No.  360. — General  Wheeler,  with  1,500  rebel    cavalry  useful 

.„  ,       ,  .  as  support  to  in- 

cavalry  and  some  artillery,  attacked  a  wagon  tram  mov-  fantry  escort, 
ing  from  Knoxville  to  Chattanooga,  and  escorted  by  in- paign,XDeo.628 *es! 
fantry,  convalescents,  etc.  Colonel  Long  at  once  mounted 
a  small  portion  of  his  command  and  charged  the  enemy, 
whose  ranks  had  been  broken  by  the  infantry  escort, 
scattering  them  in  every  direction. 

(Colonel  Long,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  435.) 

Ext.  No.  361. — I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  ar-  Train  suocess. 
rival  at  this  place  with  all  the  brigade  train  but  about  ^figttacked  at 
eight  or  ten  wagons.  We  were  attacked  at  daylight 
yesterday  morning,  and  a  disgraceful  panic  ensued,  re 
sulting  in  the  entire  destruction  of  the  Reserve  Brigade 
train  and  a  portion  of  ours,  with  battery  forges,  etc.,  the 
running  off  of  all  the  mules,  the  capture  of  a  large 
number  of  prisoners,  etc. 

(Maj.  W.  E.  Beardsley,  6th  N.  Y.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
43,  Parti,  p.  484.) 

COMMENTS. 

These  extracts  go  to  show  clearly  that  a  cavalry 
column,  when  operating  against  an  enemy,  has  little  use 
for  trains.  Cavalry  must  have  trains,  but,  when  oper 
ating  against  an  enemy,  the  trains  must  march  with  the 
infantry  column.  To  quote  General  Sherman  (Ext. 
358)  :  "Cavalry  with  a  train  is  worse  than  useless." 
This  will  necessitate  cavalry  often  camping  without  its 
baggage.  It  must  then  be  prepared  to  live  on  saddle  bag 
or  emergency  rations.  (Exts.  355,  356,  358.)  The  best 


142 

system  will  be  for  each  troop  to  have  a  led  horse  or 
mule  with  a  pack  saddle.  The  Moore  cross-tree  saddle 
is  a  good  type  for  this  purpose.  On  one  side  of  the  sad 
dle  should  be  carried  a  water  can,  inside  of  which  should 
be  a  nest  of  camp  kettles  and  other  necessities  for  cook 
ing;  on  the  other  side  should  be  a  similar  water  can 
carrying  one  day's  rations  for  the  troop;  carried  as  a 
top  pack  should  be  a  picket  rope  with  iron  pins.  This 
will  avoid  individual  cooking,  keep  the  horses  from  get 
ting  burned  on  small  lariat  ropes,  and  enable  the  com 
mand  to  always  have  a  supply  of  boiled  water,  which  is 
considered  so  indispensable  to  modern  warfare.  The 
command  will  then  have  one  day's  field  rations,  two  sad 
dle  bag  or  haversack  rations  and  one  emergency  ration, 
so  that  if  the  baggage  wagons  connect  with  it  only  once 
in  three  days  no  great  harm  will  be  done. 

When  a  battle  is  expected,  the  trains  must  be  sent  to 
the  rear.  (Ext.  357.) 

The  most  suitable  escort  for  trains  is  infantry,  dis 
mounted  cavalry,  or  convalescents.  (Ext.  360.)  Es 
cort  duty  is  very  trying  on  cavalry,  and,  besides,  a  horse 
man  cannot  fire  as  rapidly  or  with  as  much  precision  as  a 
man  on  foot. 

Trains  should  have  a  flank  guard  if  possible.  (Ext. 
359.) 

The  best  time  to  attack  a  train  is  at  daybreak.  (Ext. 
361.) 

TRANSPORTATION. 

Allowance     of  Ext.  No.  362. 

transportation. 

Headquarters  Army,  Adjutant  General's  Office, 

War  Department. 

General  Orders  Washington,  D.  C., 

No.   160.  October  18,  1862. 

The  following  regulations  are  established  for  Army 
Trains  and  Baggage : 


143 


ment  20  wagons. 


1.  There  will  be  allowed  wagons  to 
Headquarters  Army  Corps 4 

Div.  or  Brig 3 

Full  regiment  of  Infantry 6 

Light  battery  or  Squadron  of  Cavalry 3    cavalry  regi- 

In  no  case  will  this  allowance  be  exceeded,  but  al 
ways  proportionately  reduced  according  to  the  number 
of  officers  and  men  actually  present. 

2.  The  wagons  allowed  to  a  regiment,  battery  or 
squadron  must  carry  nothing  but  forage  for  the  teams, 
cooking   utensils    and    rations    for   the   troops,    hospital 
stores,  and  officers'  baggage.     One  wagon  to  each  regi 
ment  will  transport  exclusively  hospital  supplies,  under 
the  direction  of  the   regimental   surgeon;   the   one   for 
regimental   headquarters   will   carry   the   grain    for   the 
officers'  horses,  and  the  three  allowed  for  each  battery 
or  squadron  will  be  at  least  half  loaded  with  grain  for 
their  own  teams.     Stores  in  bulk  and  ammunition  will 
be  carried  in  the  regular  or  special  supply  trains. 

4.     Officers'  baggage  will  be  limited  to  blankets,  one 
small  valise  or   carpet  bag,   and  a  moderate   mess  kit. allowance- 
The  men  will  carry  their  own  blankets  or  shelter  tents, 
and  reduce  the  contents  of  their  knapsacks  as  much  as 
possible. 

Ext.  No.  362.— 


Officers  baggage 


ALLOWANCE    OF   WAGONS. 


00" 

li 

<r 

3§ 

"§*§' 

§5  MS 

^^ 

fl* 

g 

Hq.  Army  Corps  
Hq.  Division  
Hq.  Brigade 

4 
3 
3 
1 

2 
3 
2 
1 
1 

4 
2 

3 

2 

1 
1 

Hq.  Regiment  . 

Hq.  Battalion,  12  officers 

Regiment  of  Inf.,  12  Cos. 

6 

6 

6 

12 

Reg.  of  Cav.  12  Troops  .  . 
Battery  

20 
3 

6 
3 

6 

34 

3 

Supply  Trains  

/  1000  men, 
I  Div. 

7 
75 

Div.  63 

Ammunition  Trains  .... 

1000  men, 

5 

1000  men,  3 

Hospital  Supply  Train.  . 
Wagons  for  intren.  tools. 

/  1500  men, 
I  Div. 
Corps, 

3 
30 
6 

Div.  40 

Allowance    o  f 
wagons. 


144 

wheeler  has  no          Ext  No.  364. — Wheeler's  cavalry,  while  opposing 
Atlanta  Cam- Sherman's  march  to  the  sea,  had  no  wagons   for  five 
paign'1864'        months. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  J.  Wheeler,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  412.) 
Gettysburg          Ext.    No.    365. — Stuart's  cavalry,   while  marching 
1863.  '  around  the  Federal  army  during  the  Gettysburg  cam 

paign,  had  no  wagons  or  vehicles  excepting  six  pieces 
of  artillery  with  caissons,  and  a  few  ambulances. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part 
II,  p.  692.) 

Sheridan's          Ext.   No.  366. — From  February  27  to  March  28, 
domirytoS  lowest  1865,  Sheridan  marched  the  1st  and  3d  Cavalry  Divis- 

limit. 

ions,  10,000  officers  and  men,  from  Winchester  to  Peters 
burg.     Division  headquarters  had  one  wagon. 

The  command  had  8  ambulances,  ammunition  train, 
16  wagons,  a  pontoon  train  of  8  boats.  The  fifteen 
days'  rations  of  coffee,  sugar  and  salt  only  took  60 
wagons. 

Each  regimental  headquarters  had  two  pack  mules. 
Each  squadran  had  one  pack  mule. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I,  pp.  475  and  485.) 
Load  carried          Ext.  No.  367. — Division  commanders  were  directed 

by  trooper.  -11         • ,  1      r-          1         > 

to  see  that  every  trooper  was  provided  with  five  days 
light  rations  in  haversacks,  24  pounds  of  grain,  100 
rounds  of  ammunition  and  one  pair  of  extra  shoes  for 

Load  carried  his  horse ;  that  the  pack  animals  were  loaded  with  five 
days'  hard  bread,  ten  days'  sugar,  coffee  and  salt,  and 

Load  carried  the  wagons  with  45  days'  coffee,  20  sugar,  15  salt  and 

on  wagons. 

80  rounds  of  ammunition.    These  calculations  were  made 

180  rounds  per 

Senraidken  for  on  a  basis  of  sixty  days'  campaign,  under  the  supposition 
that  the  command  would  be  able  to  supply  itself  from 
the  enemy's  country  with  everything  else  in  abundance. 
Only  enough  hard  bread  was  taken  to  last  through  the 
sterile  region  of  north  Alabama. 

Bridge  train  One  %nt  canvas  pontoon  train  of  30  boats,  with 

fixtures  complete,  transported  by  50  six-mule  wagons  in 

b/JTnmoun^ld  charge  of  a  battalion  of  cavalry  was  got  ready  to  ac- 

intobattaHonZsed  company  the  expedition.     The  entire  train,  in  charge  of 


145 

the  Chief  Quartermaster,  numbered  not  far  from  250 
wagons,  escorted  by  1,500  dismounted  men  of  the  three 
divisions.  These  men  were  organized  into  battalions  and 
commanded  by  majors, 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  356.) 

Wilson's  raid,  known  also  as  the  Selma  raid,  started 
March  15,  1865.  It  was  composed  of  three  divisions 
and  numbered  about  17,000  men,  1,500  of  which  were 
without  mounts. 

If  we  deduct  the  50  bridge  train  wagons,  we  have 
only  200  left  for  supplies  and  equipage  of  17,000  men 
and  horses.     Some  of  these  wagons  might  have  been 
hauling  artillery  supplies  or  might  have  been  ambulances, 
but  assuming  that  they  were  not  so  occupied,  we  have 
left  about  12  wagons  per  1,000  men  for  a  sixty  days  £°arj° 
campaign.      This   large  number  of  wagons   was   taken  ^g°do°  " 
along  to  assist  the  command  in  crossing  the  Alabama 
river,  after  which  30  wagons  were  destroyed. 

Ext.  No.  368.— The  following  should  be  allowed:    The amount of 
One  wagon  to  each  corps  and  division  headquarters;  oneSSSylifoiad 
two-wheeled  vehicle  to  each  brigade  and  regimental  head-have- 
quarters. 

Every  officer  should  carry  his  kit  and  grain  for 
both  horses  on  his  second  horse,  and  a  suitable  pack 
saddle  should  be  provided  for  that  purpose. 

Each  troop  should  have  one  pack  mule  for  cooking 
purposes, 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  76.) 

Ext.  No.  369. — In  regard  to  the  carriage  of  rations,    Haversackisno 
the  experience  of  a  single  campaign  is  sufficient  to  decide  *' 
a  thing— that  the  haversack,  as  used  in  the  United  States 
army,  while  very  good  perhaps  for  infantry,  is  a  poor 
thing  for  cavalry. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  35.) 

Ext.  No.  370.— To  carry  three  days'  rations  on  the    How  to  carry 
saddle,  have  a  long  bag  slit  in  the  middle,  put  grain  in 
both  ends  and  throw  it  across  the  saddle  and  sit  on  it. 


146 

Tie  the  ends  to  the  cincha  rings.     Distribute  the  grain 
to  equalize  the  pack. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  35.) 
-^xt  ^o.  371. — There  are  just  three  things  which 
i4,S)ormeCn0rp8  °f  are  loaded  in  cavalry  trains,  viz.,  food,  ammunition  and 
baggage.  The  provision  and  forage  part  of  the  train 
should  not  be  taken  on  raids.  Great  bulk  and  weight  are 
necessary,  and  such  cannot  be  moved  rapidly.  Ammu 
nition  must  be  carried,  so  must  a  small  quantity  of  bag 
gage,  the  less  of  this  the  better.  The  problem  becomes, 
then,  to  carry  the  ammunition  and  baggage  in  the  small 
est  space  and  safest  and  most  expeditious  manner.  Pack 
trains  take  an  immense  number  of  animals  and  make  a 
long  and  tedious  train.  Since  cavalry  must  be  always 
accompanied  by  artillery,  wherever  a  gun  can  go  a  wagon 
should  follow.  One  wagon  with  six  mules  will  carry 
as  much  as  twenty-four  pack  mules. 

The  following  is  an  estimate  of  transportation  for 
a  cavalry  corps  of  three  divisions,  each  of  three  brigades 
of  four  regiments  with  an  average  strength  of  400  men, 
total  strength  of  corps,  14,000  men.  (Wilson's  Corps 
in  1865  numbered  17,000)  :  Forty  rounds  per  man  for 
each  battle,  three  battles  during  raid ;  ammunition  for 
these  three  battles  on  wagons  makes  120  rounds  per 
man  on  wagons,  total,  1,680,000  rounds.  Besides  this 
each  man  should  carry  enough  on  his  person  for  two 
battles. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  72.) 
Note. — In  1910  forty  wagons  each  carrying  3,500 
pounds  would  be  necessary  to  carry  this  ammunition. 

COMMENTS. 

The  orders  affecting  the  allowance  of  wagons  are 
quoted  for  all  arms,  but  the  comments  will  be  confined 
to  the  cavalry  service. 

G.  O.  160,  1862,  allowed  3  wagons  per  squadron 
of  two  troops  each,  one  for  regimental  headquarters  and 
one  for  hospital  supplies,  making  a  total  of  20  for  each 


147 

regiment  of  cavalry.  G.  O.  83,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
August  21,  1863,  allowed  6  wagons  to  each  regiment  of 
cavalry,  and  G.  O.  100,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Novem 
ber  5,  1863,  still  retained  that  allowance.  G.  O.  95, 
W.  D.  1908,  allows  each  regiment  of  cavalry  34  wagons. 
The  two  orders  of  1863,  allowing  6  wagons  per  regiment 
of  cavalry,  were  issued  after  the  Gettysburg  campaign, 
and  were  based  on  war  experience. 

The  allowance  of  34  wagons  is  simply  and  flatly 
absurd.  The  maximum  allowance  of  wagons  per  regi 
ment  of  cavalry  should  be  one  to  each  troop,  one  to  regi 
mental  headquarters  and  band,  and  one  ammunition 
wagon  to  each  squadron  of  four  troops,  total  of  16 
wagons.  Supplies  will  be  carried  on  supply  trains  and 
issued  as  needed;  but  supply  trains  are  no  part  of  a  regi 
mental  equipment.  (Ext.  362.) 

Wheeler's  cavalry,  opposing  Sherman's  march  to  the 
sea,  had  no  wagons  for  five  months.  (Ext.  364.) 

Stuart's  cavalry,  on  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  had 
no  wagons  and  only  a  few  ambulances.  (Ext.  365.) 

Sheridan  marched  10,000  cavalry  for  a  month  at 
the  rate  of  one  wagon  to  130  men.  (Ext.  366.) 

Wilson's  Selma  raid  started  with  17,000  cavalry  for 
a  two  months'  campaign  with  one  wagon  to  84  men. 
(Ext.  367.) 

On  the  Trevillian  raid  Sheridan  had  wagons  for 
ammunition  only.  (Ext.  377.) 

The  recommendation  contained  in  Extract  368,  that 
each  officer  should  carry  his  baggage  on  his  extra  horse, 
is  a  good  one,  and  sometimes  practiced  in  the  regular 
service. 

A  single-track  railroad  will  supply  an  army  of 
60,000  to  70,000  men.  (Ext.  373.) 

SUPPLIES. 

Ext.  No.  372. — I  employed  a  brigade  once  a  week 

.  How  to  gather 

in  the  duty  of  collecting  and  bringing  in  forage,  sending  ft?feagu£tr*  h°8' 
out  sometimes  as  many  as  150  wagons  to  haul  the  grain    useofBcout«. 
which  my  scouts  had  previously  located.    In  nearly  every 


148 

one  of  these  expeditions  the  enemy  was  encountered,  and 
the  wagons  were  usually  loaded  while  the  skirmishers 
kept  up  a  running  fire. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  p.  253.) 

capacity  of  a          Ext.  No.  373. — A  single-track  railroad  can  supply 
road.  an  army  of  60,000  or  70,000  men  with  the  usual  num 

ber  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  but  beyond  that  number  or 
with  a  large  mounted  force  the  difficulty  of  supply  is 
very  great. 

(Halleck  to  Grant,  R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  668.) 

in  hostile  coun-          Ext.  No.  374. — They  will  help  themselves  to  corn, 

receipts^regfypeD  meat  and  what  they  need,  and  take  all  good  horses,  giv- 

for   supplies.  ,  .  .    ,     -,          .«  •,      r  ., 

taken.  ing  simple  receipts  to  be  settled  at  the  end  of  the  war 

or  according  to  circumstances. 

(Genl.   W.  T.   Sherman,   R.   R.,  Vol.   31,    Part  I, 
p.  719.) 

cavalry  can  Ext.  No.  375. — I  will  avail  myself  of  this  occasion 
H  to  call  the  attention  of  the  commanding  general  to  the 
s  ^act  tnat  $or  nearly  two  months  my  command  has  been 
ridge,Tenn!!jant  almost  daily  engaged  with  the  enemy  and  compelled  to 
live  mainly  on  parched  corn,  most  of  which  has  been 
gathered  at  a  distance  of  from  six  to  fifteen  miles.  The 
weather  at  times  has  been  intensely  cold  and  the  suffer 
ing  very  great,  most  of  them  being  without  shelter  of 
any  kind. 

(Brig.  Genl.  S.  D.  Sturgis,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I, 
p.  138.) 
curing  two          Ext.  No.  376. — In  addition,  the  animals  were,  for 

days  fight  horses  .  .  «  .   ,  ,         .,,         ,    f 

get  nothing  to  two  entire  days,  in  which  we  were  engaged,  without  for- 
Eapidan  to  the  age,  the  surrounding  country  affording  nothing  but  graz- 
'  ing  of  a  very  inferior  quality,  and  generally  at  such  points 
as  were  inaccessible  to  us. 

(Genl.   P.   H.    Sheridan,   R.   R.,  Vol.   36,   Part   I, 
p.  785.) 

Number  of         Ext.    No.    377. — On   his  Trevillian  raid    Sheridan 
ried8 on  a0raSid.ar~  started  with  two  divisions  carrying  three  days'  rations 
ax§owforiage0are  *n   naversacks,  to  last  for  five  days,  and  carrying  two 
days'  grain  on  the  pommel  of  the  saddle. 


149 
They  carried  100  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,    Amount  of  am- 

Af\       r        1  '   1  ,1  x-^     •     munition  carried 

40  of  which  was  on  the  person  and  the  other  60  m  on  a  raid, 
wagons. 

The  only  other  wagons  were  one  medical  wagon, 
eight  ambulances  and  one  wagon  for  each  brigade  and        idan  to  the 
division  headquarters.  James,  Jane,  isw. 

(See   Sheridan's   report,   R.    R.,   Vol.    36,    Part  I, 
p.  795.) 

Ext.  No.  378. — I  made  application  for  and  obtained    cavalry  gather 

.      .  wheat  and  grind 

permission  to  gather  up  corn  and  wheat  and  take  it  to •" at  a  mil}- 
a  mill  five  miles  distant,  where  I  supplied  my  command  NO.  Alabama  and 

Tennessee,  Oct. '64. 

scantily  for  the  next  four  days. 

(Col.  D.  E.  Coon,  2d  Iowa  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45, 
Part  I,  p.  581.) 

Ext.  No.  379. — Two  divisions  of  cavalry  marched    customary   to 
on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  men,  as  usual,  carrying  tS,fi3oe ?oundas~ 

, ,      •     ,  r          ,         ,  ,  .  .    -  of  forage  and  40 

on  their  horses  rive  days  rations,  thirty  pounds  ot  forage  rounds  of  ammu- 

-    r  ,  '  .   .  '     nition  on  horse. 

and  forty  rounds  of  ammunition.  Appomattox 

(Maj.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part29a™feaign>Mi 
I,  p.  1116.) 

Ext.  No.  380. — Sheridan,  on  his  march  from  Win-    Rations. 
Chester  to  Petersburg,  February  27  to  March  28,  1865,    Forage, 
started  with  five  days'  rations  in  haversacks,  and  on  each  Transportation, 
horse  30  pounds  of  forage;  he  carried  in  wagons  fifteen    Ammunition, 
days'  rations  of  sugar,  salt  and  coffee.    The  wagons  also 
carried  100  rounds  of  ammunition,  while  each  man  car 
ried  75  rounds  on  his  horse. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I, 
p.  475;  also  report  of  Maj.  Genl.  W.  Merritt,  p.  485.) 

Ext.  No.  381. — I  had  often  seen  bread  baked  upon    improvised 

n    .  .  method  of   bak- 

a  flat  rock  or  board,  or  by  twisting  it  around  a  ramrod  ing  bread, 
or  stick  and  holding  it  to  the  fire,  but  one  method  of 
baking  corn  bread  was  practiced  successfully  on  this 
march  which  I  had  never  witnessed  before.  The  men 
would  take  meal  dough  and  fit  it  into  a  corn  shuck,  tying 
the  shucks  tightly.  It  would  then  be  placed  on  the  hot 
embers  and  in  a  short  time  would  come  out  beautifully 


150 

browned.     The  dough  was  worked  up  in  an  oil  cloth  or 
a  half  pumpkin,  thoroughly  scooped  out. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Living  off  of  a          Ext.  No.  382.  —  I  can  get  no  forage  or  rations;  am 
cau?eBsytraggiinr|  out  of  both.    The  people  give  and  sell  the  men  something 


;  to  eat,  but  I  can't  stand  that  way  of  subsisting;  it  causes 

1863* 

dreadful  straggling. 

(Genl.  Buford,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p.  324.) 
cavalry    sub-          Ext.   No.   383.—  During  the  campaign  my  brigade 
tsjyt80nthecoun"  marched  520  miles,  having  subsisted  ourselves  principally 
paigM^.  Cam'  on  the  country. 

(Col.  Atkins,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44,  p.  393.) 

wheeler's  cav-          Ext.    No.    384.—  During  the  last   five   months  my 

?ranIpo?taTfonn°  command  has  been  without  wagons  or  cooking  utensils, 

subsist  uponwith  orders  to  subsist  upon  the  country.     The  food  has 

country.  , 

been  limited  to  bread  baked  upon  boards  and  stones  and 


meat  broiled  on  sticks.  It  has  not  been  paid  in  twelve 
on  sticks.  months.  During  five  months  it  has  averaged  in  direct 

twelve  mSitLfn  marching  16  miles  per  day,  and  having  no  wagons,  has 

Average  16  been  obliged  to  pack  all  forage  and  rations  to  camp  on 
fiveemonrth£y  ***  horseback.  Our  camps  could  not  be  designated  before 

supper  at  mid-  nio-ht  fall     Details  had  then  to  be  sent  to  procure  forage 

night,  march  at       °  .        .  . 

daylight.  an(}  rations,  frequently  making  it  midnight  before  sup- 

inrt°oragceamapckonper  could  be  prepared  for  my  men,  and  then  they  were 

im- 

p.  412.  ) 

stuart'8  cav-  Ext.  No.  385.—  Stuart's  raid  around  Federal  army 
?hreecardafs0rl-  during  the  Gettysburg  campaign  carried  only  three  days' 
when  going  on  a  rations  on  the  horse  and  with  no  transportation  except 

No  transporta-  ambulances. 

'ttt^urgoa,.          (Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  C.  S,  R.  R,  Vol.  27, 

paign,Jane,       3. 


compelled  to  be  in  the  saddle  before  daylight. 

Savannah  Cam-  __    , 

Paign,i864.  (Maj.  Genl.  Joseph  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  44, 


when  cavalry          Ext.   No.   386.  —  Merritt,  commanding  reserve  bri- 

gade  at  Brist°e  Station'  October  17'  1863'  reported: 
The  command  is  hard  up  for  something  to  eat.  They 
have  not  a  thing  to  feed  on;  cannot  rations  be  sent 


immediately? 


151 

Reply  :  General  Meade  directs  that  you  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  to  have  rations  sent  out  by 
cars.  *  *  * 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  352.) 

Ext.  No.  387.  —  A  whole  division  has  been  twenty-    NO  wonder  the 

.  Army  of  the  Po- 

one  days  without  hay.     No  horses,  however  good,  and  tomac  lost  horses. 
bought  at  whatever  price,  can  stand  this  kind  of  treat-    Forase- 
ment  in  a  region  where  but  little,  if  any,  grass  can  be 
procured. 

(Brig.  Gen.  Stoneman,  R.  R.  Vol.  29,  Part.  II.,  p. 
4I9-) 

Ext.  No.  388.—  G.  O.  100,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  aJS?^or% 
fall  of  '63,  prescribes  maximum  forage  for  horses,  lO^S.01  the  Po~ 
pounds  hay  and  14  pounds  grain;  mules  10  pounds  hay 
and  11  pounds  grain.  When  short  forage  (no  hay) 
only  can  be  procured,  horses,  18  pounds  grain;  mules, 
15  pounds  grain.  When  the  army  is  on  the  march  the 
above  allowance  will  not  apply.  Marching  ration,  10 
pounds  average  per  animal  per  day.  Increased  allow 
ance  of  grain  intended  to  be  fed  only  when  animals  are 
at  rest,  after  long  marches,  to  recuperate  them  and  when 
hay  cannot  be  procured. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  II,  p.  420.) 

Ext.  No.  389.  —  My  command  was  kept  on  the  battle    Forrest's  horses 

r    .  .  _  kept  on  the  bat- 

field  during  the  night  of  the  20th,  and  men  and  horses  «e 


gerrt 

suffered  greatly  for  want  of  water.    The  men  were  with-  Jy^  food  and" 
out  rations,  and  the  horses  had  only  received  a  partial 


...  Ga.,  Sept.  20,  1863. 

feed  once  during  the  two  days    engagement. 

(General   Forrest,   C.    S.,   Battle   of   Chickamauga, 
R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p.  525.) 

Ext.  No.  390.  —  Having  but  three  days'  rations  in  soldiers  remain 

«  ,     ,  ,  cheerful  under 

twenty  days,  and  many  of  them  nearly  naked  and  several  ad  verse  condi- 

J  .  tions,  without 

times  exposed  to  a  cold,  drenching  ram,  yet  they  never  regular  rations. 


complained,  but  were  always  cheerful  and  ever  ready  to 

,  11     j        •  •  r       1  Oct.,  1863. 

perform  all  duties  required  of  them. 

(Brig.  Genl.  George  Crook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, 
p.  688.) 


152 

confederate          Ext.  No.  391. — A  very  large  proportion  of  my  men, 

cavalry  find  it          ,  ~~ 

effective  without  ^       ^V&n  officers,   are  ragged  and  barefooted,  without 
ciotwng  or  pay.  blankets  or  overcoats.     We  have  drawn  no  clothing  for 

Knoxville  Cam-  r    11  •    A  ^1  ^ 

paign  Deo.,  1863.  fall  or  winter.  The  men  have  received  no  pay  for  six 
months.  The  extremely  cold  weather  has  made  it  almost 
impossible  for  me  to  move. 

(Maj.  Genl.  W.  T.  Martin,  C.  S.,  Jan.  8th,  1864, 
R.  R.,  Vol.  31,  Part  I,  p.  549.) 

COMMENTS. 

Forage:  Cavalry  must  expect  to  live  on  the  coun 
try.  The  way  to  obtain  forage  is  to  locate  it  by  scouts 
and  then  either  send  wagons  for  it  or  impress  wagons 
from  the  inhabitants  and  make  them  haul  it.  Usually, 
however,  the  inhabitants  of  a  hostile  country  will  have 
disappeared;  the  forage  will  then  have  to  be  brought  in 
by  troops.  (See  also  Ext.  453.  Ext.  372.)  Receipts 
should  be  given,  to  be  paid  or  not  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
depending  upon  the  policy  of  the  government.  (Ext. 
374.) 

In  going  on  raids  each  horse  carried  30  pounds  of 
grain.  (Exts.  377,  379,  380.)  Cavalry  was  expected  to 
gather  forage  from  the  surrounding  country  when  the 
30  pounds  were  exhausted.  Wheeler's  cavalry,  for  five 
months,  had  to  pack  all  forage  into  camp  on  horseback. 
(Ext.  384.) 

The  forage  allowance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
G.  O.  100,  1863,  was  a  maximum  of  10  pounds  of  hay 
and  14  pounds  of  grain.  When  no  hay  could  be  obtained, 
18  pounds  of  grain  were  allowed  when  animals  were 
at  rest  recuperating;  when  marching  only  10  pounds 
were  allowed.  (Ext.  388.) 

Rations :  The  best  single  diet  known  is  Indian  corn. 
Men  can  live  on  it  by  parching  it.  (Ext.  375.)  Corn 
and  wheat  should  be  gathered  and  ground  in  neighboring 
mills.  (Ext.  378.) 

Foraging  in  a  friendly  country  causes  straggling. 
(Ext.  382.) 


153 

During  a  battle  soldiers  can  expect  little  except  what 
is  carried  on  their  persons  or  horses.  (Exts.  376,  389.) 

Cavalry  started  on  raids  with  from  three  (Exts. 
377,  385)  to  five  days'  rations  on  the  horse.  (Exts.  379, 
380.)  The  best  way  to  carry  rations  is  described  in 
extract  370. 

Emergency  rations  were  unsuccessfully  tried  during 
the  war.  (Ext.  395.) 

Improvised  methods  of  baking  were  frequently 
used,  viz :  on  a  flat  rock  or  by  twisting  it  on  the  ramrod  ; 
tied  in  corn  shucks  and  baked  in  hot  embers  (Ext.  381)  ; 
on  boards  and  stones.  (Ext.  384.) 

Amount  of  ammunition  carried :  The  amount  de 
pended  upon  the  length  of  the  expedition. 

In  the  Selma  raid  the  ammunition  carried  per  man 
for  60  clays  was  100  rounds  on  the  horse  and  80  in 
wagons.  (Ext.  367.) 

Extract  371  recommends  80  rounds  on  the  man  and 
120  rounds  per  man  in  the  wagons  as  enough  for  five 
battles,  allowing  40  rounds  per  man  per  battle. 

On  the  Trevillian  raid  each  man  carried  40  rounds 
on  the  horse  and  60  per  man  in  wagons  (Ext.  377),  but 
the  Federal  troops  ran  out  of  ammunition  and  Sheridan 
gives  that  as  the  reason  why  he  retreated.  (Memoirs, 
Vol.  I,  p.  425.) 

During  Sheridan's  march  from  Winchester  to 
Petersburg  the  ammunition  carried  per  man  was  75  on 
the  horse  and  100  in  the  wagons.  (Ext.  380.) 

During  the  war,  then,  cavalry  carried  from  100  to 
180  rounds  per  man. 

Our  cavalry  can  now  carry  80  rounds  of  rifle 
ammunition  on  the  trooper,  depending  on  the  type  of 
cartridge  belt  used.  If  each  squadron  of  four  troops  has 
one  ammunition  wagon  carrying  2,800  pounds,  or  700 
pounds  per  troop,  each  troop  will  have  8,400  rounds,  or 
84  per  man,  in  the  squadron  wagon.  It  will  be  impos 
sible  to  carry  more  in  the  saddle  pockets  unless  some 
thing  else  is  thrown  out.  There  is  already  carried  one 
day's  emergency  rations,  one  day's  field  rations,  two 


154 

haversack  rations,  extra  grain  in  the  nose  bag,  extra 
horseshoes  and  other  necessary  articles.  More  ammuni 
tion  can  be  carried  on  the  person  in  bandoliers.  If  each 
trooper  carries  one,  he  will  have  on  the  person  140 
rounds  and  in  the  wagon  84  rounds,  making  a  total  of 
224  rounds,  which  should  be  ample  for  at  least  two  mod 
ern  battles. 

AMMUNITION   SUPPLY  —  TO   THE    FIRING   LINE. 

Ammunition          Ext.  No.  392. — And  here  let  me  call  your  attention 

supply  to  the  fir-  ,  ,  .  t 

ing  line.  to  the  necessity  of  having  some  organized  system  of  ord- 

Janfep9ldMay*i864.e  nance  sergeants,  or  men  detailed  whose  duty  it  shall  be 
to  keep  cavalry  commands  well  supplied  with  ammu 
nition  during  engagements.  Men  armed  with  the  breech- 
loading  weapon  will  necessarily  fire  a  greater  number 
of  rounds  than  those  armed  with  a  muzzle-loading  piece, 
and  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  a  cavalryman  to  carry 
more  than  from  60  to  80  rounds  upon  his  person,  and 
when  dismounted  and  away  from  his  horse  this  supply 
can  easily  be  exhausted  in  a  few  hours'  firing. 

At  daylight  details  were  sent  to  the  train.  Captain 
Weeks,  in  command  of  detail,  immediately  started  for 
our  own  train,  some  nine  miles  distant,  making  the  trip 
back  to  Hanover  Court  House,  thence  to  Ashland,  twen 
ty-seven  miles,  each  man  loaded  with  85  pounds  of 
ammunition,  in  less  than  one-half  day  and  even  then 
hardly  arrived  in  time,  as  three  boxes  were  captured 
by  the  enemy  before  we  could  issue  it  to  the  men. 

(Lieut.  Col.  G.  A.  Purington,  2d  Ohio  Cav.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p.  895.) 

Mounted  de-          Ext.    No.    393. — Through   the   kindness    of   Major 

tails  distribute 

ammunition   to  Dana,  who  furnished  me  with  a  mounted  detail,  I  suc- 

the    firing    line 

regaled  eavily  ceeded  in  procuring  a  supply  of  ammunition,  which  was 
Five  Forks,  Va.,  delivered   and    distributed   to   the   men   on   the   line   of 

Apr.  1,  1865. 

battle  while  heavily  engaged. 

(Col.  A.  C.  M.  Pennington,  3d  N,  J.  Cav.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  46,  Part  I,  p.  1136.) 


155 
Ext,  No.  394. — Forty  rounds  of  ammunition  ought    Amount  of  am- 

,  .        .   ,  •  c    -i         r-    1  .L    munition  necee- 

to  be  enough  for  any   cavalry  skirmisher   if  he  rights  sary  for  a  cavalry 

.          .skirmisher  to  last 

from  daylight  to  dark,  and  a  regiment  announcing  itseli  an  day. 
"out  of  ammunition'"  in  the  thick  of  a  fight  ought  to  be tJnTva.1,1  June8ii- 
severely  censured  in  brigade,  division  and  corps  orders. 
But  these  "out  of  ammunition"  fellows  have  often  got 
better  men  into  grave  peril  by  falling  back,  and  thus 
leaving  a  gap  for  the  enemy  to  occupy.  I  have  seen  the 
whole  of  a  brigade  forced  into  a  retreat  and  the  loss  of 
many  prisoners  from  the  failure  of  a  single  regiment  in 
this  manner.  It  was  at  Trevillian  Station,  near  Gordons- 
ville,  Va.,  we  were  fighting  on  foot,  and  before  we  were 
aware  of  it  a  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  our  rear  and 
firing  into  the  led  horses.  Only  the  approach  of  dark 
ness  saved  many  of  us,  myself  in  the  number,  from  cap 
ture,  and  I  lost  my  horse  and  had  to  foot  it  till  I  cap 
tured  another. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  21.) 

Sheridan  claims  that  he  had  to  withdraw  from  Tre 
villian  Station  because  his  ammunition  had  given  out. 
(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  425.) 


COMMENTS. 


A  soldier  should  carry  enough  ammunition  on  his 
person  to  fight  at  least  one  battle.  A  cavalryman  may 
have  ammunition  on  his  horse,  which  ammunition,  under 
most  circumstances,  will  be  available.  It  will  seldom  be 
possible  to  bring  ammunition  from  the  squadron  wagons 
to  the  firing  line,  but  where  horsemen  can  approach 
the  firing  line  from  the  rear  under  cover,  ammunition 
can  be  so  supplied.  (Ext.  393.) 

Pack  mules  will  usually  be  available  to  bring  am 
munition  from  the  wagons  to  some  sheltered  place,  where 
the  boxes  can  be  broken  open  and  the  bandoliers  dis 
tributed.  If  an  organization  is  well  controlled  in  fire 
discipline,  the  80  rounds  in  the  belt  and  one  bandolier  on 
the  person,  together  with  what  can  be  obtained  from 
the  dead  and  wounded,  should  enable  it  to  fight  at  least 
one  pitched  battle.  (Ext.  394.) 


156 

EMERGENCY   RATIONS. 

Emergency  ra-  Ext  No.  395. — They  have  also  sent  us  compressed 
cakes  which  Lun,  our  mess  cook,  calls  "desecrated  vege 
tables."  We  have  boiled,  baked,  fried,  stewed,  pickled, 
sweetened,  salted  it,  and  tried  it  in  puddings,  cakes  and 
pies,  but  it  sets  all  modes  of  cooking  at  defiance,  so  the 
boys  break  it  up  and  smoke  it  in  their  pipes.  They  say 
the  Dutch  of  the  "Fourst  Missouri"  know  how  to  cook 
it,  but  we  are  too  proud  to  learn. 

(The  Last  Campaign,  by  E.  N.  Gilpin,  3d  la.  Cav., 
published  in  the  Journal  of  the  U.  S.  Cavalry  Associa 
tion.) 


157 


CHAPTER  X. 


Spnt    Ont 

(Genl.  D.  S.  Stanley,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p. 


ANIMALS  — ENDURANCE,  CARE  AND  DISEASE. 


ENDURANCE. 

Ext.  No.  396.  —  From  September  26  to  October  9,  ^ivfcio^  mar- 
1863,  Crook's  division,  composed  of  Minty's  and  Long's  s*x  days 
brigades,  marched  and  fought  247  miles  in  six  days. 

668.) 

Ext.  No.  397.—  The  First  Maine  Cavalry  marched  chiflTm 

nrv        ..  .  ,  without  rest. 

90  miles  without  rest.  Bristoe  (Va.) 

(J.  Irvin  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  I,  p.  366.)      campaign,  Oct., 

Ext.  No.  398.  —  Mitchell's  Cavalry  Division  marched    Division   mar 

ches  52  miles  in 

52  miles  in  24  hours.  ^  hours. 

(Brig.  Genl.  R.  B.  Mitchell,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  RJ?dey'se5aTdd 

TT  £*(\\  Oct.,  1863. 

II,  p.  669.) 

Ext.  No.  399.  —  In  the  pursuit  of  Wheeler's  cavalry,  six  days  forced 
October  4th  to  9th,  1863,  there  was  scarcely  an  hour  dur-ah-y  out  of  busi- 
ing  the  whole  pursuit  that  the  horses  were  unsaddled,  wheeierand 

T-        j  1      •    1  A  ,1,1  •      ,1  1  11      Roddey's  raid 

For  days  and  nights  together  the  men  were  in  the  saddle,  Oct.,  ises. 
almost  constantly  on  the  march,  and  some  days  making 
as  high  as  53  and  57  miles.  A  greater  part  of  the  time 
the  troops  were  out  of  rations,  our  hasty  movements  giv 
ing  them  no  time  to  forage  on  the  country;  the  nights 
were  very  cold  and  the  men  without  overcoats.  It  is 
positively  necessary  that  a  large  number  of  horses  be 
had  before  the  command  can  be  in  working  condition 
again. 

(Brig.  Genl.  R.  B.  Mitchell,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, 
p.  672.) 

Ext.  No.  400.  —  First  Brigade  Michigan  cavalry  Brigade  mar- 
marched  350  miles  in  14  days.  0  miles  in 


158 
wheeler  and          (Col.  A.  P.  Campbell,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p. 

Roddey's  raid  ,-«0  x 
Oct.,  1863.  678. ) 

ch^fef^ieTTn          Ext-   No-   401.— The  9th   Perm.   Cav.   marched  61 
22^  hours.         mil     f         2  ;30  October  2d,  to  1 :00  p.  M.,  October 

Wheeler  and 
Roddey's  raid,  ^A      1  S^S 

Oct.,  1863.  OQ>    1C)00- 

(Lieut.  Col.   R.   M.   Russell,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,   Part 
II,  p.  679.) 
wheeler  and          Ext.  No.  402. — First  Term.  Cav.  marched  750  miles 

Roddeys  raid, 

Oct.,  1863.  m  two  mOnths. 


(Lieut.  Col.  J.  P.  Brownlow,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part 
II,  p.  681.) 

Ext.  No.  403. — I  had  marched  41  miles  that  day. 
°nwhay'i  (Bri§"-  Genl.   George  Crook,  2d  Cav.  Div.,  R.  R., 

WaSSf'-Vol.  30,  Part  II,  p.  686.) 
Brigade  mar-          Ext.  No.  404. — Although  my  horses  and  men  were 

ches  30  miles  per 

weeks01*  eightweai~ied  with  marches,  which  for  eight  weeks  had  aver- 
w heeler  and  aged  30  miles  a  day,  I  obeyed  the  order. 

se°ptdoecCi863id'          (Col.  G.  B.  Hodge,  C.  S.,  Comg.  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 

30,  Part  II,  p.  726.) 
Division  mar-          Ext    No.  405. — My  command  having-  marched  52 

ches  52  miles  in 

24  hours.  miles  in  24  hours. 

octh,ai8m63er>s  raid          (Col.  Edward  Hatch,  Comg.  Cav.  Div.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 

30,  Part  II,  p.  741.) 
Brigade  mar-          Ext.  No.  406. — After  making  a  march  of  50  miles 

ches  50  miles  in  .       .  r 

15  hours.  m  15  hours. 


(Col.  J.  J.  Morrison,  Comg.  Cav.  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
31,  Parti,  p.  12.) 
Division  mar-          Ext.  No.  407. — We  marched  30  to  40  miles  daily 

ches  30  to  40  mile*  .  .  1       1         r          •        1      j 

daily  for  six  days,  for  six  days,   during  which  a  great  deal  of  ram  had 
mond^May!  ife?"  fallen,  and  the  roads  in  some  places  very  heavy.     Con 
sidering  the  work  done,  comparatively  few  of  the  horses 
failed.     We  captured  as  many  horses  as  we  lost. 

(Brig.  Genl.  A.  V.  Kautz,  Comg.  Cav.  Div.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  36,  Part  II,  p.  174.) 

TWO  divisions          Ext   No-  408.— During  the  Trevillian  raid  Sheri- 
Sivehdaysconsec"  dan's  two  divisions  marched  fifty-six  consecutive  days. 

jatfA^rr     (R-  R-> VoL  36> Part  J> 

1864.    ' 


159 

Ext.   No.   409.  —  If  such  is  their  expectation,  it   is    Division  mar- 
impossible  that  they  can  know  that  this  command  has  Sis  day*  " 
marched   1,400  miles  since  the   1st  of  May,  without  a  Vasnhe«  Bc™  *J«£ 
remount,  and  without  a  halt  sufficiently  long  to  set  the  ^-Jnl^  1864- 
shoes  on  my  horses. 

(Report  of  Brig.  Genl.  Wm.  W.  Averill,  Comg.  2d 
Cav.  Div.,  dated  Aug.  3d,  1864,  R.  R.,  Vol.  37,  Part 
I,  p.  330.) 

Ext.  No.  410.  —  Both  men  and  horses  of  my  division    Division  stay 

'  in  the  saddle  18 

need  rest.     They  have  been  in  the  saddle  from  eighteen 


to  twenty  hours  each  day  since  the  2cl  of  this  month.        Atlanta  eam- 

J  paign  May,  1864. 

(Col.  E.  M.  McCook,  May  20,  1864,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38, 
Part  II,  p.  752.) 

Ext.  No.  411.  —  I  received  orders  to  move  to  Gil-    Brigade  gallops 

5  miles  and  ren- 


lem's  Bridge   (five  miles)   at  a  gallop  and  to  hold  the 

bridge  at  all  hazards.     This   five-mile  gallop  rendered    Kingston,   Ga., 

May  19,  1864. 

about  300  horses  unserviceable. 

(Col.    Robt.    H.    G.    Minty,    Comg.    Brig.,    R.    R., 
Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p.  811.) 

Ext.  No.  412.  —  My  command  up  to  this  time  had    cavalry   com- 
traveled  about  seventy  miles  without  having  halted.          S&mneT  without 

(Maj.   Genl.  Jos.  Wheeler,  C.  S.,  R.   R.,  Vol.  38,  Quanta  cam- 
Part  III,  p.  955.) 

Ext.  No.  413.  —  The  march  of  470  miles  from  Cyn-    cavalry  march 
thia  to  the  Cumberland  river  and  back  to  Lexington  inaay1?,  aBndni20 

.  ,  miles  in  less  than 

eleven  days  is,  perhaps,  the  most  rapid  and  trying  known  60  hours. 
during  the  war,  especially  that  from  Irvine  to  the  Cum-into°ifentarcVy, 
berland,  a  distance  of  120  miles,  in  less  than  sixty  hours, 
with  stock  the  most  of  which  had  already  traveled  nearly 
a  thousand  miles. 

(Col.   Chas.    S.   Hanson,   R.    R.,   Vol.   39,    Part   I, 
P-  42.) 

Ext.   No.  414.  —  'The  forces  under  Generals  Burn-    Morgan   con 

cedes  that  enemy 

bridge  and  Hobson,  who  were  at  Pound  Gap  and  Mud 


Creek,  finding  that  the  state  was  invaded,  immediately.  Morgan's  raid 

'  .  J  into    Kentucky 

gave   up   their   intended    expedition    into   Virginia   and  June>  1864- 
pursued  my  command.     They  reached  Mount  Sterling 


160 

at   daylight   on   the  9th,   having   marched   90  miles   in 
twenty-four  hours. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  H.  Morgan,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39, 
Part  I,  p.  68.) 

^xt.  No.  ^^'  —  During  this  interval  of  eighty-one 
uchodf  hours  the  command  rested  from  marching  and  fighting 
Cam-  not  to  exceed  six  hours.     During  these  eighty-one  hours 
June,  1864.  the  Division  marched  135  miles. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  40,  Part  I,  p. 
624.) 

'  —  Curing  Grierson's  raid,  April,  1863, 


0  uand 


16  days.  two  regiments  of  111.  Cav.  marched  600  miles  in  less  than 

Grierson's  raid, 

Apr.,  1863.  16  days.     The  last  76  miles  was  marched  in  28  hours. 

This    command    was    enabled    to    replace    broken-down 
horses  from  the  country  passed  through. 
(R.  R.,  Vol.  24,  Parti,  p.  528.) 

ENDURANCE   IN   THE   CHARGE. 

charge  unsuc-          Ext.  No.  417.  —  We  charged  up  to  the  enemy  over 

cessful  with  -  1  «    <  t'c 

blown  horses,      a  long  stretch  of  marshy  ground,  intersected  by  a  dif- 

JuteHse!'.  Va"ficult  ditch  and  terminating  in  a  hill  of  plowed  ground. 

The  charge  was  unsuccessful,   the  most  of  the  horses 

being  so  blown  that  it  was  impossible  to  bring  or  keep 

them  for  such  a  distance  at  a  charging  pace. 

(Capt.  Cram,  6th  U.  S.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part 
I,  p.  947.) 
Regiment          Ext.    No.    418.  —  The   2d   Kentucky,    with   Colonel 

charges   for   5  r 

miles  and  breaks  Long-  at  their  head,  made  a  most  gallant  charge  of  some 

through  enemy  s  ^       ~ 

line-  five  miles,  breaking  through  his  lines,  etc. 

TenncMocBtn4,vi863:  (Brig.  Genl.  George  Crook,  R.  R.,  Vol.  30,  Part  II, 

p.  685.) 

COMMENTS. 

These  extracts  speak  for  themselves.  There  is  little 
to  be  said  on  the  subject  of  endurance  of  cavalry  on  the 
march,  except  that  all  recent  marches,  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  what  can  be  done,  serve  no  purpose  other 
than  breaking  down,  unnecessarily,  horses  which  are  very 
difficult  to  replace.  The  war  of  the  Rebellion  sufficiently 


161 

tried  out  the  subject,  and  if  anybody  is  not  satisfied  with 
the  above  reports,  the  Rebellion  records  furnish  many 
more. 

OARE. 

Ext:.  No.  419.  —  Here  we  drew  five  pounds  of  for-    cavalry 

t  get  no  care  or  for 

age  and  removed  our  saddles  for  the  first  time  in  sixaee- 


days,   during  which  period  we  had  marched   from  the  badfor 
Rappahannock  to  Chancellorsville,  doing  duty  both  day  3  SrS8eg8reat 
and  night,  and  had  been  under  the  command  of  rAae 
different  officers. 

(Lieut.  Col.  G.  A.  Purington,  2d  Ohio  Cav.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  36,  Part  I,  p.  893.) 

Ext.   No.   420.  —  The  thirteen  days  we  lay  at  this    FUII  forage  can- 
place  is  the  only  time  during  the  whole  campaign  that  during  ea 
we  had  full  forage  for  our  horses.  P&At  u  n  t  a 

(  Atlanta  Campaign,  Col.  R.  H.  G.  Minty,  R.  R.,  paign'  ] 
Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p.  815.) 

Ext.  No.  421.  —  The  men  have  taken  excellent  care    veteran 
of  their  horses  and  have  uncomplainingly  marched  on 
foot  a  considerable  portion  of  each  day's  march  in  order 
to  save  them. 

(Lieut.  Col.  J.  H.  Peters,  4th  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
49,  Part  I,  p.  499.     Wilson's  Selma  raid.) 

Ext.  No.  422.  —  The  horses  subsisted  almost  entirely    use  of  green 

,       .  corn  as  forage. 

upon  green  corn   during  our  absence,   but   returned   in    Grierson's  raid 
fair  condition.  Apr"May'  1868' 

(Brig.  Genl.  B.  H.  Grierson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part  I, 
p.  388.) 

Ext.   No.  423.  —  My  horses  are  much  worn  down,    Green  com 


having  been  fed   for  the  last  ten  days  on  green  corn. 


Many  of  them  are  foundered  by  the  injudicious  manner  ApG^ 
in  which  they  are  fed. 

(Col.  Joseph  Karge,  Comdg.  Cav.  Div.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
39,  Part  I,  p.  392.) 

Ext.  No.  424.—  The  horses  of  the  battery  have  suf-    Green 
fered  most,  as  the  toil  they  have  had  to  undergo 
been  greater  than  animals  can  stand  with  no  other  forage  AP^ 
than  green  corn  at  this  season. 


162 

(Col.  J.  W.  Noble,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part  I,  p.  396.) 

The  following  is  a  summary  of  a  report  well  worth 
reading : 

Ext.  No.  425. — The  7th  Pa.  Cav.  started  April  30, 

1864'  with  919  horses  fresh  from  the  corral  at  Nashville; 
rlusueitsdepl°rable  they  were  unused  to  military  duty  and  the  majority  were 
young. 

Of  the  enlisted  men  300  were  raw  recruits;  some 
had  never  been  on  a  horse  before.  The  regiment  traveled 
48  consecutive  hours  and  during  that  time  the  horses 
were  without  food.  Then  we  received  23  pounds  of  corn 
for  three  days"  feed,  and  carried  it  and  five  days'  rations 
on  the  horses. 

Out  of  72  hours  the  horses  were  under  the  saddle 
60  hours.  May  22d  the  loss  of  76  horses  reported  as  died 
of  starvation.  May  26th  to  June  2d  the  horses  were 
without  feed  and  actually  starved. 

One  battalion  lost  in  action  trying  to  procure  for 
age,  33  horses,  and  101  starved  to  death. 

A  detail  traveled  30  miles  after  forage  and  returned 
without  any.  Another  detail  traveled  26  miles  and  re 
turned  with  one  quart  per  horse. 

June  13th  to  18th,  received  half  forage. 

June  19th  to  22d,  received  no  forage. 

June  23d  to  July  17th,  received  half  forage. 

sore  backs  Juty  27th  to  30th,  foraged  on  the  country  for  twen- 
ing8forageonafhe  ty  miles  around  Stone  Mountain.  All  was  packed  upon 
much6  harm  as  the  withers  of  the  horses,  doing  as  much  harm  as  the 

the   forage   does  .  ...  ,  .  . 

good.  feed  did  good,  causing  sore  backs, 

cavalry   in          August  1st  to  15th  the  command  was  in  the  trenches 

trenches    means          .  •,    c  .,11 

gross  neglect  of  and  separated  from  the  horses. 

August  15th  and  16th,  received  one  quart  per  head. 
August  17th  and  18th,  received  one  pint  of  feed. 
August  19th  to  24th,  marched  120  miles,  feeding 
but  once  upon  green  corn. 

August  24th  to  September  9th,  half  rations. 
September  9th  to  llth,  no  feed  and  no  grazing. 
Stock  received  no  salt  or  hay  during  the  campaign. 


163 

Recapitulation : 

Horses 

Started  with 919 

Captured 42 

961 
Loss : 

Abandoned  and  died 230 

Killed  and  captured 171 

—     401 


Present  September  13 560 

Marched  902  miles,  not  including  picket  duty  and 
company  scouting. 

The  horses  were  without  food  26  days  and  scant  March  from 
food  27  days;  they  were  7  consecutive  days  without  f ood to'^SA^ 
of  any  kind.  g&A»p- to  AH^: 

The  majority  of  horses  that  died  and  were  aban 
doned  were  literally  starved. 

(Maj.  Wm.  Jennings,  7th  Pa.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38 
Part  II,  p.  832.) 

Ext.  No.  426.— The  men  are  in  good  health  and  Neariy  half  of 
spirits,  but  want  clothing  badly.  I  have  sent  back  toSWgffiSK 
endeavor  to  procure  a  supply  of  both,  and  also  horse- ofehoJseef80ho5aat 
shoes,^for  want  of  which  nearly  half  our  cavalry  is  ,&$?}"£  iffi! 
unserviceable.  As  soon  as  these  necessary  articles  are 
obtained,  we  shall  be  prepared  to  resume  operations. 

(General  R.  E.  Lee,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  p,  302.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  frequent  change  of  commanders  is  highly  det 
rimental  to  any  organization.  (Ext.  419.) 

Constant  night  picket  duty  will  soon  render  cavalry 
unserviceable.  (Ext.  419.) 

Full  forage  can  seldom  be  expected  during  a  cam 
paign.  (Ext.  420.) 

Veteran  cavalry  will  frequently  walk  on  foot  to 
save  their  horses.  (Ext.  421.) 

Green  corn  is  a  very  unsatisfactory  forage.  (Exts. 
423,  424.) 


164 


Deplorable  results  can  be  expected  from  recruits 
mounted  on  young,  untrained  and  unseasoned  horses 
which  receive  scant  forage.  (Ext.  425.) 

Sore  backs  caused  from  packing  forage  on  the 
horse  does  cavalry  as  much  harm  as  the  forage  does 
good.  (Ext.  425.) 

The  placing  of  cavalry  in  trenches  means  gross 
neglect  of  their  horses.  (Ext.  425.) 

The  want  of  horseshoes  will  render  cavalry  tem 
porarily  unserviceable.  (Ext.  426.) 

FIELD   DISEASES. 


Hoof-rot. 


Hoof-rot  Ext-    N°-    427.  -  *   haVC   Sent   t0   the   Quartermaster'S 

Bristoe  (Va.)  Department   in   Washington   City  471    disabled   horses. 

ampaign  Oct  '63 

'There  are  at  least  100  more  in  the  command.  The 
frightful  loss  among  horses  owing  to  a  disease  which 
resembles  tetter  (called  in  the  army  hoof  rot)  from  the 
effects  of  which  the  finest  appearing  horses  in  the  com 
mand  become  disabled  in  a  few  days'  march.  The  dis 
ease  seems  to  have  been  contracted  in  the  quartermas 
ter's  corrals  in  Washington. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part 
I,  p.  353.) 

Ext.  No.  428.  —  My  cavalry  was  much  reduced  by 
recent  active  operations,  and  particularly  by  the  appear 
ance  with  the  last  few  days  of  hoof  disease,  which  is 
now  spreading  rapidly. 

(Genl.  Meade,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  II,  p.  376.) 

Ext.  No.  429.  —  His  horses  are  not  fit  for  hard 
service,  and  the  disease  called  "rotten-hoof"  has  made 
its  appearance  in  that  division  with  great  virulence. 

(Genl.  Pleasanton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  II,  p.  382.) 

Hoof-rot  and          Ext.  No-  430.—  Within  the  last  three  days  I  have 
swelled  tongue.   been  ^({^  to  send  into  the  dismounted  camp  265  men 
and  horses,  the  horses  having  been  affected  with  hoof 
disease  and  swelled  tongue. 

(Genl.  Kilpatrick,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  II,  p.  401.) 


Hoof-rot. 


165 

Ext.  No.  431. — The  remedy  used  at  the  depot  is 
chloride  of  antimony  for  sore  feet,  and  a  decoction  of 
white  oak  bark  for  the  mouth. 

Another  is  borax  and  alum,  half  and  half,  pulver-  Another  remedy, 
ized  and  mixed  with  sweet  oil  and  applied  with  a  swab 
to  the  tongue;  and  still  another,   common   salt  crisped 
on  a  hot  shovel  and  applied  to  the  feet  and  mouth. 

Prevention :     Give  the  horses  all  the  salt  they  can    Prevention, 
eat. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  29,  Part  II,  p.  419.) 

From  February  27th  to  March  28th,  1865,  Sheri 
dan,  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  marched  from  Win 
chester  to  Petersburg.  He  says :  "There  perhaps  never 
was  a  march  where  nature  offered  such  impediments  and 
shrouded  herself  in  so  much  gloom  as  upon  this;  inces 
sant  rain,  deep  and  almost  impassable  streams,  swamps 
and  mud  were  overcome. 

"Our  loss  in  horses  was  considerable — almost  en-    LOSS  from  hoof- 
tirely  from  hoof-rot." 

Ext.  No.   432. — A  troublesome  disease,  known  as    Grease-heei. 
"grease  heel,"  had  prevailed  among  the  horses,  and  the 
number  of  men  for  duty  in  this  brigade  had  been  re 
duced  to  less  than  1,000. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  169.) 

Ext.  No.  433. — The  hardships  of  the  expedition  had 
been  so  extreme  and  prolonged  that  it  had  perceptibly 
affected  them,  leaving  them  jaded  and  footsore.     Many 
also  were  now  taken  with  the  "scours"   and  "cramp,"    scours, 
which  proved  so  fatal  in  a  few  moments  that  of  the  550    CrampB- 
with  which  the  command  reached  Rome,  not  more  than 
250  remained. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  279.) 

Ext.  No.  434. — A  slip  of  old  blanket  made  into  a    HOW  to  keep 

,          .  <•    11  horses  from  get- 

bandage,   carefully  and  closely  rolled  around  the  legs,  ting  scratches. 

beginning  at  the  pastern,  will  save  every  horse's  heels 
from  scratches.     Four  such  strips,  warmed  and  dried  at 


166 

the  fire,  will  put  such  comfort  into  the  animal  as  to 
enable  him  to  go  through  a  mud  raid  unharmed.  The 
heels  and  pasterns  should  be  hand  rubbed  after  cleansing, 
and  a  little  grease  rubbed  in  now  and  then.  Such  a  plan 
will  save  the  whole  force  from  scratches  if  the  use  of 
bandages  is  combined  therewith.  (P.  39.) 

Dry  quarters  will  save  your  horses  from  scratches. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  54.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  disease  called  hoof-rot  amounted,  at  times,  to 
an  epidemic.  It  comes  from  constantly  standing  in  the 
mud.  It  was  common  in  the  cavalry  camp  at  Huntsville, 
Ala.,  in  1898.  The  prevention  is  to  stand  the  horse  in 
a  dry  place  and  bandage  their  pasterns  with  flannel  ban 
dages.  (Ext.  434.)  The  cure  is  very  difficult. 

The  scours  and  cramps  which  proved  so  fatal  to 
Forrest's  horses  seemed  to  be  very  rare.  (Ext.  433.) 

LED   HORSES. 

Led  horses          Ext.   No.  435.  —  The  confusion  occasioned  by  get- 

causes  confusion  ,  .  <  i  r   1     1    1  1^-111 

to  troops  in  rear,  ting  a  large  number  of  led  horses  hastily  back  on  one 


'  road  was  communicated  to  the  men  and  caused  the  men 
to  break  badly. 

(Col.  G.  H.  Chapman,  Comg.  2d  Brig.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
36,  Part  I,  p.  897.) 

in  an  assault          ^xt>  ^To>  ^^'  —  Lieut.   Col.  Briggs  deserves  great 
man7  shoui^be  credit  f  or  his  efforts  to  bring  every  man  possible  into 
Fngiine°  the  fir"  action,  leaving  only  one  man  in  eight  with  horses. 
Apises/1*"          (Col«  A-  °-  Miller,  Comg.  Brig.,   R.  R.,   Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  448.) 

This  extract  refers  to  the  assault  of  Selma,  Ala., 
by  dismounted  cavalry. 

Led   horses          ^xt>  ^°'  ^  '  —  ^n  t^ie  attac^  on  Selma,  Ala.,  April 

fmendtedbyareg~2d>    1865>   the  led   horses   and   pack   mules   of   General 

2Si86?a'Ala''Apr'  Long's   division   were   guarded  by   a   regiment,   the  3d 

Ohio.     They  were  found  necessary  to  keep  off  the  Con 

federate  cavalry,  which  was  attacking  them  in  rear. 

(Col.  Robt.  Minty,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  461.) 


167 

(Brig.  Genl.  Eli  Long,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
438.) 

Ext.  No.  438.  —  So  closely  did  the  enemy  press  my    when    dis- 

j  r   ,1  .     mounted  cavalry 

command  many  of  the  men  were  unable  to  mount  their  br  eats,  press 

.  .  them  closely. 

horses;  the  enemy,  capturing  and  mounting-  the  horses,    stoneman's  raid 

j,         i  .  July  27,-Ang.  6, 

repeatedly  charged  my  rear  as  I  continued  to  retreat.      1864- 
(Col.  H.  Capron,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part  II,  p,  927.) 
Ext.  No.  439.  —  Gregg  decided  to  retreat  when  he    in  a  retreat  the 

got  all  his  led  horses  fairly  on  the  way,  and  such  of  sent  aSSS  with 

,     ,  ,  ,    ,  .    the  wounded. 

the  wounded  as  could  be  transported,  he  retired  by  his  A11  wounded 
right  flank—  in  some  confusion,  it  is  true,  but  stubbornly  S5??deBhSuid  bl 
resisting—  to  Hopewell  Church,  where  Hampton  ceased  TaiC^c'ross 
to  press  him.  ?20aid8SkVa"  Jnne 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  p.  435,  Vol.  I.) 

Ext.  440.  —  The  rebel  brigade  came  at  double  quick  when  mount- 
up  the  hollow,  colors  in  front,  and  in  another  instant  an%avyefirefil?s 
was  in  line  of  battle.  Three  hundred  Spencers  from  thethe  command 

0  mounted    under 

zd  Iowa  drove  them  back  in  confusion  ;  but  a  moment,  fSSS^SSd00" 
however,  intervened  when  the  rebels  rallied.  Major  Hor-  One  battalion 
ton  in  the  meantime  retired  and  mounted,  by  battalions,  &*  "hi  TthSrs 
under  fire,  leaving  one  officer  and  five  men  wounded  on  withdrawal*1 

the  field  Campbellsville, 

me  neia.  Tenn  Nov  24>  ,64; 

(Col.  D.  E.  Coon,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I,  p.  588.) 
Ext.  No.  441.  —  Wheeling  with  his  escort  (about  75    A  sudden  dash 

.  into  a  battery 

men)  and  a  detachment  of  some  50  strong,  the  Conf  ed-  f°aj£e08 
erate  commander   now  made   one  of   his   characteristic 


dashes  at  their  pieces,  dispersed  their  gunners  and  threw  Rop^rsk^nsn 
their  infanty  support  into  such  confusion  as  to  materially  30>  1862' 
aid  his  command  at  the  moment  to  regain  and  mount 
their  horses. 

(Campaigns  of  Forrest  and  of  Forrest's  Cavalry, 
p.  214.) 


COMMENTS. 


If  a  large  number  of  led  horses  go  back  on  one 
road,  much  confusion  will  result.  (Ext.  435.)  It  will 
often  happen  that  there  is  no  other  road  over  which  they 
can  travel.  If  possible,  led  horses  should  be  in  rear  of 


168 

the  units  to  which  they  belong  and  maintain  that  relative 
position. 

When  horses  do  not  need  to  be  moved,  they  can  be 
tied  in  a  circle,  and  thus  bring  more  men  into  the  fight. 
(Ext.  436.) 

A  guard  should  always  be  left  with  the  led  horses. 
(Ext.  437.) 

Extract  438  cites  a  case  of  led  horses  being  cap 
tured,  mounted  and  used  to  charge  their  former  riders. 

When  a  retreat  is  decided  upon,  the  led  horses  may 
be  sent  to  the  rear  with  the  wounded.  (Ext.  439.) 

Dismounted  troops  may  regain  their  led  horses 
under  cover  of  a  vigorous  attack.  (Exts.  440,  441.) 

value  of  being  Ext.  No.  442.—*  *  *  through  which  flows  a 
]umpfngehorse.  a  little  stream  whose  steep  banks  form  a  ditch  from  ten  to 
jun?8o!i863.'Pa''  fifteen  feet  wide  and  from  three  to  four  feet  deep. 
Stuart,  with  his  staff  and  couriers,  occupied  this  field 
on  the  side  next  the  enemy.  The  position  soon  became 
one  of  extreme  peril  to  Stuart,  whose  retreat  by  the 
road  was  cut  off.  Nothing  remained  but  to  leap  the 
ditch.  Splendidly  mounted  on  his  favorite  mare,  Vir 
ginia,  Stuart  took  the  ditch  at  a  running  leap  and  landed 
safely  on  the  other  side  with  several  feet  to  spare.  Some 
of  the  party  made  the  leap  with  equal  success,  but  a  few 
failed  and  landed  their  riders  in  the  shallow  water, 
wrhence  by  energetic  scrambling  they  reached  the  safe 
side  of  the  stream. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  328.) 

pact  trains          Ext.   No.   443.  —  I  directed  McCook  to   strengthen 
roE  the  battalion  previously  ordered  to  Centerville  by  a  regi- 


therefore  ma-  „,  ,  .         ,     . 

chine  guns  on  me  nt  and  to  follow  at  once  with  LaGrange  s  entire  bn- 

packs  cannot  •  i       i 

cavli?yu  making  £acle>  leaving  all  pack  trains  and  wagons  with  the  main 
a  forced  march    coiumn   so  that  he  could  march  with  the  utmost  celerity. 

Wilson  s    Raid,  T 

Mar,APr.,i865.  (Mzj.  Genl   j    H    Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 

p.  358.) 


169 

Ext.  No.  444. — I  found  it  necessary  to  retreat.     I     Mules    as 
immediately  gave  the  command :    "  fours,  right  about,  mJonTsborongii 
gallop,  march."     This  movement,  owing  to  the  narrow- Ga'  Augl 81' 1864> 
ness  of  the  lane  and  the  many  obstinate  mules  on  which 
one-fourth  of  the  men  were  mounted,  was  executed  with 
some  confusion. 

(Capt.   M.  Choumee,  Comg.  5th  la.  Cav.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  38.,  Part  II,  p.  873.) 


170 


CHAPTER  XL 


MISCELLANEOUS  INTERESTING  FACTS. 


Artillery  team          Ext.  No.  445. — Seeing  our  force  so  small,  a  bat- 

disabled     by 

K>?6e!ng   wheel  tanon  °f  tne  enemy  formed  and  advanced  to  retake  the 
TeMcNutt's Bridge,  guns.     A  horse  in  each  wheel  team  was  shot  to  hinder 
his  moving  them. 

(Col.  O.  H.  LaGrange,  R.  R.,  Vol.  32,  Part  I,  p. 
144.) 

See  also  Ext.  119. 
Killing  of  lead          Ext.  No.  446. — Before  the  guns  could  be  moved,  the 

and  swing  horses    ,    .  ,    ,  r      1        1        1 

does  not  prevent  drivers  and  horses  of  the  lead  and  swing  teams  were 

the  gun  from  be-      . 

ing  moved.         killed  or  wounded,  and  Ryan,  the  driver  of  the  wheel 

May  e,  1864.       ''team,    had   his   arm   shattered   by    a   bullet.      Breathed 

jumped  from  his  horse,  cut  loose  the  teams  that  were 

struggling  on  the  ground,  mounted  a  wheel  horse,  and 

brought  off  the  gun  almost  as  by  a  miracle. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  408.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  foregoing  extracts  go  to  show  that  the  best 
way  to  stop  an  artillery  team  is  to  kill  a  wheel  horse. 
Model  canton-          Ext.   No.  447. — The  plan  of  that  constructed  by 
bison's  Raid  General  Hammond  and  afterwards  occupied  by  Upton's 
Mar.-Apr.,  1865.    divjsion  j  regard  the  best  arrangement  of  a  cavalry  can 
tonment  yet  devised. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  355.)  " 


171 


172 


astt  Yards 

£}  oa  DO  oa  oa  DO  o 
a  DO  DO  oa  oa  DO  D 

sO  DO  DO-,Da  DO  DO  D 
^Q  DO  DO  DO  DO  DO  D 

-a  DO  DO  DO  Da  DO  D 
43  DO  DO  oa  DO  oa  D 


a  oa  oa  DO 

a  D-D  DO  DO 

a  oa  Da^oa 

a  oa  Da°Da 

a  DO  DO  oa 

a  DO  DO  DO 


DO  oa  D 
DO  oa  D 
DO  oa  o 
DO  DO  D 
DO  oa  D 

OO  DO  D 


to  oo  oo  oo  oo  oo  o  o  oo  oo  QQ  oo  oo  o 

H  ?« 

Waterloo  and  CrieallvaTn's  Ferry  Road 


O  DO  DC  DO  DO  DO  O 

a  oa  DO  Da  oa  oa  o 

o  DO  DO-DO  oa  oa  o 

CD  DO  oa^oa  oa  DO  o 

a  oa  DO  DO  DO  DO  D 

a  DQ  DO  DO  DO  oa  o 


a  oo  oo  oo  oo  oo  o 

a 


Plan  of  the  Cantonment  of  the  1st  Brigade,  7th  Division,  Cavalry  Corps,  Military  Divi 
sion  of  the  Mississippi,  at  Gravelly  Springs,  Ala.,  in  January  and  February,  1865.  Accom 
panying  report  of  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen.  J.  H.  "Wilson,  U.  S.  A.,  June  29, 1865. 


NOTE  : 

A.  End  Elevation  of  Stables. 

B.  Side  Elevation  of  Stables. 

C.  Side  Elevation  of  Cabins. 

D.  Front  Elevation  of  Cabins. 

E.  Plan  of  Cabins. 

F.  Stables. 

G.  Men's  Quarters. 

H.  Regimental  Headquarters. 

I.  Brigade  Headquarters. 


NOTE  : 

a.  Table. 

b.  Bunks. 

c.  Chimnej'  and  Fireplace. 

d.  Door. 

e.  Vacant  place  to  sit. 

Figures  denote  the  dimensions  in  feet 
and  inches. 


Treatment    of          Ext.   No.  448. — The  enemy  made  a  forced  march 

civilians  when  . 

secrecy  is  desired.  of  35  miles  on  the  3d  instant,  and  picked  up  on  their 
way  all  persons  who  might  give  information  of   their 
approach.    An  important  scout  was  captured  twelve  miles 
from  the  post,  and  the  enemy  avoided  my  infantry  pick 
ets  near  the  town  and  in  advance  of  the  bridge  by  dis 
mounting  and   moving  through   the   fields   with    negro 
Poor  outpost  guides.      Their   sudden   and    unexpected   appearance   at 
capture  of  TUS-  the   bridge    and    overwhelming   numbers   dispersed   the 

caloosa,  Ala.,  Apr.  .    .     '  . 

4,1865.  militia  guard  after  but  a  faint  show  of  resistance. 

(Capt.  A.  B.  Hardcastle,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part 
I,  p.  505.) 


173 

OOLOB8. 

Ext.  No   449. — We  missed  the  colors,  taken  to>  the    colors  neces 
sary  to  rally  reg- 

states  by  the  men  discharged,  to  rally  the  regiment  on,  iment  on. 

Cedar  Creek,Va., 

more  in  this  engagement  than  at  any  other  time  since  NOV.  12,  ISM. 
on  account  of  the  small  number  of  officers  present. 

(Maj.  W.  G.  Cummings,  1st  Vt.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
43,  Parti,  p.  549.) 

(See  also  "A  Summer  Night's  Dream.") 

Ext.  No.  450. — In  our  own  cavalry  sets,  at  the  com-  u?e  of  lariats 
mencement  of  the  war  lariat  ropes  were  issued  with  iron 
picket  pins.  These  were  soon  disused.  Their  intention 
was  to  confine  the  horse  at  night  and  permit  him  to 
graze  while  tethered.  In  practice  it  was  found  that  the 
horses  were  certain  to  get  entangled  in  the  ropes  and 
cut  their  hind  pasterns  very  dangerously. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  66.) 

AN    EXPLOIT. 

Ext.  No.  451. — At  about  3:00  A.  M.  February  21,    Lieut.  McNeil 
1865,    Lieutenant    McNeill,    Confederate   cavalry,    with  Federal  generals 

J  without  firing  a 

thirty  men,  entered  Cumberland,  Maryland.     They  cap-  an0ta?arrmreating 
tured  the  picket  and  rode  quietly  to  the  headquarters    Cumberland, 

Md.,  Fed.  21, 1865. 

of  Generals  Crook  and  Kelley,  overpowered  the  guards, 
and  without  disturbing  the  occupants  of  the  adjoining 
rooms,  compelled  the  generals  to  dress  and  mount  led 
horses  waiting  at  the  door  and  made  off  at  a  rapid  rate, 
making  good  the  capture  and  escape  without  firing  a 
shot.  The  alarm  was  not  given  for  ten  minutes  and  it 
was  an  hour  before  a  pursuing  party  could  be  started. 

(R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I,  pp.  469  and  470.) 

Ext.  No.  452. — About  thirteen  miles  from  Macon  I    Treatment    of 
was  met  by  a  flag  of  truce  under  the  rebel  general,  Rob-    Wilson's  Raid, 

-PU      £  '  j   *i        n  r  Apr.  20, 1865. 

ertson.  Ihe  force  we  were  pursuing  passed  the  flag  of 
truce  and  thus  saved  themselves.  The  flag  of  truce  de 
tained  us  about  half  an  hour.  I  then  received  orders  to 
give  them  five  minutes  to  get  out  of  the  way,  and  then 
to  drive  everything  before  me.  After  going  about  two 
miles  he  came  in  sight  of  the  flag  of  truce  party  covering 
the  rear  of  about  250  men.  They  were  moving  very 


174 

slowly  and  evidently  trying  to  delay  us.  Seeing  this, 
the  adjutant  charged  them,  causing  the  flag  of  truce  to 
run  into  the  woods,  capturing  three  of  the  officers  that 
were  with  it  and  driving  the  rebels  pell-mell  along  the 
road. 

(Lieut.  Col.  F.  White,  17th  Ind.  Mtd.  Inf.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  458.) 

FOBAGING — HOW    DONE. 

HOW  to  collect          Ext.   No.  453. — The  only  proper  people  to  attend 

and  distribute  J  L 

forage.  to   foraging  parties  are  officers   of  the  quartermaster's 

department.  They  ought  to  be  made  to  attend  to  it  the 
same  as  regular  issues,  the  corps  quartermaster  mapping 
out  the  ground  for  his  division  quartermasters,  who, 
in  turn,  assign  to  each  brigade  its  foraging  ground.  All 
forage  should  be  collected  and  issued  by  the  brigade  and 
regimental  quartermasters  proportionately  and  justly. 
The  best  way  is  to  impress  wheeled  vehicles  of  the 
country  into  the  service  and  forbid  the  carriage  of  grain 
on  the  horses.  The  quartermasters  can  then  keep  the 
grain  more  easily  under  their  own  control,  and  six  or 
seven  times  as  much  can  be  brought  in  for  distribu 
tion  without  any  distress  to  the  horses. 

(See  also  Forage  under  heading  of  "Supplies.") 
(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  65.) 
safeguards.  Ext.  No.  454. — Safeguards  should  in  all  cases  be 

left  at  houses  that  have  supplied  the  troops  to  protect 
them  from  future  pillage. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  65.) 

Marching  cav-          Ext-    No-   455.— Next  morning  I   was  ordered  to 
Sov«?  venrfyanerxy  move  my  division  dismounted,  and  did  so,  marching  the 

ftmOttw     to  men  about  two  miles>  and  as  there  was  S0me  change  in 
l5S?i8w.iss"Jttly  the  orders  about  our  position  after  we  came  upon  the 
field,    there    was    consequently    marching   and    counter 
marching,  which  proved  very  exhausting  to  men  unac 
customed  to  marching  on  foot. 

(Brig.   Genl.  J.   R.   Chalmers,  C.   S.,  of  Forrest's 
cavalry,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part  I,  p.  326. 


175 

Ext.   No.    456.  —  And   so  at  last  our  cavalry  was    Advantages  of 
gathered  together  from  its  places  of  contempt  and  banded  organized  into*! 
together  in   one  corps,   as   it   should   be.      Its   progress 
from  that  moment  was  positively  marvelous.     Not  a  dis 
aster  befel  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
the  day  it  was  first  drawn  into  the  cavalry  corps.     It 
went  on  from  victory  to  victory. 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  24.) 

Ext.    No.    457.  —  Any   scheme    of   military    service    cavalry  should 

not  be  at  a  peace 


. 

which   requires  long  drilling  and  costly  preparation  i 
eminently  unfitted  for  the  United  States.  \?£™s  a11  the 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  27.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  extracts  referring  to  organization  are  very  few, 
but  very  important.  The  lessons  illustrated  should  not 
be  forgotten.  At  the  time  Sheridan  took  charge  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  picketing 
an  infantry  camp  on  a  line  of  60  miles  and  guarding 
wagon  trains.  Although  the  Confederate  cavalry  had 
been  an  object  lesson  for  three  years,  not  much  was 
learned  from  the  lesson  till  Sheridan,  with  Grant's  sup 
port,  was  enabled  to  break  away  from  the  established 
custom  of  using  cavalry  as  above  described. 

Extract  457  is  very  short,  but  Captain  Whittaker 
might  have  written  a  book  and  not  have  said  more. 
In  substance  it  means  that  a  peace  organization  which 
is  to  be  increased  in  time  of  war  is  to  be  condemned. 
No  system  could  be  more  vicious.  It  was  tried  out  in 
the  Spanish  war,  and  conclusively  demonstrated  that  cav 
alry  in  time  of  peace  should  be  at  its  war  strength.  Any 
inflation  except  by  trained  men  will  operate  as  a  complete 
block  to  its  effectiveness.  At  the  beginning  cavalry  will 
be  needed  badly  or  not  at  all.  The  principle  is  supported 
by  such  eminent  authority  as  Von  Bernhardi  and  others. 

Ext.  No.  458.—  The  transfer  of  Torbert  to  the  po-    cavalry  need. 
sition  of  Chief  of  Cavalry  left  Merritt  in  command  of  1™<3SC™°* 
the  First  Cavalry  Division.     He  had  been  tried  in  the 


176 


place  before,  and  from  the  day  he  was  selected  as  one 
of  the  young  men  to  be  appointed  general  officers,  with 
the  object  of  giving  life  to  the  cavalry  corps,  he  filled 
the  measure  of  expectation. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  p.  474,  Vol.  I.) 

PRISONERS. 

strength  of  a          Ext.  No.  459. — March  3d  to  8th,   1865,  Sheridan 

guard  of  convoy 

ni8ptiie0cnoeuntrn  a  sent  Prisoners  captured  at  Waynesborough,  under  con- 

shenandoah  voy  commanded  by  Col.  John  L.  Thompson,  N.  H.  Cav., 

i865.ey  '  to  Winchester,  number  of  prisoners  l,3oo.     The  escort 

consisted  of  dismounted  men  and  those  with  poor  horses 

from  all  the  cavalry,  about  600  men,  together  with  seven 

small  organizations  numbering  600  men  in  all  ranks. 

The  march  was  through  a  hostile  country  infested 
by  Rosser's  and  Mosby's  men. 

The  strength  of  the  guard  was  about  one  soldier 
to  one  prisoner. 

(Col.  J.  L.  Thompson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  46,  Part  I,  p. 
528.) 

Advance  troopi          Ext.  No.  460. — We  had  no  men  to  spare  to  guard 

leave  prisoners  to        .  , 

be  gathered  up  prisoners,  and  they  were  ordered  to  the  rear  as  fast  as 

by  other   troops 

in  rear.  captured,  and  were  gathered  up  bv  parties  of  our  own 

Selma,  Ala.,         ,      ^ 

Apr.  2, 1865.        and  other  commands. 

(Col.  J.  G.  Vail,  17th  Ind.,  R.  R,  Vol.  49,  Part  I, 
p.  450.) 

command  not          Ext.  No.  461. — I  moved  forward  as  fast  as  possible 

prisoners.          toward  the  city,  passing  squads  of  the  enemy  who  had 

Apr.  2, 1865.      ''  thrown  away  their  arms,  and  whom  I  ordered  to  the  rear, 

but  on  account  of  the  paucity  of  my  command  I  could 

not  spare  men  to  guard  them. 

(Lieut.  Col.  E.  Kitchell,  98th  111.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  452.) 
victorious          Ext.  No.  462. — Here  the  column  turned  to  the  right 

troops  pay  no  at 
tention  to  prison-  and  at  the  double-quick  moved  down  the  line  of  entrench- 

Columbus,  Ga.,  ments  on  the  principal  fort,  running  over  scores  of  the 

Apr.  16, 1865. 

enemy  and  paying  no  attention  to  prisoners.  (Lieut.  Col. 
J.  H.  Peters,  4th  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p. 
498.) 


177 

Ext.  No.  463. — The  capture  of  prisoners  was  com-  prisoners ignor- 
pletely  ignored  in  the  eagerness  of  the  men  to  press  Inem?  stniihoJS 
forward  so  long  as  there  was  an  enemy  still  showing  re-  EbeneezeTchnrch 
sistance.  Aia.,  Apr.  i,  1865. ' 

(Col.  J.  Morris  Young,  5th  la.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Parti,  p.  503.) 

COMMENTS. 

Where  there  is  little  danger  of  prisoners  becoming 
organized  to  offer  effective  resistance,  no  attention  should 
be  paid  to  them  by  advanced  troops. 

It  is  true  that  troops  in  rear  will  gather  them;  up 
and  claim  the  honors,  but  advanced  troops  will  have  to 
suffer  the  injustice  rather  than  fail  to  administer  a  de 
cisive  defeat  to  the  enemy.  To  deplete  the  advanced 
victorious  troops  of  men  to  guard  prisoners  would  be  to 
relinquish  the  fruits  of  victory.  (Exts.  460,  461,  462.) 
The  advanced  troops  should  press  forward  as  long  as 
there  is  an  enemy  still  to  show  resistance.  (Ext  463.) 

Ext.  No.  464. — I  attempted  to  fall  back  upon  the    Recruits  are 

.  f  not  to  be  depend- 

support  above  referred  to,  but  finding  this  in  full  retreat, ed  on- 

the  regiment  was  swept  to  the  lines  of  the  First  Brigade,  naee,nva.!aocta7", 

nearly  two  miles,  without  being  able  to  offer  any  effectual 

resistance.      It   will  be  borne  in  mind   that   I   had    150 

recruits  in  ranks  that  never  before  had   drilled  a  day 

or  heard  a  shot  in  earnest. 

(Lieut.  Col.  J.  W.  Bennett,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  545.) 

COMMENTS. 

The  commander  who  depends  on  recruits  will  lean 
on  a  broken  reed.  They  are  useful  only  at  their  own 
fireside,  which  they  will  fight  to  defend.  Even  then 
they  are  useful  only  on  the  defensive. 

Ext.  No.  465. — In  sending  re-enforcements  into  the 
field  Heaven  grant  that  they  may  not  be  organized  into 
fresh  regiments,  as  they  were  at  ruinous  and  suicidal 
costs  in  1864.  Sent  as  recruits  to  fill  up  gaps  of  the 
veterans,  such  men  pick  up  their  duty  in  a  very  short 
time  under  the  teaching's  of  their  comrades. 


178 

(Volunteer  Cavalry,  Lessons  of  the  Decade,  p.  32.) 
Recall  gives          Ext.  No.  466. — Col.  La  Grange,  rinding  the  enemy 

notice   to   the 

of  a  re-  massing  heavily  upon  him,  ordered  the  recall  sounded. 
Ma ta9~  ^e  enemy  becoming  aware  of  our  situation,  rushed  for- 
1864>  ward  in  overwhelming  numbers,  capturing  many  of  the 

dismounted  skirmishers  and  driving  the  remainder  in 
confusion  to  the  woods. 

(Lieut.  Col.  H.  P.  Lamson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  38,  Part 
II,  p.  781.) 

COMMENTS. 

Trumpet  calls  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  only 
serve  to  give  them  notice  of  intended  movements.  The 
value  of  trumpet  calls  may  well  be  questioned.  If  they 
cannot  be  used  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  of  what 
good  are  they  in  time  of  peace?  There  are  a  few  that 
it  will  make  no  difference  whether  the  enemy  knows  or 
does  not  know,  such  as  the  charge.  The  enemy  can  see 
the  charge,  and  it  will  make  no  difference  if  he  does 
hear  the  call.  Such  calls,  however,  as  the  recall,  to  the 
rear,  assemble,  by  the  flank,  etc.,  might  as  well  be  dis 
pensed  with. 

RUSE   OK   STRATAGEM. 

A  ruse.  Ext.  No.  467. — In  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  still 

Jam?s! jSA'K  more,  I  sent  during  the  night  one  of  my  divisions  to  the 
opposite  side  of  the  James,  first  covering  the  bridge  with 
moss  and  grass  to  prevent  the  tramp  of  the  horses  being 
heard,  and  at  daylight  marched  it  back  again  on  foot 
in  full  view  of  the  enemy,  creating  the  impression  that  a 
large  and  continuous  movement  to  the  north  side  was 
still  going  on. 

(Maj.  Gen.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  800.) 

Aruse  Ext.    No.    468. — During   Grierson's    raid,    Captain 

Grierson's  Raid,  Forbes  with  Co.   C,    1st   111.   Cav.,   was   detached.     He 

Apr.  17,-May  2,  bo.  , 

later  reached  Enterprise  in  an  effort  to  rejoin  Gnerson  s 
command.  Here  he  found  2,000  rebels  just  getting  off 
the  cars.  He  promptly  raised  a  flag  of  truce  and  rode 
boldly  forward  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  place 


179 

to  Colonel  Grierson.  The  rebel  officer,  Colonel  Good 
win,  asked  one  hour  to  consider  the  proposition,  which 
was  granted.  Captain  Forbes  then  moved  out  of  sight 
and  then  moved  off  after  Colonel  Grierson  with  all  pos 
sible  speed. 

(History  of  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Brackett,  p.  296.) 

Ext.   No.  469. — Fortunately  Young  had  with  him    A  ruse, 
a  regimental  band ;  this  he  moved  rapidly  from  point  to  pafg", Vet  ei863m" 
point  in  rear,  and  by  its  music  tended  to  exaggerate  in 
the  enemy's  estimation  the  force  at  his  disposition. 

(Life  and  Campaigns  of  Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
p.  384.) 

BOUT— PANIC. 

Ext.  No.  470. — The  enemy's  retreat  finally  became    Rout.  Panic, 
a  rout;  led  horses,  mounted  men  and  artillery  all  fled  gre\TlScutioen 
together  in  the  wildest  confusion.     Williston,  with  hisE>rn00rps.treatiIlg 
battery,  took  position  near  by  and  did  elegant  practice  tJn*va"ajuneii', 
with  his  guns,  planting  shells  in  the  midst  of  the  con-181 
fused  mass  of  the  retreating  enemy. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part 
I,  p.  850.) 

Ext.  No.  471. — In  this  attack  the  enemy  was  driven    cavalry  when 

.  ..  .  defeated  in  front 

in  confusion  from  his  position  and  simultaneous  with  of  infantry,  com- 

mn  n  i  cat ea  its 

it,  Merritt  and  Averill,  under  Torbert,  could  be  distinctly  ggjgjj"  to  the 
seen  sweeping  up  the  Martinsburg  pike,  driving  the  en~  V{J>pesqeu  t"^^' 
emy's  cavalry  before  them  in  a  confused  mass  through 
the  broken  infantry. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  47.) 

Ext.  No.  472. — I  found  it  impossible  to  rally  the    Defeated  troops 

~,  ,.  seized   with   a 

troops.     They  would  not  listen  to  entreaties,  threats  orgerat   terror  of 

the  enemy's  cav- 

appeals  of  any  kind.     A  terror  of  the  enemy  s  cavalry  alry. 

,  ,.  ^  Cedar    Creek, 

had  seized  them  and  there  was  no  holding  them.     They  va.,oct,  19,1864. 
fled  in  the  greatest  confusion. 

(Lieut.  Genl.  J.  A.  Early,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43, 
Part  I,  p.  562.) 


180 

COMMENTS. 

The  psychology  of  the  battle  field  is  a  subject  which 
is  receiving  much  consideration.  The  commander  who 
can  utilize  it  to  its  fullest  extent  will  have  a  great  ad 
vantage  over  one  who  cannot. 

In  time  of  panic  cavalry  will  certainly  fill  a  defeated 
enemy  with  terror.  (Ext.  472.)  Then  will  be  the  time 
to  reap  the  reward  in  trophies  and  prisoners.  (Ext. 
471.) 

Macademized          Ext.    No.   473.  —  The   roads  macadamized   and  the 
SpMvairy  witn°-  cavalry  unprovided  with  horseshoes,  and  being  compelled 

out  shoes.  J  •   1  1        T     r  J 

Shenandoahto  subsist  mostly  on  young  grass  without  salt,  1  found 
May-7une\mfflgn'  my  -command    in   a   most   deplorable   condition.      Our 
work  had  been  eternal,  day  and  night.     We  were  under 
fire  twenty-six  days  out  of  thirty. 

(Col.  T.  T.  Munford,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12,  Part  I, 
p.  733.) 
soldiers  sleep          Ext.  No.  474.  —  I  allowed  the  men  to  sleep  on  their 

on    the    ground  .  .  •«« 

holding  bridles,  arms,  which  for  our  arm  of  the  service  means   to  he 


-  upon   the  ground,   holding  the  bridle,   and   keeping  in 
readiness  to  leap  into  the  saddle  at  a  moment's  notice. 
(Col.  E.  B.  Sawyer,  1st  Vt.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  29, 
Part  I,  p.  393.) 

stragglers   get          Ext.  No.  475.  —  A  party  of  foragers  sent  out  from 
Expedition  to  the  1st  Miss,  lost  two  of  their  men  who  straggled  from 

Oxford,     Miss., 

Aug.  6,1864.        the  column. 

(Lieut.  Col.  J.  C.  Hess,  R.  R.,  Vol.  39,  Part  I,  p. 
393-) 
Guerillas  pre-          Ext.  No.  476.  —  During  this  campaign  I  was  at  times 

Ind\ese?!mlnl  annoyed  by  guerrilla  bands;  the  most  formidable  was 
under  a  partisan  chief  named  Mosby,  who  made  his 
headquarters  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  in  the  section  of 
the  country  about  Upperville.  I  had  constantly  refused 
to  operate  against  these  bands,  believing  them  to  be,  sub 
stantially,  a  benefit  to  me,  as  they  prevented  straggling 
and  kept  my  trains  well  closed  up,  and  discharged  such 
other  duties  as  would  have  required  a  provost  guard  of 
at  least  two  regiments  of  cavalry. 


181 

(Maj.  Gen.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I 
p.  55.) 

Ext.  No.  477.—  July  9,  Colonel  N.  P.  Richmond 
was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  brigade,  and  the 
regiment,  by  order,  went  to  Frederick  City,  Md.,  for 
the  purpose  of  doing  provost  duty  and  arresting  all 
stragglers,  and  to  form  a  stragglers'  camp. 

(Maj.  C.  E.  Capehart,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p. 
1020,  After  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg.) 


COMMENTS. 


Some  patriotic  Americans  think  that  we  are  so 
brave  that  straggling  as  an  item  can  be  ignored.  The 
records  show  just  the  contrary.  After  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  a  stragglers'  camp  had  to  be  established  to 
collect  the  skulkers.  (Ext.  477.) 


MOBALE. 


Ext.  No.  478.—  I  was  ordered  to  support  Custer's 
brigade.  *  *  *  As  soon  as  the  enemy  opened  his  guns 
upon  General  Custer,  the  latter  charged  with  his  brigade,  *  Yell°w 
mostly  mounted.  In  pursuance  to  my  instructions,  Chap 
man  with  his  brigade  charged  at  the  same  time.  *  *  * 
The  charge  was  entirely  successful.  *  *  *  It  was  in 
this  charge  and  the  melee  which  followed  that  the  rebel 
cavalry  leader,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  was  killed,  and  from  it 
may  be  dated  the  permanent  superiority  of  the  national 
cavalry  over  that  of  the  rebels. 

(Brig.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part  I, 
p.  879.     Yellow  Tavern,  May  11,  1864.) 

Ext.  No.  479.  —  Under  gallant  leaders  your  cavalry   Federai 
has  become  the  efficient  arm  in  this  war  that  it  has  proved  Gob™*  e6a  S  e°rd 
in  other  countries,  and  is  winning  by  its  exploits  the^e 
admiration  of  the  government  and  the  country.  i8a64ley 

(Stanton  to  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I,  p.  62.) 

Ext.  No.  480.  —  Officers  and  men,  as  they  saw  the    Military  spirit 
sun  appear  bright  and  glorious  above  the  horizon,  felt  ex^mplified; 

upeqiion  trpen. 

a  consciousness  of  renewed  strength,  a  presentiment  of  Va->  Sept-  19-  1864- 
fresh  glory  to  be  added  that  day  to  their  already  unfad- 


cav- 
e°rds 


182 

ing  laurels.  They  felt  like  men  who  were  willing  to  do 
and  die;  that  they  were  not  deceived  the  history  of  the 
day  proves. 

(Brig.  Genl.  Wesley  Merritt,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part 
I,  p.  443.) 

superiority  in          Ext.  No.  481. — In  this  fight  I  had  already  defeated 

tuILTh^scr"16'  the  enemy's  infantry,  and  could  have  continued  to  do  so, 

va°pesep?  i9ri864  but  the  enemy's  great  superiority  in  cavalry  and  the  conv 

parative  inefficiency  of  ours  turned  the  scale  against  us. 

(Lieut.   Genl.  Jubal  A.   Early,  C.   S.,  R.   R.,  Vol. 

43,  Parti,  p.  555.) 


COMMENTS. 


Morale  plays  a  very  important  part  in  the  winning 
or  losing  of  a  battle.  Troops  that  feel  conscious  of  their 
superiority  are  difficult  to  defeat,  while  those  that  feel 
their  inferiority  are  half  defeated  at  the  beginning.  This 
feeling  of  inferiority  may  be  in  the  arms,  morale,  artil 
lery,  leadership  or  cavalry.  (Ext.  481.)  The  effect  of 
leadership  is  shown  in  extracts  478  and  479.  Troops 
conscious  of  their  superiority  are  mentioned  in  Extract 
480.  ! 

UNMOUNTED    CAVALRY. 

mounted  cavalry.          Ext.  No.  482.  —  In  obedience  to  orders,  I  took  com- 


mand  of  the  dismounted  (unmounted)  men  of  this 
division,  designated  as  the  Fourth  Brigade  Cavalry.  I 
organized  the  command  into  three  regiments,  the  men 
of  each  brigade  forming  a  regiment,  and  numbered  after 
their  respective  brigades  as  the  First,  Second  and  Third 
Regiments.  Each  regiment  was  formed  into  companies 
of  fifty  men  each,  with  one  commissioned  officer  and  the 
proper  number  of  non-commissioned  officers  to  each 
company. 

(Lieut.  Col.  Wm.  B.  Way,  9th  Mich.  Cav.,  R.  R., 
Vol.  47,  Part  I,  p.  902.) 
M™X'.8Bald'          (See  also  Vol.  49,  Part  I,  p.  356.) 


183 

Ext.   No.  483. — All  dismounted  cavalry  belonging    Unmounted 
to  the  army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  dismounted  cav- JJd-2a?°8r82 
airy  belonging  to  the  Middle  Military  Division  not  re-  pofnt.6  c 
quired  for  guarding  property  belonging  to  their  arm  of 
the  service  will  report  to  Brigadier  General  Benham  to 
be  used  in  the  defenses  of  City  Point. 

(Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  p.  128.) 

COMMENTS. 

Unmounted  cavalry  may  be  used  to  guard  wagon 
trains,  convoy  prisoners  (Ext.  459),  to  defend  important 
points,  as  infantry,  to  guard  property  belonging  to  their 
arm  of  the  service  (Ext.  483),  or,  better  yet,  as  Forrest 
used  them,  namely,  take  them  along  and  capture  mounts 
for  them. 

FRUITS  OF   VICTORY. 

Ext.  No.  484. — We  sent  to  the  War  Department    Fruits  of  vic- 
from  May  5,  1864,  to  April  9,   1865,  205  battle  flags tory>  Trophies' 
captured  in  the  open  field,   and   captured  between    160 
and  170  pieces  of  artillery. 

In  all  the  operations  the  percentage  of  cavalry  cas-    Percentage  of 

1  J  cavalry  losses. 

ualties  was  as  great  as  that  of  infantry,  and  the  ques 
tion  which  had  existed,  "Who  ever  saw  a  dead  cavalry 
man?"  was  set  at  rest. 

(Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  Report  of  Cavalry  Opera 
tions  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.) 

Ext.  No.  485. — The  part  that  I  expected  the  cav-    cavalry  fails  to 

i  ..   ,  -,-,.   «        .     -r-T'11  f    M  secure  the  fruits 

airy  to  accomplish  at  P  isher  s  Hill  was  a  complete  failure,  of  victory. 

I  have  relieved  Averill  from  his  command.     Instead  of  val ley  "campaign, 

following  the  enemy  when  he  was  broken  at  Fisher's 

Hill  so  that  there  was  not  a  cavalry  organization  left, 

he  went  into  camp  and  left  me  to  pursue  the  enemy  for 

a   distance   of   fifteen   miles   with    infantry   during   the 

night. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  29.) 

Ext.  No.  486. — When  I  attacked  the  enemy,  Mer-  Pursuitweii 
ritt  and  Custer,  under  the  direction  of  Torbert,  fiercely  ofevicto?y gather- 
attacked  the  enemy's  flanks  and  when  he  broke,  closed 


184 

cedar  creek,va.,  in  after  dark  and  secured  the  artillery,  trains,  etc. 

The  cavalry  pursuit  was  kept  up  to  a  point  between 
Edenburg  and  Mount  Jackson.  We  captured  fourteen 
battle  flags,  50  pieces  of  artillery,  1,600  prisoners,  ambu 
lances,  wagons  in  large  numbers,  etc. 

(Maj.  Genl.  P.  H.  Sheridan,  R.  R.,  Vol.  43,  Part  I, 
p.  33.  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek  or  Winchester.) 
Trophies  of  Ext.  No.  487.  —  During  and  after  the  Battle  of 
™a6hviiie,Teim.  N&shville.  'Stannary:  Captured  by  Hatch's  Division, 
2  redoubts,  17  guns,  2  battle  flags,  2  droves  of  beef  cat 
tle,  35  wagons  (including  the  headquarters  train  of  Chal 
mers'  Division),  one  brigadier  general  and  701  pris 
oners;  Knipe's  Division  —  5  battle  flags,  350  prisoners,  1 
piece  of  artillery  and  2  caissons;  Johnston's  Division  — 
56  prisoners;  Croxton  brigade,  184  prisoners;  4th  U.  S. 
cavalry  —  1  gun  and  25  prisoners.  In  addition,  John 
ston's  and  Knipe's  Divisions  should  be  credited  with  the 
wounded  taken  in  hospitals  at  Franklin,  2,000  men. 

Total,  2  redoubts,  19  guns,  7  battle  flags  and  3,316 
prisoners. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  H.  Wilson,  R.  R.,  Vol.  45,  Part  I, 
p.  554.) 

of  a          Ext.  No.  488.  —  Results  of  Wilson's  Selma  raid: 
eima          Twenty-two  colors,  210  pieces  of  artillery,  34,500 
£1*1866^'  22>  Apr<  stand  of  small  arms,  18  locomotives,  563  coal,  flat  and 
box  cars,  6,820  prisoners,  255,000  bales  of  cotton  de 
stroyed,  military  uniforms  and  supplies  too  numerous  to 
mention. 

(Provost  Marshal  C.  L.  Greeno,  R.  R.,  Vol.  49, 
Part  I,  p.  413.) 


COMMENTS. 


The  possibility  of  cavalry  at  the  time  of  a  general 
victory  is  here  well  illustrated.  A  dead  cavalryman  was 
at  last  discovered,  and  the  percentage  of  cavalry  losses 
was  as  great  as  that  of  infantry.  (Ext.  484.) 

The  cavalry  commander  who  puts  his  cavalry  in 
camp  at  time  of  a  general  victory  should  be  given  an 
other  job,  as  was  Averill.  (Ext.  485.) 


185 

There  will  be  times  when  cavalry  will  secure  a  great 
number  of  trophies  as  a  result  of  their  own  prowess.  In 
many  cases,  however,  they  reap  the  reward  of  a  victory 
brought  about  by  other  troops.  (Ext.  487.) 

WOUNDED. 

Ext.  No.  489. — Morgan  always  made  it  a  point  to      wounded 

—.  .,  1  1  1  r   1  t    should     not    be 

carry  off  every  wounded  man  who  could  be  safely  moved,  abandoned  to  the 
In  this  way  he  prevented  much  of  the  demoralization 
attending  the  men  felt  of  falling,  when  wounded,  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

(Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  Duke.) 

Ext.  No.  490. — It  was  very  soon  evident  that  the      wounded 

should  always  be 

force  of  the  enemy  was  superior  to  ours,  and  that  they  removed  if  possi- 
were  supported  by  infantry.     *     *     *     It  became  evi-    st.  Mary's 

.    Church,  Va.,  June 

dent  that  the  contest  was  too  unequal  to  maintain  it  '24> 186*- 
longer.  The  led  horses,  and  wounded  for  whom  there 
was  transportation,  and  caissons  were  started  on  the 
road  leading  to  Charles  City  Court  House,  8  miles  dis 
tance.  These  fairly  under  way,  our  division  began  to  re 
tire  by  the  right.  Our  men  continued  fighting  on  foot, 
but  were  mounted  from  time  to  time.  The  movement 
was  made  without  confusion  or  disorder. 

(Brig.  Genl.  D.  McM.  Gregg,  R.  R.,  Vol.  36,  Part 
I,  p.  856.) 

COMMENTS. 

Wounded  should  not  be  abandoned  to  the  enemy 
when  it  is  possible  to  remove  them.  Not  only  does  the 
abandonment  seriously  affect  the  morale,  but  such  of  the 
wounded  as  get  well  are  subject  to  exchange  as  prisoners 
of  war.  In  the  end,  then,  it  amounts  to  surrendering 
fighting  troops.  It  is  usually  the  case  that  wounded  can 
not  be  removed  from  the  firing  line,  but,  as  the  line  passes 
on,  the  wounded  should  be  removed  by  a  special  organ 
ization  as  soon  as  it  is  safe  to  do  so.  The  fighting  men 
should,  under  no  circumstances,  be  allowed  to  leave  the 
firing  line  to  assist  or  carry  wounded  to  the  rear. 


186 

Qualities  need-  Ext-  ^°'  491- — Jt  was  in  one  of  tnese  brilliant  en- 
commaudearvalry  gagements  that  the  noble  and  gallant  Farnsworth  fell, 
jiSy"?i8&3glP*"  heroically  leading  a  charge  of  his  brigade  against  the 
rebel  infantry.  Gifted  in  a  high  degree  with  a  quick 
perception  and  correct  judgment,  and  remarkable  for 
his  daring  and  coolness,  his  comprehensive  grasp  of  the 
situation  on  the  field  of  battle  and  the  rapidity  of  his 
actions  had  already  distinguished  General  Farnsworth 
among  his  comrades  in  arms.  In  his  death  was  closed  a 
career  that  must  have  won  the  highest  honors  of  his 
profession. 

(Genl.  A.  Pleasonton,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  I,  p. 
916.) 

what  to  do  Ext-  No-  492. — During  the  night  of  July  3,  the  con> 
*8  manding  general  withdrew  the  main  body  to  the  ridges 
' Pft"  west  of  Gettysburg  and  sent  word  to  me  to  that  effect, 
but  the  messenger  missed  me.  I  repaired  to  his  head 
quarters  during  the  latter  part  of  the  night  and  received 
instructions  as  to  the  new  line. 

(Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27,  Part  II,  p. 
699.) 

sleeping  in  the          Ext.  Nto.  493. — After  a  series  of  exciting  combats 
dttysi>urgCam.  and  night  marches,  it  was  a  severe  tax  on  their  endur- 
ain,  Jane,  1873.  ance.  whole  regiments  slept  jn  the  saddle;  their  faithful 

animals  keeping  the  road  unguided.  In  some  instances 
they  fell  from  their  horses,  overcome  with  physical  fa 
tigue  and  sleepiness. 

(Maj.  Genl.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  27, 
Part  II,  p.  696.) 

Ext.  No.  494. — Five  days  and  nights  of  constant 

JVl^n.    sleep    in. 

f™m  hoSel  ^  duty  in  the  saddle,  added  to  fourteen  days'  rapid  march- 
is™'  m£>  would  shake  even  the  most  robust  constitution.   Men 
fell   from  their  horses,  and  the  most  persistent  efforts 
of  their  officers  could  not  keep  them  awake. 

(Lieut.  Col.  F.  A.  Jones,  8th  Ind.  Cav.,  R.  R.,  Vol. 
38,  Part  II,  p.  875.) 


187 

Ext.  No.  495. — The  6th  Regiment  was  in  the  rear  Men  who  ride 
and  our  men  were  completely  worn  down  and  most  of  u0uvehrdays°wif£ 
them  sleeping  on  their  horses.  *  *  *  Many  of  the  fn  Ue°stddie.p  M 
men  were  nearly  exhausted  from  hunger  and  loss  of  VaSifey 
sleep.  We  had  been  in  the  saddle  and  had  no  regular1862' 
rations  for  three  days. 

(Col.  T.  T.  Munford,  C.  S.,  R.  R.,  Vol.  12,  Part  I, 
p.  730.) 

COMMENTS. 

It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  that  cavalry,  un 
der  exceptional  conditions,  is  going  to  sleep  in  the  saddle. 
A  saddle  for  this  purpose  must  have  a  high  cantle.  In 
the  combat  the  trooper  will  have  to  jump  ditches,  fences 
and  other  obstacles.  The  saddle  with  a  high  cantle  is 
not  adapted  to  this  use.  The  McClellan  tree  is  adapted 
to  the  former  rather  than  to  the  latter  purpose.  It  should 
be  modified  so  as  to  fulfill  all  the  conditions  of  combat, 
rather  than  those  of  sleep,  which  are  to  be  regarded  as 
exceptional. 


INDEX. 


ADVANCE 
GUARD. 


AMBULANCES 
AMMUNITION 


ARMAMENT 


ARTILLERY 


ATTACK 

BANDS 

BARRICADES 
BATTLE 
BATTLEFIELD 
BOLDNESS 


In  general,  Exts.  244  to  247,  p.  100. 
Comments  on,  p.  102. 
Formation  of,  Ext.  247,  p.  101. 
Morgan's  system  of,  Ext.  246,  p.  100. 
Exts.  305,  366,  p.  144;  385,  p.  150. 

Amount  carried  on  the  horse,  Exts.  367,  p.  144 ;  371,  p.  146 ;  377,  p.  148 ; 
379,  p.  149;  3SO,  p.  149. 

Amount  carried  on  wagons,  Exts.  367,  p.  144;  362,  p.  142;  366,  p.  144; 
367,  p.  144;  371,  p.  146;  377,  p.  148;  380,  p.  149. 

Comments  on  the  amount  carried,  p.  153. 

Amount  necessary,  Ext.  371,  p.  146.J 

Supplied  to  the  firing  line,  Exts.  133,  p.  54;  392  to  394,  p.  154. 

Supplied  to  the  firing  line,  comments  on,  p.  155. 

Of  Confederate  Cavalry,  See  Introduction,  pp.  12  and  16. 

Of  Forrest's  Cavalry,  Ext.  6,  p.  16;  Introduction,  p.  14. 

Of  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Introduction,  p.  7. 

Comments  on,  p.  37. 

Charged  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  73  to  76,  p.  36. 

How  to  charge,  Ext.  78,  p.  37. 

How  to  disable  horses  of,  Exts.  119  p.  51 ;  445,  446,  p.  170. 

Use  revolvers,  Ext.  77,  p.  37. 

Of  Cavalry  from  the  rear,  Ext.  229  p.  93. 

Of  river  crossing,  Exts.  207  to  211,  p.  77. 

Should  play   during  the  battle,  Exts.  101,  p.  44;    223,  p.  90;  469, 
p.  179. 

Exts.  142,  p.  56;  154,  p.  61. 

Of  Booneville,  p.  82. 

Selection  of  by  Cavalry,  Ext.  145,  p.  57. 

Eesults  in  small  losses,  Exts.  50,  51,  p.  30. 

Takes  the  place  of  numbers,  Ext.  79,  p.  38. 


Will  often  succeed  when  timidity  will  fail,  Ext.  143,  p.  56. 
BOWIE  KNIVES  Use  of,  Ext.  4,  p.  16. 
BRANDING         For  pillage,  Ext.  330,  p.  131. 
BREAD  How  made,  Exts.  381,  p.  149;  384,  p.  150. 

BREASTWORKS  Attack  of,  Exts.  143,  p.  56;  147,  p.  58;  154,  p.  61. 

Made  for  Infantry,  Exts.  133,  134,  pp.  54  and  55. 
BRIDGES  Attack  and  defense  of,  Exts  213  to  218,  pp.  78-80. 

Attack  and  defense  of,  comments  on,  p.  126. 

Construction  and  repair  of,  Exts.  307  to  316,  pp.  123-126. 

Pontoon,  Exts.  312,  314,  315,  p.  124;  366,  367,  p.  144. 

Rate  of  crossing,  Ext.  316,  p.  126. 

CALLS  Trumpet,  Ext.  466,  p.  178;  comments  on,  p.  178. 

CANTONMENT   Model,  Ext.  447,  p.  170. 

CARBINE  Use  of  dismounted,  Exts.  1,  p.  12;   12,  p.  17;   74,  p.  36;  90,  p.  41 

113  to  151,  pp.  50  60. 

Use  of  mounted,  Exts.  13,  p.  17;  24,  p.  20;  101  to  111,  pp.  44-49. 
CARE  Of  horses,  Exts.  419  to  426,  pp.  161-163;  comments  on,  p.  163. 

CAVALRY          Confederate,  Stuart's,  Introduction,  p.  11. 

Wheeler's,  Introduction,  p.  12. 

Forrest's,  Introduction,  p.  14. 

Morgan's,  Introduction,  p.  14;  Ext.  3,  p.  14. 

Mosby's,  Introduction,  p.  14. 

Driven  through  Infantry  lines,  Exts.  53,  p.  30;  471,  p.  179. 
Fight,  picture  of,  Ext.  2,  p.  13. 
Improper  use  of,  Exts.  227  to  231,  pp.  93,  94. 
Needs  young  officers,  Ext.  456,  p.  175. 
Strategic  use  of,  Exts.  295  to  306,  pp.  118-121. 
Unmounted,  how  used,  Exts  482,  p.  182;  483,  p.  183;  459,  p.  176. 
CHARGE  Against  Artillery,  Exts.  73,  p.  36 ;  75,  p.  36 ;  76,  p.  36. 

Against  bridges,  Exts.  215  to  217,  p.  79. 
Against  field  works,  Exts.  87  to  91,  pp.  41-42. 
Against  Infantry,  Exts.  55,  56,  p.  30-31 ;  79  to  83,  p.  38-39. 
As  foragers,  Ext.  24,  p.  20. 
Boot  to  boot,  Ext.  81,  p.  38. 
By  brigade,  Exts.  65,  p.  32;  69,  p.  33. 
By  division,  Ext.  65,  p.  32. 


By  regiments,  Exts.  63,  p.  32;  64,  p.  32;  66,  p.  33. 
Comments  on  the  charge,  p.  34. 

Distance  over  which  charge  can  be  made,  Exts.  411,   p.  159;   418, 
p.  160;  95,  p.  43. 

Impetuosity  of  the,  Exts.  48,  p.  29;  50,  p.  30;  51,  p.  30;  60,  p.  31;  216, 
p.  79. 

In  column  of  fours,  Exts.  86,  p.  40 ;  92,  p.  42 ;  96,  p.  43 ;  97,  p.  43 ; 
112,  p.  49;  143,  p.  56;  168,  p.  64. 

In  column  of  squadrons,  Exts.  24,  p.  20;  76,  p.  36;   93,  p.  43;  98,  p. 
43;  101,  p.  44. 

In  column  of  close  column  of  squadrons,  Ext.  56,  p.  31 ;  59,  p.  31 ; 
94,  p.  43. 

In  column  of  regiments,  Exts.  99,  p.  44;  100,  p.  44. 
In  flank,  Ext.  79,  p.  38. 

Met  by  charge,   Exts.  34,  p.  21;  57,  p.  31;  58,  p.  31;  66,  p.  33;  92, 
p.  42  ;  230,  p.  93. 

Number  of  made,  Exts.  63  to  66,  pp.  32-33. 
Ready  to,  Exts.  68,  p.  33 ;  72,  p.  34. 
Repulse  of,  Ext.  95,  p.  43. 

Time  to,  Exts.  48,  p.  29;   50,  p.  30;    51,  p.  30;  55,  p.  30;  57,  p.  31; 
58,  p.  31;  68,  p.  33;  70,  p.  34;  72,  p.  34;  79,  p.  38;  80  to  83, 

pp.  38-39;  107,  p. 48;  143,  p.  59;  153  to  159,  pp.  61-62;  181,  p.  68. 
With  blown  horses,  Ext.  417,  p.  160. 

CIVILIANS         HOW  treated,  Ext.  448,  p.  172. 

CLUBBED  GUNS  Ext.  84,  p.  39. 

COLORS  Uge  in  battle>  Ext  449>  p>  173 

COMBINED         Mounted  and  dismounted,  Exts.  152  to  170,  pp.  61-65;  219,  p.  82. 

ACTION 

With  Artillery,  Exts.  189,  p.  72;  190,  p.  72. 

Infantry,  Exts.  171  to  186,  pp.  66-70. 
COMMAND         Divided,  Ext.  243,  p.  99. 
COMMANDER     Duties  of,  Ext.  348,  p.  136. 

Position  of,  Ext.  267,  p.  108. 

Qualities  needed,  Ext.  491,  p.  186. 

COMMUNICA-Ext.  268,  p.  108. 
TIONS, 

CONFUSION        Caused  to  Infantry  by  defeated  Cavalry.  Exts.  53,  p.  30;  471,  p.  179, 
CONVOY  Of  prisoners,  Ext.  459,  p.  176. 

Railroad  trains,  Ext.  266,  p.  108. 
CORN  Green  as  forage,  Exts.  422  to  424,  p.  161. 


Parched  as  food,  Ext.  375,  p.  148. 
CORPS  Cavalry  organized  into  a,  Ext.  156,  p.  1 75. 

Correct  use  of,  Exts.  238  to  240,  p.  98. 

How  marched,  Ext.  242,  p.  99. 
COURA  GE          How  kept  u  p,  Ext.  1  ]  3,  p.  50. 
COURIERS  Exts.  284,  285,  p.  113. 

CUTTING  WAY  Exts.  220  to  226,  pp.  89-91. 

COVERING  Rear  of  retreating  army,  Exts.  192,  p.  73;  260,  p.  105;  261,  p.  106. 
Comments  on,  p.  73. 

Quick  one  essential,  Exts.  48,  p.  29;  50,  p.  30;  51,  p.  30;  68,  p.  33; 
70,  p.  34;  71,  p.  34;  72,  p.  34;  107,  p.  48;  156,  p.  62;  164,  p.  63; 
216,  p.  70. 

DECMKNT     M°*Exts-  55»  P-  -s°;  68,  p.  33;  70,  p.  34;  72,  p.  34;  82,  p.  39;  83,  p.  39; 
107,  p.  48 ;  153,  p.  61 ;  156  to  161 ,  pp.  62  63 ;  181,  p.  68. 

Cavalry  driven  through  Infantry  lines,  Exts.  53,  p.  30;  471,  p.  179. 

Troops  have  fear  of  Cavalry,  Ext.  472,  p.  179. 

Of  river  crossing,  Exts.  210  to  214,  pp.  77-78;  297,  p.  118. 

DEIT1oNlG  AC"  Exts"  191  to  206>  PP-  73-76. 

DEPLOYMENT    Not  made  till  enemy's  fire  compels  it,  Ext.  219,  p.  82. 

DISEAS  '-  S  OF  Exts.  427  to  434,  pp.  164-165. 
THK  HORSE 

Comments  on,  p.  166. 

DISPATCHES      Captured,  Ext.  293,  p.  116. 

Sent  in  duplicate,  Ext.  294,  p.  116. 
ENDURANCE      Qn  the  march,  Exts.  396  to  418,  pp.  157-160. 

Comments  on,  p.  160. 
EXPLOIT  Ext.  451,  p.  173. 

FENCE  As  a  barricade,  Exts.  115,  p.  50;  122,  p.  51. 

FIELD  WORKS    Assault  of,  Exts.  148,  p.  58;  149,  p.  59;  179,  p.  67;  181,  p.  68. 

Charging,  Exts.  87  to  91,  p.  41;  148,  p.  58;  150,  p.  60;  211,  p.  77. 

Constructing,  Exts.  133,  p.  54;  134,  p.  55;  172,  p.  66. 

Holding  of  by  cavalry,  Exts.  178,  p.  67;  186,  p.  70;  249,  p.  102. 

Number  of  men  necessary  to  man,  Ext.  172,  p.  66. 

FIGHTING    ON  Exts.  2A,  p.  14;  6,  p.  16;  113  to  151,  pp.  50-KO. 
FOOT 

Time  consumed  by,  Exts.  123,  p,  62;  129,  p.  53;  132,  p.  54. 
FIRE  ACTION     Chapter  III,  p.  47. 

With  carbine  mounted,  Exts.  101  to  111,  pp.  44-49;  219,  p.  82. 
With  carbine  mounted,  comments  on,  p.  49. 


With  carbine  dismounted  against  Cavalry,  Exts.  113  to  127,  pp.  50-52. 

With  carbine  dismounted  against  Cavalry,  comments  on,  p.  53. 

With  carbine  dismounted  against  field  works,  Exts.  147  to  151,  pp.  58-60. 

With  carbine  dismounted  against  field  works,  comments  on,  p.  60. 

With  carbine  dismounted  against  Infantry,  Exts.  128  to  146,pp.  53-57. 

With  carbine  dismounted  against  Infantry,  comments  on,  p.  58. 

With  revolver,  Ext.  112,  p.  49. 

With  revolver,  comments  on,  p.  49. 
FIRE  Discipline,  Ext.  394,  p.  155. 

Position,  Ext.  214,  p.  78. 

Shoot  down  the  enemy's,  Exts.  149,  p.  59;  209  to  214,  pp.  77-78. 

When  opened,  Exts.  128,  p.  53;  146,  p.  57;  151,  p.  60;  219,  p.  82. 
FLAG  Of  truce,  how  treated,  Ext.  452,  p.  173. 

FLANK  Attack  of,  Exts.  128,  p.  53;  176,  p.  67  ;  272,  p.  109. 

Enveloping,  Ext.  270,  p.  109. 

Protection  of  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  272,  273,  p.  109. 

Turning,  Exts.  124,  p.  52;  143,  p.  56;  153,  p.  61  ;   165,  p.  63;  180,  p.  68; 
198,  p.  74;  219,  p.  82. 

Strengthening  by  regular  troops,  Ext.  125,  p.  52. 
FLANK  GUARD  Cavalry  used  as,  Exts.  262  to  265,  p.  107. 

Comments  on,  p.  107. 
FORAGE  Allowance  of,  Ext.  388,  p.  151 ;  comments  on,  p.  152. 

Green  corn  as,  Exts.  422  to  424,  p.  161. 

How  carried,  Exts.  377,  p.  148;  379,  p.  149;  380,  p.  149;  384,  p.  150. 

How  gathered  in  hostile  country,   Exts.  372,  p.  147;  384,  p.  150; 
453,  p.  174. 

In  wagons  carried,  Exte.  362,  p,  142;  377,  p.  148;  380,  p.  149. 
Packed  on  horses  make  sore  backs,  Ext.  425,  p.  162. 

Want  of,  Exts.  376,  p.  148;  382,  p.  150;  384,  p.  150;  385,  p.  150;  387, 
p.  151 ;  389,  p.  151 ;  419,  p.  161 ;  420,  p.  161 ;  425,  p.  162. 

FORAGERS         Ext.  86,  p.  40. 

FORDING  Swift  streams,  Ext.  325,  p.  129. 

FORMATION      Comments  on,  p.  44. 

For  attack,  Exts.  152,  p.  61 ;  155,  p.  61 ;  161  to  166,  pp.  63-64 ;  226,  p.  91. 

Successive,  Exts.  191  to  206,  pp.  73-76. 

Used  in  the  charge,  Exts.  74,  p.  36;  76,  p.  36;   86,  p.  40;  92  to  101  > 
pp.  42-44 ;  143,  pf  56 ;  144,  p.  57, 


6 


GR  UND 

SC<  'UTS 
GUERRILLAS 

GUIDES 
HISTORY 
HOOF-ROT 
HORSE 


INFANTRY 
INFORMATION 


JUMPING 
HORSE 


LANE 
LANCE 


LANCERS 
LARIATS 


Exts.  68,  p.  33;  86,  p.  40;  101,  p.  44. 

Ext.  476,  p.  180. 

Use  of,  Exts.  219,  p.  82;  244,  p.  100. 

Of  U.  S.  Cavalry,  See  Introduction. 

Exts.  427  to  432,  pp.  164-165. 

As  a  weapon,  Ext.  67,  p.  33. 

Arriving,  blown  at  charging  point,  Ext.  95,  p.  43. 

Captured,  Ext.  374,  p.  148. 

Care  of,  Exts.  387,  p.  151;  419  to  426,  pp.  161-163;  comments  on, 
p.  163. 

Diseases  of,  Ext.  427  to  434,  pp.  164-165;  comments  on,  p.  166. 

Each  man  fires  holding  his  own  by  the  reins,  Ext.  127,  p.  52. 

Led  horses,  Exts.  218,  p.  80;  435  to  441,  pp.  166-167. 

Marines,  Ext.  319,  p.  127. 

As  means  of  transportation  on  the  battle  field,  Ext.  113,  p.  50. 

Recuperating  of  the,  Ext.  227,  p.  93. 

Ridden  by  recruits,  Ext.  425,  p.  162. 

Unserviceable  for  want  of  shoes,  Ext.  426,  p.  163. 

Veteran  troopers  walk  to  save,  Ext.  421,  p.  161. 

Use  of  Cavalry  to  stop  routed,  Exts.  317,  p.  127 ;  318,  p.  127  ;  320,  p.  127. 

Chapter  VII,  Exts.  277  to  294,  pp.  111-116. 

Absence  of,  Exts.  280,  p.  112;  351,  p.  137. 

By  blowing  horns,  Ext.  290,  p.  115. 

Should  be  verified,  Ext.  291  p.  116. 

Comments  on,  p.  117. 

Received  from  country  people,  Exts.  277,  p.  Ill;  278A,  p.  Ill;  28", 
p.  113. 

Received  from  strategic  use  of  Cavalry,  Exts.  295  to  306,  pp.  118-121. 

Value  of,  Ext.  442,  p.  168. 

Attack  in,  Exts.  153,  p.  61 ;  160,  p.  62;  166,  p.  64;  168,  p.  64;  169,  p.  64; 

170,  p.  65. 

As  defensive  weapon,  p.  27. 
Comments  on  use,  p.  28. 
Use  in  Mexican  war,  Ext.  45,  p.  27 ;  p.  8. 
Use  in  U.  S.,  Ext.  45,  p.  27. 
Reg.  of,  6th  Penn.  Vol.  Cav.,  pp.  8,  28, 
Ext.  450,  p.  173. 


LKADER  Good,  needed,  Ext.  479,  p.  181. 

Timid  will  fail,  Exts.  50,  p.  30;  51,  p.  31. 
LED  HORSES      Capture  of,  Ext.  438,  p.  167. 

Cause  confusion  to  troops  in  rear,  Ext.  435,  p.  166. 

Comments  on,  p.  167. 

Guard  for,  Ext.  437,  p.  166. 

How  mounted,  Exts.  440,  p.  167 ;  441,  p.  167. 

In  general,  Exts.  218,  p.  80;  435  to  441,  pp.  166-167. 

Sent  ahead  when  retreating,  Ext.  439,  p.  167. 
LINES  Of  battle,  straight,  Ext.  241,  p.  98. 

Successive,  Exts.  239,  240,  p.  98. 
LOSSES  Of  moving  target,  Ext.  114,  p.  50. 

Per  centage  of,  Ext.  484,  p.  183. 

Of  retreating  troops,  Exts.  85,  p.  39;  470,  p.  179. 
MARCHING        Of  Cavalry,  Exts.  231,  p.  94;  242,  p.  99;  396  to  418,  pp.  157-160. 

Comments  on,  p.  160. 

Dismounted  proves  exhausting  to,  Ext.  455,  p.  174. 

Distance  marched,  Exts.  396  to  418,  pp.  157-160. 

Forced  march,  Ext.  399,  p.  157. 

Rate  of,  Exts.  396  to  418,  p.  157-160. 

MARINE     CAV-  Ext.  319,  p.  127. 
ALRY 

MELEE  Carbine  vs.  Revolver,  Exts.  13,  p.  17;  478,  p.  181. 

MOMENTUM       Qf  the  charge,  Exts.  47,  p.  29 ;  86  p.  40. 

MORALE  Of  the  saber  in  charging,  Exts.  1,  p.  12 ;  2,  p.  13 ;  41,  p.  22 ;  480,  p.  181, 


MULES 


Of  troops,  Exts.  478  to  481,  pp.  181-182. 
As  mounts,  Ext.  444,  p.  169. 


NIGHT  OPERA-  Ext.  235  to  237,  pp.  96-97. 

TIONS 

Comments  on,  p.  97. 
OBJECTIVE         Strategic,  Ext.  298,  p.  119. 
ORGANIZATION  Of  U.  8.  Cavalry,  See  Introduction,  p.  6. 

Vol.  Cavalry,  See  Introduction,  p.  7. 

Comments  on  p.  175. 

Into  corps,  Ext.  456,  p.  175. 

Peace  and  war,  Ext.  457,  p.  175. 

ORDERS  What  to  do  when  none  are  received,  Ext.  492,  p.  186. 

OUTPOSTS          In  general,  Exts.  254  to  261,  pp.  104-106;  275,  p.  110. 


8 


Comments  on,  p.  106. 

Evading  the,  Ext.  448,  p.  172. 

Far  out,  Exts.  219,  p.  82;  256,  p.  105. 

Resistance  required  by,  Ext.  219,  p.  82. 

Support  of,  Exts.  254  to  258,  pp.  104-105. 

PACK  TRAINS     Exts.  366>  p    H4;   3^  p    144;   37^  p    UQ .   443>  p    m 

PARTISAN  T?xt   42   n   oo 

WARFARE     J 

PANIC  Exts.  27],  p.  109;  470  to  472,  p.  179. 

PAY  Exts.  384,  p.  150;  391,  p.  152. 

PICKETS  Resistance  required  of,  Ext.  219,  p.  82. 

Use  of,  Exts.  254  to  259,  pp.  104-105. 
PICKETING        Infantry  camp,  Ext.  227,  p.  93. 

PICKET  DUTY    £xt   419>  p    161> 

PILPLUNDER     In  General,  Exts.  330  to  336,  pp.  131-132. 

Comments  on,  p.  132. 

Effect  on  discipline,  Exts.  331,  p.  131  ;  332,  p.  131. 

Stops  pursuit,  Ext.  336,  p.  132. 

Turns  victory  into  defeat,  Ext.  334,  p.  132. 

Victory  neutralized  by,  Ext,  333,  p.  131. 

PIONEERS          Cavalry  do  the  woik  of,  Exts.  307  to  316,  pp.  121-126. 
PISTOL  In  general,  Exts.  3  to  11,  pp.  14-17;  112,  p.  49. 

Comments  on  use,  Exts.  41,  p.  22;  p.  24. 

Collective  fire  of,  Exts.  5,  p.  16;  6,  p.  16;  112,  p.  49. 

In  individual  combat,  Exts.  13  to  19,  pp.  17-19;  22,  p.  19;  36,  p.  21. 

Used  by  Artillery,  Ext.  77,  p.  37. 

Use  dismounted,  Exts.  7  to  10,  pp.  16-17. 

Use  in  the  woods,  Ext.  38,  p.  22. 

PONTOONS          Exts.  S12,  p.  124;  314,  p.  125;  315,  p.  126;  366,  p.  144;  367,  p.  144. 
PONTONIERS     Ext.  312,  p.  124. 

POSITION  FIRE  Ext.  214,  p.  78. 

POSITIONS          Selected  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  127,  p.  52;  133,p.54;  175,p.67;  184,p.69. 
PRISONERS        In  general,  Exts.  459  to  463,  pp.  176-177. 

Comments  on,  p.  177. 

How  captured,  Exts.  460  to  463,  pp.  176-177. 

Strength  of  guard  for,  Ext.  459,  p.  176. 
PURSUIT  In  general,  Exts.  337  to  343,  pp.  133-134. 


RAIDS 


Comments  on,  p.  135. 

By  dismounted  men,  Exts.  338,  p.  133;  343,  p.  134. 
How  far  kept  up,  Exts.  107,  p.  48;  123,  p.  52;  181,  p.  68;  337,  p.  133; 
486,  p.  183. 

Parallel,  Exts.  339,  p.  133;  340,  p.  134;  342,  p.  184. 

Rear,  Exts.  339,  p.  133;  341,  p.  134. 

Stopped  by  plundering,  Ext.  336,  p.  132. 

Vigorous,  Ext.  49,  p.  29. 

In  general,  Exts.  344  to  351,  pp.  135-137. 

Comments  on,  p.  138. 

Conditions  favorable  to,  Ext.  344,  p.  135. 

Damage  of  to  railroads  temporarily,  Ext.  349,  p.  137. 

Leave  Cavalry  unserviceable,  Exts.  350,  p.  137;  351,  p.  137. 

Morgan's  method,  Ext.  346,  p.  136. 

Object  of,  Ext.  347,  p.  136. 

Strategic,  Exts.  303,  p.  120;  347,  p.  13rt. 

Successful,  must  rejoin  in  safety,  Ext.  548,  p.  186. 

Capacity  of,  P^xt.  373,  p.  148. 

How  guarded,  Ext.  266,  p.  108. 

Carbines,  Exts.  74,  p.  36;  133,  p.  54;  141,  p.  56;  151,  p.  60. 

Comments  on,  p.  152. 

Amount  carried,  Exts.  366,  367,  pp.  144;  377,  p.   148;  379,  p.  149; 
380,  p.  149;  385,  p.  150. 

Carried  on  the  trooper,  Exts.  367,  p.  144;  370,  p.  145;  369,  p.  145; 
377,  p.  148;  379,  p.  149;  380,  385,  pp.  149-150. 

Carried  on  wagons,  Exts.  366,  367,  p.  144;  371,  p.  146;  377,  p.  148; 
380,  p.  150. 

Emergency,  Ext.  395,  p.  156. 

How  obtained,  Ext.  374,  375,  p.  148  ;  378,  p.  149  ;  381  to  383,  pp.  149-160. 

Given  for  supplies,  Ext.  374,  p.  148. 

Bad  for  horses,  Ext.  425,  p.  162. 

Not  to  be  depended  upon,  Ext.  464,  p.  177. 

Ext.  465,  p.  177. 

In  force,  Ext.  301,  p.  119. 

Made  by  the  commander,  Ext.  219,  p.  82. 
R  ECU  PER  AT-  Of  horses,  Ext.  227,  p.  93. 
REINFORCING   Of  Infantry  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  173,  174,  p.  67.     (  See  Combined  Action.) 


RAILROADS 


RAPID  FIRE 
RATIONS 


RECEIPTS 
RECRUITS 


RECRUITING 

RECONN  A  is- 


1(1 


REPORT 


RESERVES 


RETIRING 


RETREAT 


REVOLVERS 

REVOLVING 

RIFLES 

RIVER  CROSS 
ING 
ROADS 

ROUT 
RUSE 
SABER 


By  staff  officer,  Ext.  305,  p.  120. 

Made  in  duplicate,  Exts.  289,  p.  115;  294,  p.  116. 

Model,  Ext.  278,  p.  111. 

Carry  forward  the  firing  line,  Ext.  126,  p.  52. 

Last  formed,  Exts.  66,  p.  33;  95,  p.  43. 

Kept  mounted,  Ext.  152,  p.  61. 

No  time  to  form  on,  Ext.  153,  p.  61. 

Across  a  bridge,  Ext.  218,  p.  80. 

By  successive  formations,  Exts.  191  to  206,  pp.  73-76. 

Troops  stopped  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  317,  318,  320,  p.  127. 

Under  the  cover  of  a  vigorous  attack,  Exts.  191,  p.  73;  218,  p.  80; 
440,  p.  167;  441,  p.  167. 

Costly,  Exts.  170,  p.  65. 

Covered  by  mounted  men,  Exts.  167,  p.  64;  191,  p.  73. 

See  pistol. 

Ext.  74,  p.  37;  (See  rapid  fire  carbines.) 

Attack  and  defense  of,  Exts.  207  to  218,  pp.  77-80. 

Macadamized  cut  up  Cavalry  without  shoes,  Ext.  473,  p.  180. 

Exts.  470  to  472,  p.  179. 

Exts.  467  to  469,  pp.  178-179. 

Against  Artillery,  Exts.  73,  75,  p.  36. 

Against  foot  troops,  Ext.  83,  p.  39. 

Against  revolver,  Exts.  12,  p.  17;  17  to  23,  pp.  18-19;  38,  p.  22. 

As  cutting  weapon,  Exts.  16,  p.  18;  20,  p.  19;  21,  p.  19;  28,  p.  20; 
29,  p.  20;  37,  p.  21  ;  40,  p.  22 ;  55,  p.  30;  83,  p.  39. 

As  final  weapon,  Ext.  33,  p.  21. 

As   shock   weapon,  Exts.  26,  p.  20;   27,  p.  20;  31,  p.  20;  46  to  51, 
pp.  29-30;  60,  p.  31 ;  168,  p,  64. 

AH  thrusting  weapon,  Exts.  22,  23,  p.  19. 
Capture  of  prisoners  with,  Ext.  35,  p.  21. 
Comments  on  use  of,  p.  24,  Ext.  41,  p.  22. 
Dismounted,  Ext.  39,  p.  22. 
Individual  combat,  Exts.  15,  p.  18;  36,  p.  21. 
In  open  country,  Ext.  14,  p.  18. 
In  partisan  warfare,  Ext.  42,  p.  23. 
In  pursuit,  Ext.  49,  p.  29. 


11 


SAFE  GUARDS 
SCOUTS 


SCREENING 


SECURITY 
SHOCK  ACTION 


SHOT  GUNS 
SIGNALS 
SKIRMISHERS 
SLEEPING 

SPIES 

SQUADRON 
STEAMBOATS 
STONE  WALLS 
STRAGGLERS 


STRATEGIC 


STRATEGY 
STRATEGEM 


Need  of,  Exts.  13,  p.  17;  34,  p.  21. 

Opinion  of  by  Stuart,  Ext.  32,  p.  21, 

Use  in  woods,  Exts.  38,  p.  22 ;  44,  p.  24. 

Use  by  reserves,  Ext.  61,  p.  32. 

Ext.  454,  p.  174. 

Ground,  Exts.  68,  p.  33;  86,  p.  40;  101,  p.  44. 

Organization,  Ext.  283,  p.  113. 

Scouting  parties,  Exts.  292,  p.  116;  372,  p.  147. 

Of  main  body,  Exts.  248  to  253,  pp.  102-103;  295,  p.  118. 

Comments  on,  p.  137. 

Breaking  of  screen,  Exts.  253,  p.  103 ;  299,  p.  119. 

Formation  of  screen,  Ext.  253,  p.  103. 

Chapter  VII,  p.  100. 

Chapter  II,  p.  29. 

Against  artillery,  comments  on,  p.  37. 

Against  Cavalry,  comments  on,  p.  34. 

Against  field  works,  comments  on,  p.  42. 

Against  Infantry,  comments  on,  p.  40. 

By  successive  blows,  Exts.  52,  p.  30 ;  54,  p.  30 ;  57,  p.  31 ;  64,  p.  32 
65,  D.  32;  66,  p.  33;  84,  p.  39;  233,  p.  95. 

Ext.  25,  p.  20. 

Prearranged,  p.  86. 

Exts.  101,  p.  44 ;  110,  p.  48 ;  (  See  Fire  Action  Mounted ). 

On  the  ground  holding  the  reins,  Ext.  474,  p.  180. 

In  the  saddle,  Exts.  493  to  495,  pp.  186-187. 

Exts.  281,  282,  p.  112. 

Definition  of,  p.  5. 

Capture  of  by  cavalry,  Exts.  352  to  354,  p.  139. 

Exts.  86,  p.  40;  90,  p.  41 ;  91,  p.  42;  122,  p.  51  ;  154,  p.  61. 

Exts.  320,  p.  127;  382,  p.  150;  475  to  477,  pp.  180-181. 

How  prevented,  Ext.  476,  p.  180. 

Camp  for,  Ext.  477,  p.  181. 

Use  of,  Exts.  295  to  306,  pp.  118-121. 

Comments  on,  p.  121. 

Exts.  297,  p.  118;  302,  p.  119. 

Exts.  467  to  469,  pp.  178-179. 


12 


STREET  FIGHT 
ING 
STRENGTH 


SUBSISTENCE 
SUCCESSIVE 

SUPPLIES 

SUPPORTS 


SURPRISE 

SURRENDER 

SWIMMING 


TACTICS 


TARGETS 

TOWNS 
TRAINS 


Exts.  109,  p.  48;  232  to  234,  p.  95. 

Of  enemy,  how  determined,  Exts.  286,  287,  p.  113;  288,  p.  115;  293, 
p.  116. 

In  general,  Exts.  374  to  384,  pp.  148-150. 
On  the  country,  372  to  384,  pp.  147-150. 
Formations,  Exts.  191  to  206,  pp.  73-76. 
Blows  in  charging,  Ext.  233,  p.  95. 
In  general,  Exts.  372  to  395,  pp.  147-156. 

Of  dismounted  by  mounted  troops,  Exts.  152  to  170,  pp.  61-65;  219 
p.  82. 

Of  Infantry  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  138,  p.  56;  173,  p.  67;  174,  p.  67;  183, 
p.  69 ;  188,  p.  70. 

Of  Infantry  follow  weak  Cavalry,  Exts.  177,  p.  67;  182,  p.  69;  184 
p.  69 ;  185,  p.  70. 

Exts.  216,  p.  79;  275,  276,  p.  110. 

Good  Cavalry  should  not,  Exts.  220  to  226,  pp.  89-91. 

Streams,  Exts.  321  to  329,  pp.  128-130. 

Comments  on,  p.  130. 

By  men,  Ext.  322,  p.  128. 

By  animals,  Exts.  321  to  329,  pp.  128  to  130. 

Of  Cooke,  1862,  p.  10. 

Of  Poinsett,  1841,  p.  9. 

Of  Upton,  1873,  p.  11. 

Of  Scott,  1826,  p.  8. 

Of  Wheeler,  1863,  p.  12. 

Moving,  Ext.  114,  p.  50. 

Exts.  109,  p.  48;  232  to  234,  p.  95;  245,  p.  100;  335,  p.  132. 

In  general,  355  to  361,  pp.  140-141  ;  384,  p.  150. 

Comments  on,  p.  141. 

An  incumbrance  to  Cavalry,  Exts.  356,  p.  140;  358,  p.  140;  384,  p.  150, 

Disposition  of  during  battle,  Ext.  357,  p.  140. 

How  guarded,  Exts.  359,  p.  141 ;  367,  p.  144. 

Marching  Cavalry  in  rear  of,  Ext.  231,  p.  94. 

Pontoon,  Exts.  366,  367,  pp.  144. 

Sent  ahead  when  retiring,  Ext.  218,  p.  80. 

Should  not  be  guarded  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  228,  p.  93;  360,  p.  141. 

When  to  attack,  Ext.  361,  p.  141. 


13 


Where  marched,  Ext.  355,  p.  140. 
TOUCH  Keeping,  Ext.  279,  p.  112. 

TRENCHES         Occupied  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  425,  p.  162;  483,  p.  183. 
TRANSPORTA-In  General,  Exts.  362  to  371,  pp.  142-146. 

TION 

Comments  on,  p.  146. 

Allowance  of,  Exts.  362,  363,  p.  143;  366  to  368,  pp.  144-145;   371, 
p.  146;  377,  p.  148. 

Cavalry  with  no,  Exts.  364,  365,  p.  144. 

Of  officers  baggage,  Exts.  362,  p.  142 ;  368,  p.  145. 

TROPHIES  Exts-  484  to  488>  PP-  183-184. 

TRUMPET          Calls,  Ext.  466,  p.  178. 

Comments  on  p.  178. 

TURNING  Movements  Exts.  124,  p.  52;  128,  p.  63;  153,  p.  61;  171,  p. 66;  180,  p.  68. 

VICTORY  In  general,  Exts.  484  to  488.  pp.  183-184. 

Comments  on  p.  184. 

Causes  increased  confidence  in  leaders,  Ext.  1 15,  p.  50. 

Fruits  of,  gathered  by  Cavalry,  Exts.  143,  p.  66;  181,  p.  68. 

Fruits  of  failing  to  secure,  Ext.  485,  p.  183. 
WOODS  Cavalry  in,  Exts.  38,  p.  22;  44,  p.  '24;  83,  p.  39;  16(5,  p.  64. 

For  camp  grounds,  Ext.  348,  p.  1H(>. 
WOUNDED          In  general,  Exts.  489,  490,  p.  185. 

Comments  on  p.  185. 

Sent  ahead  when  retiring,  Ext.  439,  p.  167. 

Should  not  be  abandoned,  Ext.  489,  p.  185. 


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